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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution states, "The judicial power 
of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of general 
jurisdiction . . ., and in such other courts as the Legislature by statute may 
establish." 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-3(1953) states that "A premarital agreement 
must be in writing and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without 
consideration." 
i 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-6(1953) states as follows: 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-6. Enforcement 
(1) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against 
whom enforcement is sought proves that: 
(a) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or 
(b) the agreement was fraudulent when it was executed and, 
before execution of the agreement, that party: 
(i) was not provided a reasonable disclosure of the property or 
financial obligations of the other party insofar as was possible; 
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right 
to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other 
party beyond the disclosure provided; and 
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate 
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party. 
(2) If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or 
elimincttes spousal support and that modification or elimination 
causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a 
program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital 
dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, 
may require the other party to provide support to the extent 
necessary to avoid that eligibility. 
(3) An issue of fraud of a premarital agreement shall be decided 
by the court as a matter of law. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. New trials; 
amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for 
any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for 
a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the 
judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
ii 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either 
party was prevented from having a fair trial.. . 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
Rule 7 of The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: 
(f) Orders. 
1. (f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, 
including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a 
judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in 
the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise 
provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it 
with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered 
upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with 
an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, 
the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's 
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity 
with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be 
filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order 
shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or 
upon expiration of the time to object. 
iii 
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ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
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Telephone: (435)722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 0540000084 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The above case came before the Court for trial on July 9, 
2008. The Court has entered an order divorcing the parties and 
took the remaining issues under advisement. The Court has now 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based 
thereon, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Respondent, if he wants to retain ownership of the home 
and Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. (Brough Trucking), is 
ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00 within 90 
days of the entry of this decree. He is to notify Petitioner's 
U0u3/i 000001 
counsel within 15 days 01 entry of the dt'" '-^  • 
r e t a i t J ^ - - .- , 
2. li the Respondent does not elect to retain ownership f^ 
the home ana B:- " • T]"ir:I;.i n:j a;, pi.n Lded above, then the Petitioner 
is awarded the Neola home and property, the Respondent is awarded 
Brough '"r^c*1-" : ncr ;md the ; Respondent i ,; i Jere< to nav "Petitioner 
: • . ... inj difference in the value within 9C days ^f entry 
of the decree. 
3. Respondent is ordered to refinance the $160,000 debt to 
remove the home and Petitioner from, liability '»h lli.il liu-iii. 
4. The Pet i. 1: ioner- is awarded the vehicle she drives (subject-
to the remaining debt on it as of the date this decree is signed), 
the personal property in hei1 possessic .-. . ;.::9 property listed on 
Exhibit 24. 
• - Respondent is .awarded MM- Tema.i u.i IKJ peisonal property, 
.- „railer and the vehicle he drives. 
Neither party is awarded alimony. 
7. Rer;.:.:,i- : : A- . ed to pay to Petitioner the amount she 
has incurred in legal fees and cosis in : _is matter. The 
$15,391.53 set fore. _ i::ea as Exhibit 4,. J"» 
hours at $ 17 5 nn pe2 ., _ ^ r :;; 1 prepara11 DH and 3 hours at $17 5.00 
2 
x. U o u o / 0 
0f>0002 
per hour for trial are awarded and ordered to be paid. In 
addition, the Petitioner's counsel shall submit a supplemental 
affidavit for the time spent on post-trial matters. If Respondent 
objects to the reasonableness of that amount, he shall file a 
motion with the Court setting forth those objections and the Court 
will set for hearing those objections. 
8. Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appraisal 
performed by Brad Townsend. 
9. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver, without 
delay, any titles or other documents which are presented to either 
one by the other and whicn are necessary to effectuate the transfer 
of property as has been hereinbefore set forth. 
DATED this yjj day of August, 2008. 
son 
district Court Judge 
009013 
UuuoBO 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I. Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED & 
McCLELLAI ' at tor ne;\, rs £ :>:i : I >eti tioi i- 31. herein and hereby certify 
that ; servea the attached DECREE OF DIV0RC5- >n Respondent 1: y 
p i a c - -. l~ • - •" --^-•v . . ^ ; i t s s e d 
tO: ; 
RANDALL GAITHER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
159 WEST 300 SOUTH^BROADWAY #105 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT '84101 
and deposited the same ,
 : seal fi'J, , , j ' •- '»nstage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail ct riocseve.:, Utah, . .. :.he 7Lh 
day of August, 2008. 
CHEREE BROTHERSON 
U(HM)I) 
U u u o b 6 
DISTRICT 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0 0 55 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
ALLRED 8c McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435)722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, ) Civil No. 054000084 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
The above case came before the Court for trial on the 9th day of 
July, 2008. Petitioner was present with her attorney, Clark B Allred. 
Respondent was present with his attorney, Randall Gaither. Evidence was 
received by the Court in the form of testimony and exhibits. Argument 
was received by counsel and the Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and after being fully 
advised, makes these findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1, Petitioner was a resident of Duchesne County, State of Utah, 
and had been for more than three months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
000005 
ne Petitioner worhed l r \ tra "~ ?spcndent from 1 rKn t 1";)95. 
• " * ' * ' . :.„\d, . -- ' 1 they separated. In the 
summer • . she again started working for the Respondent at NJ 
Trucking. 
n
 On December ~ * * he part.^ started living together and 
they married on July /,r<8. 
4 -_t he *"iT.«.- ,ue parties married l he Respondent had two minor 
.^id.cri frc- a previous marriage. •.' II reasons I he.- |i.ui K-'S 
•u. __ assist the Respondent in obtaining custody of those two 
minor children. 
5. I: - .
 : . c -xau two older children who were of 
majority age 7t -*r niidrer. _nsisted t'-at fc ne Petitioner sign an 
agreemer • ,o^t^ . . . jp^r^eht t:;en owned i f the 
parties ^vjr.-a in the future. The Respondent statet that he thought 
t**e i^'n«st was dumu. rr. " .^-^ .-r _ie two children,. 
called ~:i attorney, but wi.cn -.nformea * * - '.c- cl preparing a 
prenuptial agreement elected i ;:r;te oui - - II.^ .JJJ tLaternent 
w! n - i-3p::^e:i signed which :s Respondent's exhibit 1, 
There w*s no .iscursicn cr disclosure -: vhat each ---y— ow:v-- ~'--e 
testimon ' -• t '^Jtutttu, was *...- the 
statement was only to a;p,-- to assets owned en :te dat-- of marriage and 
not tv^  turther acquirer: -,-c.^ - - __- assets. 
2 UUU366 000006 
6. At the time of the marriage, the Respondent owned a business 
called the Glass Shop that no longer exists, family property in Randlett 
(to which the Petitioner has made no claim) , a home in Duchesne that had 
a large mortgage against it, and a business called NJ Trucking. He was 
also purchasing acreage in Bandana Ranches. 
7. At the time of the marriage, NJ Trucking had some vehicles, 
trailers, and equipment. NJ Trucking had been valued at $44,000 a few 
years earlier in the Respondent's prior divorce. The cost to acquire the 
equipment that remains from NJ Trucking, based on Exhibit 27, was 
$93,124.00. Its present depreciated value is $3,151.00. The 1999 
financial records and tax return shows that NJ Trucking had gross income 
of $188,785.00. 
8. After the parties' marriage, the parties changed and expanded 
the NJ Trucking business. They bought a crane for $135,000 and other 
heavy equipment and changed the name to Brough Trucking and Crane 
Service Inc. Respondent remained the sole shareholder. In 2004, the 
year before the parties separated, the gross income had increased to 
$785,250.00. Both parties worked in the business. They seldom took 
salaries and paid most of the family and personal expenses from Brough 
Trucking. The parties personally and jointly took out a $160,000.00 
loan that was used to pay off the debt on the crane and other equipment. 
The marital home was us^d as collateral for the loan. The net value of 
3 000007 
Brough Trucking at the time of the trial is $432,000.00. See Exhibit 3 
Towi isei id appraisal. 
9. When the parties started living Together :^ -; at the beginning 
i i na ri ia ge, tl ie} ] : . .•-..-..w - was owned by the 
Respondent, That home was subject to a substantial mortgage : v.h.:: 
n: i c i 11 1 i p a ym e n t s w e r e m a d e ' . . 
payments were made from, earnings from Brough Trucking. 
10. The Petitioner, with her M ^ L lal "JT <II. 1 f lr- i;;,si o1 cm. '* t h< i 
son, remodeled the Duchesne house, including making a room ou: :: zh -
patio, adding walls and windows, taking out a sliding glass door 10 ope^: 
up an area.; painting, installing sheet lock, carpet and siding; and 
replacing the old shower with <\ new bathtub. She also remode,! ed the 
i .JVJFJIU L LI L r S ell "id ad:led a vva.l I , ,Aw . \ Lucked, painted and added carpet 
downstairs, put in light fixtures, and did yard work, 
f!hr>i't ].y a f.]-<••> r Hie part ies niai r i n J i ii Septenibei ( »1 1 ()i'^<» „ tlie 
Respondent's son, Bryan, age 14 , came to live with the parties. He 
wanted to go to school in Roosevelt. Just prior to t:he j: • a i t:i es stax; ti i Ig 
to live together, the Respondent had purchased a shop in Roosevelt from 
Drillers Inc. to use for Brough Trucking. That shop was dir ty and 
* - e ir -'jpaii s. The pai ties decided to construct living quarters in the 
Roosevelt: shop so that they could move •_ - Roosevelt. 
.•-. se ] f ] : i 11 ; :i 11 i assistai ice of 
her children and the Respondent's children, built a bedroom, bathroom 
000364 0OU008" 
and living area upstairs in the Roosevelt shop including sheet rock, 
tile work and carpet. Downstairs, she put in 2 bedrooms, a kitchen, 
cleaned the shop and added floor tiles to the shop. Carpets were added 
to all living areas and an office was constructed downstairs. 
13. In August of 1999, the Respondent's youngest daughter, Amanda, 
age 12, came to live with the parties. The parties and the children 
moved from Duchesne and started living in the Roosevelt shop. 
14. The parties then started looking for a more suitable home or 
property on which to construct a home. The Petitioner looked at many 
properties but did not find anything acceptable to both parties. In the 
summer of 2000, the parties were talking to a Clare Duncan who said he 
had some acreage for sale. The parties went and looked at the property, 
approximately 18 acres near Neola, Utah, and made an offer of 
$50,000.00. That offer was accepted and the transaction closed on 
August 3, 2000. The parties paid $20,000 down and jointly signed a note 
for the balance of $30,000.00. The property was deeded jointly to the 
parties. The $20,000.00,down payment was paid from Brough Trucking just 
as all other bills were paid from Brough Trucking. 
15. The parties then took plans and hired a general contractor. 
Construction on the home started in early 2001. The Petitioner was 
responsible for coordinating the work. She went to the construction 
site on a daily basis. In addition to coordinating with the 
contractors, she picked up materials and also worked on the home. The 
s uio'o63 0u0009 
home is a log home, and the Petitioner was the person that chinked (put 
putty) between the logs. 
16. The Respondent then fired the general contractor so the 
Petitioner took over the completion of the home. Additionally, in the 
summer of 2001, the Respondent broke his leg and was unable to help on 
the home or to work at Brough Trucking. The Petitioner did the 
insulating of the home, completed the sheet rock, built a fruit room, 
constructed a gun room tor the Respondent, and painted, wallpapered and 
carpeted the home. The parties and the Respondent's two children moved 
into the home at Thanksgiving of 2001. The following summer (2002), the 
Petitioner did the landscaping, including putting in the yard, trees and 
an orchard, sprinkling system, fire pit and painting the fences. Later, 
she constructed a deck and swimming pool. 
17. The monies for constructing the home were paid primarily from 
Brough Trucking and some payments were made from the Respondent's 
personal checking account and some from the Petitioner's personal 
checking account. 
18. The present value of the home is $325,000.00 which is less 
than the parties paid to construct the home. It ;Ls jointly owned by the 
parties. 
19. During the marriage, the Respondent worked at Brough Trucking 
(except for the year summer of 2 0 01 to the summer of 2 0 02 when his leg 
was broken). The Petitioner was involved in the remodeling and building 
e 000010 
of the living quarters, the maintaining of the home and family and also 
worked at Brough Trucking. The parties seldom took salaries from the 
business. W2 records show the Petitioner was only paid $3,360 in 1999, 
$10,640.00 in 2000, $8,880 in 2001, $7,680.00 in 2002 and $6,876.00 in 
2003. Both parties maintained separate checking accounts. The 
Petitioner deposited her checks in her account and then used those 
monies on the home, the family, and expenses for both her children and 
the Respondent's children. Respondent deposited his monies in his 
account and used those to pay child support and legal fees in the early 
part of the marriage and for personal and family expenses during the 
marriage. Since the parties took minimal salaries, almost all living 
expenses, food, utilities, transportation, housing (including the 
remodeling of the shop and Duchesne house, mortgage payments and 
building of the home) wepre paid with checks or credit cards from Brough 
Trucking. 
20. The Respondent claimed that he should have credit against the 
value of the home for premarital assets that were sold. However, the 
evidence did not support that claim. He was unable to trace those assets 
and monies. The evidence showed that monies from the sale of assets 
were used for purposes other than the home including paying operating 
expenses of Brough Trucking when the Respondent had a broken leg. 
21. Respondent claimed that the money from the sale of the Bandana 
Ranch was used for the down payment of the 18 acres in Neola where the 
home was built. First, that property was paid for during the marriage. 
Secondly, the 18 acres in Neola closed on August 3, 2000. The Bandana 
Ranch was not sold until August 24, 2000 and the account the $18,512 
went into was used to pay many different living and personal expenses. 
22. Respondent claimed the money from the sale of the Duchesne 
shop should be a credit. He sold that shop on May 3, 1999. The down 
payment of $28,983 was two years before the home was constructed and the 
monies went into the general account at NJ Trucking and was spent for 
expenses of NJ Trucking. The balance of the purchase price was 
apparently received in 2000 (a year before the home was constructed) and 
also went into the Brough Trucking general account and was used for 
Brough Trucking expenses!. 
23. Respondent also claims a credit of $30,000 for a rig he sold 
in June 2000 and other equipment he sold in 2000. Again, those sales 
occurred well before the construction of the home, those monies went 
I 
into the general account at Brough Trucking and they were spent before 
the land was bought or the home was constructed, 
24. Respondent also makes a claim for the $24,702.00 received from 
the sale of the Duchesne home in April 2002. That home had been 
substantially improved and remodeled by the Petitioner and marital 
monies were used to pay mortgage and taxes on the property. There was 
no showing where that money was deposited and no showing it was used on 
the Neola Home. 
8 *.. bUluUU 0G0012 
25. On October 9, 2002, the parties borrowed and jointly signed a 
promissory note for $160,000.00. The home was used as collateral. The 
money was used to pay off the loan on the crane and other equipment. 
Respondent testified that, because of his broken leg and his inability 
to work for a year, the money was needed to keep Brough Trucking 
operating. The money apparently was used to pay off the debt on the 
crane and some other vehicles to reduce the monthly obligations of 
Brough Trucking. 
26. After completing the home, the parties decided to further 
expand Brough Trucking. In March 2 0 04, they purchased 80 acres in 
Ballard to be used for a gravel pit and fill dirt. The 80 acres was 
titled in Brough Trucking. Petitioner remodeled an old trailer house 
which was moved to the property to be used as a scale house and office. 
That remodeling included framing, insulation, sheet rock, and wiring. 
The purchase price for the 8 0 acres was paid by Brough Trucking. 
27. In May 2004, the parties jointly acquired 4 acres with 
utilities adjacent to the 80 acres. The 4 acres were titled in the 
names of the parties as joint tenants. The purchase price was paid by 
Brough Trucking. The parties then deeded that property to Brough 
Trucking. 
28. The Petitioner was the primary person involved in raising the 
Respondent's two children. She helped and encouraged them in school, 
Uouobj 000013 
did the cooking, cleaning and laundry. She also paid some of their 
expenses from her bank account. 
29. Shortly after Amanda turned 18, she and the Petitioner had an 
argument. The Respondent then told the Petitioner to vacate the home. 
The Petitioner vacated the home on August 1, 2005, taking very few 
personal items with her. She came back the next day and loaded some 
items into a horse trailer. The Respondent, however, took back the 
horse trailer with most of the items. 
30. The personal property is all used property and has minimal 
value. The values listejd by the Respondent are either new values or 
exaggerated. 
31. After the parties separated, the Petitioner obtained 
employment as a laborer with Stanco Insulation. She presently resides 
with her mother. She has purchased a used trailer she is setting up 
next to her mother. Her present net monthly income is $1,656.00 and her 
expenses are $1,695.00 per month. 
32. The Respondent has continued to reside in the home and operate 
Brough Trucking and continues to pay his personal expenses thru Brough 
Trucking. 
33. Petitioner has incurred legal fees and costs in this matter. 
The affidavit of the Petitioner's attorney shows that she had incurred 
$15,391.53 in fees thru July 2, 2008. He testified that he had incurred 
an additional 10 hours in preparation prior to trial at $175.00 per 
io .. Ububoi 000014 
hour. In addition, there was the time of trial and the post-trial work. 
The affidavit sets forth in detail the work that was provided and the 
hourly rates charged. In addition, the Petitioner paid $400.00 for the 
appraisal of the home. 
34. The Petitioner has made some payments on her legal fees but, 
based on her income and expenses, she has not been able to pay those 
fees and she does not have the means to pay the additional fees incurred 
in preparation for the trial and the trial. 
35. Respondent did not request reimbursement of legal fees in his 
pleadings. At trial, he requested that he be reimbursed for the costs 
incurred in providing information to the appraiser of Brough Trucking. 
There is also approximately $7,000.00 still owing for that appraisal. 
The appraisal of Brough Trucking was based on an order of the Court. 
Respondent was ordered tb pay that expense with the Court reserving the 
right to reallocate that expense. The appraisal was needed and helpful 
to the Court in valuing the assets and deciding the division of the 
assets. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes: 
1. The one paragraph prenuptial agreement was not negotiated by 
the parties. There was no disclosure of assets in the prenuptial 
agreement and it was prepared mainly to appease the older children. It 
was intended to be limited to what the Respondent owned at the time of 
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the marriage as listed on that document. Items listed included the Glass 
I 
Shop, the family properties in Randlett, and the assets in NJ Trucking 
at the time of the marriage. At the time of the marriage, the 
Respondent had also purchased the Roosevelt shop, and had the Duchesne 
shop and the Duchesne home. Those properties were not listed on the 
agreement, were not disclosed and became marital properties because of 
the marital funds used 'to pay for and enhance those assets and the 
enhancements and improvements made by the Petitioner.1 The facts that the 
Petitioner improved the other assets, signed jointly on a $160,000.00 
loan and worked in the i business also support the position that the 
agreement was limited to assets and debts existing at the time of the 
marriage. 
2. The Glass Shop no longer exists and there was no evidence that 
any of its value remains. The Petitioner made no claim to the Randlett 
properties. There was little evidence as to the value of NJ Trucking at 
the time of the marriage. The best evidence was the $44,000.00 value at 
the Respondent's prior divorce. 
3. The monies from the sale of the Duchesne shop were deposited 
in the general bank account of Brough Trucking and used for general 
expenses of Brough Trucking. Those monies were received prior to the 
construction of the home and were not used in the home. Since there is 
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ^[24-25; arid Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 
V 11120, 27. 
no showing or tracing of those monies to the home, there should be no 
credit given against the value of the marital assets. 
4. The parties changed the nature of NJ Trucking and changed its 
name to Brough Trucking. Petitioner was actively involved in Brough 
Trucking and in the parties' successful efforts to increase its business 
and its value. She was also actively involved in enhancing the assets 
of Brough Trucking. She remodeled the Roosevelt shop and increased its 
value. She also built the scale house for the 80 acres. She cosigned 
on the $160,000.00 note,to pay for the crane and other vehicles. The 
monies to buy the crane,jvehicles and land for Brough Trucking all came 
from earnings during the marriage. The parties did not treat Brough 
Trucking as a separate entity but paid all marital bills and living 
expenses from Brough Trucking. The business and personal expenses were 
commingled to make it impossible to determine what was personal and what 
Wcis business. Even though Brough Trucking's stock was in the 
Respondent's name, it is a marital asset less the $44,000.00 value at 
the time of the marriage. 
5. The Roosevelt shop, though titled in the Respondent's name is 
used in and is part of Br,ough Trucking. The valuation of Brough Trucking 
by Mr. Townsend included the value of the shop. As noted above, the 
Petitioner greatly enhanced the value of that shop by cleaning it and 
building living quarter^ on the shop. The shop should be included in 
Brough Trucking and is a marital asset. 
6. The Duchesne house was subject to a mortgage when the parties 
married which mortgage was paid from earnings during the marriage. The 
home was also remodeled and improved by the Petitioner during the 
marriage. The monies from the sale of the house were deposited in a 
general account which was spent for general living and business 
expenses. There was no tracing or showing that the monies from the sale 
of the Duchesne house went into the Neola house. In addition, those 
monies became marital assets because of the use of earnings during the 
marriage to pay the mortgage and taxes and the remodeling by the 
Petitioner. 
7. The Bandana Ranch property was being purchased during the 
marriage with earnings from the marriage. The money from the sale of 
that property did not go to the down payment on the Neola property, as 
claimed by the Respondent, but was spent on general expenses. There 
i 
should be no credit against marital assets given for those monies. 
8 . The Respondent also claimed credit for a rig and other 
property he asserted that he sold and used the proceeds to pay on the 
Neola house. The Respondent originally denied having any documents to 
support his claim of premarital assets. Shortly before trial, he 
provided some documents and tried to introduce additional documents at 
trial which the Court refused to receive because they had not be timely 
disclosed. There was evidence of $3 0,000.00 from a rig. There was no 
evidence showing that those monies went into the home, but rather those 
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funds went into the Brough Trucking account and were spent on Brough 
Trucking expenses.2 
9. The Neola home was purchased jointly by the parties and 
remains titled in both parties' names. The Petitioner was the primary 
person involved in the construction of that home, including doing much 
of the construction herself. The monies for the construction of the home 
came from earnings in Brough Trucking, from Petitioner's account where 
she deposited her salary and from the Respondent's account where he 
deposited his salary. It is a marital asset. 
10. The Petitioner was actively involved in the expansion of 
Brough Trucking, she remodeled two living quarters and built the Neola 
home, she raised the Respondent's two children thru their teenage years 
and she was the person doing the cleaning and meals. The Respondent's 
position, that all property was premarital and that Petitioner should 
get no interest in it, would leave the Petitioner, at age 55, with 
nothing. The small wage she was paid results in less social security 
when she reaches retirement age than if she had been working for full 
wages. Fairness and equity require that she receive one half of the 
value of the Neola home and Brough Trucking (less $44,000.00).3 Brough 
2Dunn v Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 (Ut.App. 1990) pre marital assets 
that have been consumed, commingled etc loss their separate 
status. 
3 
Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). See also Haumont v. Haumont, 793 
15 0GU019 
Trucking has a value of $492,000.00 less $44,000.00 and the house has a 
value of $325,000.00. Therefore, the Respondent, if he wants to retain 
ownership of the home and Brough Trucking, should be ordered to pay to 
the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00. In the alternative, the 
Petitioner should be awarded the Neola home and property with a value of 
$325,000.00 and the Respondent awarded Brough Trucking and the 
Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner the difference of $61,500.00 and to 
refinance the $160,000.00 debt to remove the home and Petitioner from 
liability on that loan. 
11. The Petitioner should also be awarded the vehicle she drives, 
subject to the remaining debt on it as of the date the decree is signed 
and the personal property in her possession and the property listed on 
Exhibit 24. Respondent should be awarded the remaining personal 
property, the horse trailer and the vehicle he drives. 
12. Petitioner waived her claim to alimony as her income presently 
meets her expenses. However, her income is not sufficient to pay her 
legal fees and costs. The financial declaration received by the Court 
seems to be accurate and the expenses listed thereon are reasonable. 
P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Qliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ^20; Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) (using marital funds to 
make installment payments on separate property changes it to marital 
property); and Mortensen V. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) (listing 
many factors the court considers). 
16 
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The Respondent has had the benefit of Brough Trucking to pay his 
expenses and legal fees and he has resided in the home. The Respondent 
should be ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for the legal fees she has 
incurred. The amount of legal fees as set forth on the Affidavit 
submitted by Petitioner's attorney were necessary and the fees charged 
are reasonable.4 In addition, the Petitioner incurred 10 more hours in 
preparation and the time incurred for trial and post-trial work. An 
additional affidavit should be submitted as to the additional time 
incurred. 
13. The cost for j:he appraisal of Brough Trucking was needed for 
the valuation of the business. The Respondent should be required to pay 
the balance owing on that bill. There is no basis to award the 
Respondent for expenses incurred by his secretary to provide information 
to the appraiser. The Respondent, having the full control of Brough 
Trucking, has the much greater ability to pay the expenses including 
appraisal costs and legal fees in this case. 
DATED this l^G day of August, /^Qp"6 . 
/*"V B/JTME /COUR' 
John K. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
4Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner herein and hereby certify 
that I served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
on Respondent by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an 
envelope addressed to: 
RANDALL GAITHER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
159 WEST 300 SOUTH |BROADWAY #105 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 7th 
day of August, 2008. 
CHEREE BROTHERSON 
,,,un 0UU022 J600 
t KATHRYN CURFEW BAUM AM IN NO WAY ASSOCIATED WITH AND HOLD NO CLAIM TO 
ANY PERSONAL PROPERTIES, ASSETS OR MONEY OF RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, N.J. 
TRUCKING INC., THE GLASS STORE, ANY PERSONAL OR FAMILY PROPERTIES. ALSO I WILL 
NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEBTS THAT OCCURE FROM AN Y OF THE ABOVE PROPERTIES. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEBTS THAT KATHRYN 
CURFEW BAUM HAS ACQUIRED. 
A KATflRYN CURFEW BAUM 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH 
+u+m*+m+^>*lmm+m+m+***m*m*m0*i 
RONNIE J MIEURS 
NotoiyPubOe 
STATE OF UtAH 
MyComm. Expire JUN 5.1990 . 
SSg 100 NroOSEVEtfUT 640*6] 
HoTA/LI 
0udi)23 
! 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
Katliiyn C Biough, : 
: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Pelitionei, * And Decree 
vs 
Richaicl James Brough, 
Respondent 
Having come on legulaily loi tual on July 9, 2008, Randall Gaithei appealing foi the 
Respondent, and Claik Allied appealing foi the Petitionei Evidence having been adduced, aigument 
having been made, and the Court having taken the mattei undei advisement now makes and issues the 
following 01 dei, findings of fact, conclusions of law and deciee 
The Court heaid testimony abcjmt the ten yeai marnage and the contributions put into the mamage 
by both parties Theie was a pienuptial agieement piepared by the Petitionei at the insistence of the 
Respondent's adult childien 
This was a fifth mamage foi Mrs Biough and a fourth mamage foi Mi Biough 
The Petitioner did not ask foi alimony Theie aie no children born as issue oi the mamage 
Dining the couise oi the mamage, the parties acquned additional business assets and a home The Court 
is of the opinion that Mis Biough would be entitled to the value of the business as it acciued and giew 
fiom the date of the mamage The Couit is also of the opinion that the Petitionei is entitled to one-hall of 
tin net equih in the home that was built in Neola The paities have stipulated to the ical estate appiaisal 
which indicated a value of appioximately $312,000 
Theexpeit appraiser Biad To\Vnsend, piescnted documentation and was cioss-examined via 
telephone conference and he determined that the piesent existing value of the business was $492,000 An 
examination oi the appraisal documents and interpolation of the value of the business beiore oi at the date 
of the prenuptial agieement was approximately $ 
Fiom the foiegomg intioductory obsei vations, the Court now makes and enteis its 
t Case No 054000084 
1 
; Judge John R Anderson 
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FINDINGS OF PACT 
1. The parties were married in July of 1998. 
2. The prenuptial agreement wa& prepared by the Petitioner and was entered into primarily to satisfy 
the Respondent's adult children. 
3. During the course of the marriage, the Petitioner contributed to the marital estate by working and 
first of all improving the Duchesne home, and secondly assuming the role of Mom to the 
Respondent's children. She disciplined them, went to the school functions and was successful in 
getting both children to and graduating from high school ' 
4 As the marital estate grew from the expansion of the business, the Petitioner worked hard in 
keeping books, acting as secretary and doing household duties, all of the cooking, all ol the 
cleaning, all of the child problems, and single handedly took on constructing an apartment in the 
place of business housing the oilfield moving company now known as Brough Trucking and 
Crane. 
5. After deciding the Apartment! in the shop owned by Brough Trucking was uncomfortable and 
unreasonable, the parties acquired an interest in land in Neola from Mr. Duncan. The land 
purchase was in August, 20001 During the construction of the Neola home, the general contractoi 
was fired al about its first stage of completion. The evidence adduced that the Petitioner sole 
handedly finished the home, chinked all of the logs, refinished the second floor, insulated the 
second floor and the roof, hung sheetrock, finished the sheetrock, painted, and by her efforts, 
painted the home in total. The evidence adduced also indicated that she built a deck, decking 
around the home, and installed a swimming pool. From the evidence, it is apparent that the 
earnings from Brough Trucking were used to pay family expenses, mortgage payments on the 
home, and for other necessities. The funds from Brough Trucking were co-mingled. The parties 
were fairly conservative in their spending. 
6. During the course of the marriage and post prenuptial agreement, the company acquired a crane for 
$130,000, two Kenworth trucks in the year 2000, bought another red Kenworth truck, a Chevrolet 
Yukon, a Chevrolet pickup, and JLI one-ton truck. The record also indicated they purchased two 
vehicles for Amanda, which was^the Respondent's young daughter. Evidence also showed that the 
company purchased a $50,000 trailer, a Catepillar tractor, and bought a big loader. The step??? 
trailer was used in oilfield moving. It's valued on the sheets prepared by the appraiser at the present 
depreciated rate. 
7 Tiie Couri finds from inspection of financial statements and interpreting the appraisal that the 
business then known as N.L. Trucking was worth $200,000 at the date of the marriage. At the date 
ol the separation, the Respondent ordered the Petitioner out of the family home She packed up a 
few items m a horse trailer and left without an argument. 
8. (Itemize here the personal property in dispute....which ] don't know since I wasn't there) 
The Couri would observe that the only thing hardei than raising teenagers is raising someone else's. 
0u0Q25 
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9. The evidence adduced that the Respondent had an accident and broke his foot m July 2001 and was 
out of heavy duty work for approximately one year. In order to keep funding the company and to 
make some purchases, to wit thje crane, the Respondent borrowed $160,000 against the real estate to 
cover that. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes and utters it 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I The prcnuptial agreement, white valid as such, only protected the property of the Respondent up to 
the date of marriage. Anything 'acquired or any increases irom that date become marital property 
2. The log house in Neola is marital property. 
3. Because there is such a disparity in income of the parties, the Petitioner will be awarded her 
attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this day of July, 2008 
BY THE COURT; 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Eighth District Court Judge 
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Sunrise Title Company 
PLAINTIFF') 
EXHIBIT NO. JHIB/T 
a unnse 11 ue company • ,7,» *• " ^ u -7 r\ 
550 East 200 North 118-3 I ^^OBNCB^T^^^ 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 fOL£f?K 
Re; Misc. 
entry jLKjpwvn ao 
Book- 921j Page 671 $10.00 
15-APR-0p 12:00 
RANDY SIMMONS 
RECORDER!, UINTAH COUNTY. UTAH 
SUNRISE JTITLE COMPANY 
550 E 200 N (11 ft-3) ROOSEVELT. UT 3*066 
Rec By: CONNIE SIMPER . DEPUTY 
Mail Tax Notice To: 
S/N 14:019:0029 
E n t r y 2005002793 
B<Brbu|3arucldB^ge 671 
& Crane Service, Inc. 
P.O. Box 367 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
WARRANTY DEED 
RICHARD J. BROUGH AND KATH Y BROUGIJgrantors of Roosevelt, County ofDuchesne, State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
BROUGH TRUCKING AND CRANE SERVICE, INC. 
grantees of Roosevelt, County ofDuchesne, State of Utah, for the sum of TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS, and other 
good and valuable considerations, the following described tract of land in Uintah) County, State of Utah: 
! 
Commencing at the Southeast Corner of SECTION 18, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, UINTAH 
SPECIAL MERIDIAN; thence North 89°11'19" West a distance of 18*5.64 (feet along the South line of said 
Section and North 1°19'27M East a distance of 451.22 feet to the TRUE POINT, OF BEGINNING; thence North 
89°ll f19" West 259.65 feet; thence North ^WIV1 East 470.00 feet; thence East 620.00 feet, more or less; thence 
Southerly 140.00 feet, more or less; thence North 89°11,I9" West 350.00 feet; thence South l°19'27n Wert 333.00 
feet to beginning. I 
(Parcel 1) 
Easement for Right-of-way: Commencing at the Southeast Corner of SECTION 18, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, 
RANGE 1 EAST, UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN; thence North BSPll'lP" West 1545.64 feet along the South 
line of said Section and North 1°19'27" East 924.22 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence East 40 
feet; thence South 924.22 feet; thence West 40 feet; thence North 92422 feet to beginning, as created in Corrected 
Easement for Right-of-way recorded May 4,2004 as Entry No. 2004003326 in Book 881, at Page 142, records of 
Uintah County, Utah. 
(Parcel 2) 
INCLUDING all improvements and appurtenances thereto belonging. 
SUBJECT TO rights-of-way and easements of record and/or enforceable in law and equity. 
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all gas, oil and other mineral*. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantors, this 
£5L^«/^C 
*vf-
)ss, 
STATE OF UTAH 
County ofDuchesne 
On this <?'"^ day of August, 2004^ before me, the undersigned Notary Public in and for said County and 
State, personally appeared RICHARD J. BROUGH AND KATHY BROUGH [ M) personally known to me] [ ( 
) proved tome on the basis of satisfactory evidence] to be the persons whose names Have subscribed to this instrument 
and acknowledged to me that they executed it. 
y1 
00*be 
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"DEBORAH 
550 E. 200 N.II 
ROOSEVELT, UT 6 
w hand and official scaly MM' 
Notary Public in and ity and State 
NORMAN, TOWNSEND & JOHNSON 
I '%! 1 .. f LLC 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC A C C O U N T A N T S 
Forensic Accounting, Valuation, and Economic Loss Consultants 
July 8, 2008 
Clark Allred 
Allred & McClellan, P.C. 
148 South Vernal Ave., Suite 101 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Re: Fair market value of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking and 
Crane Service, Inc. on a control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31,2007 
Dear Mr. Allred: 
Norman, Townsend & Johnson, LLC (NTJ) has been retained to estimate the fair market value of 
100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. (Brough Trucking 
or the Company) on a control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31, 2007. We have also been 
asked to value NJ Trucking, Inc. as of the time of marriage of Richard Brough and Kathy 
Brough. We were unable to determine a value for NJ Trucking, Inc. at the time of marriage due 
to the lack of sufficient documentation and the inability to retroactively inspect the business' 
assets to compensate for the lack of documentation. Attached is our summary valuation report 
for Brough Trucking. 
We have performed a valuation engagement and present our summary report in conformity with 
the "Statement of Standards for Valuation Services No. 1" (SSVS) of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants. Our study was undertaken using widely accepted principles of 
financial analysis and valuation. The standard of value is fair market value. 
The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms defines fair market value as: 
"The price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would change hands 
between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, 
acting at arras length in an open an unrestricted market, when neither is under compulsion 
to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." 
In preparing this valuation we have relied upon historical financial information which Brough 
Trucking provided. We did not make independent examinations of any financial statements or 
other information provided by management which was relied upon and, accordingly, we make no 
representations or warranties nor do we express any opinion regarding the accuracy or 
reasonableness of such. 
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Since valuation is an imprecise science, NTJ does not purport to be a guarantor of value. Value 
is a question of informed judgement, and reasonable persons can differ in their estimates of 
value. NTJ does certify that this valuation study was conducted using conceptually sound and 
commonly accepted valuation methods. 
In the opinion of the undersigned appraiser, using the valuation methods described in the 
attached summary report, and subject to the assumptions and limiting conditions incorporated 
herein, the fair market value of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking on a 
control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31, 2007, is: 
$492,000 
Four Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Dollars 
Brad Towiisend, MBA, CPA/ABV, DABFA 
Norman, Townsend & Johnson, LLC 
INTRODUCTION 
IDENTITY OF CLIENT 
Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC (NTJ) has been retained by Kathy Brough in the divorce 
proceedings of Kathy Brough v. Richard Brough to provide valuation services. This valuation 
report shall not be provided to any party other than the Court, the parties to this action, and their 
respective legal counsel without the written consent of NTJ. 
PURPOSE AND INTENDED USE OF THE VALUATION 
We understand that the results of our analysis will be used for establishing the fair market value 
of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking as of December 31, 2007 (the valuation 
date). The purpose of this valuation is to determine the value of Brough Trucking for use in the 
divorce proceedings of Kathy Brough v. Richard Brough. 
IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT ENTITY AND SUBJECT INTEREST 
We have been asked to provide an estimate of the fair market value of 100 percent of the 
common stock in Brough Trucking on a control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31, 2007. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE APPRAISAL AND THE DATE OF THE REPORT 
In this summary report we have determined the fair market value of 100 percent of the common 
stock of Brough Trucking on a control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31, 2007. The date 
of the report is July 8, 2008. 
PREMISE OF VALUE 
The premise of value is going concern. The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms 
defines "Going Concern" as uan ongoing operating business enterprise," and "Going Concern 
Value" as "the value of a business enterprise that is expected to continue to operate into the 
future. The intangible elements of going concern value result from factors such as having a 
trained work force, an operational plant, and the necessary licenses, systems, and procedures in 
place." 
STANDARD OF VALUE 
The standard of value used in this report is fair market value. Fair market value is defined in the 
International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms as "the price, expressed in terms of cash 
Page 1 
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equivalents, at which property would change hands between a hypothetical willing and able 
buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arms length in an open and unrestricted 
market, when neither is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable 
knowledge of the relevant facts." 
DUE DILIGENCE SUMMARY 
In connection with our analysis, we have made such reviews, analyses and inquiries as we have 
deemed necessary and appropriate under the circumstances. 
• We analyzed the Company's historical income statements for the periods ending 
December 31, 2001 through 2007. 
• We analyzed the Company's historical balance sheets as of December 31,2001 through 
2007. 
• We analyzed certain other publicly available financial data relevant to the analysis 
including: Federal Reserve statistical releases; Morning Star SBBI Valuation Edition 
2007 Yearbook; Duff & Phelps, Risk Premium Report; financial data and SEC reports for 
the selected guideline companies; and other miscellaneous information. 
• We conducted such other studies, analyses and inquiries, as we have deemed appropriate. 
We have not independently verified the accuracy and completeness of the information supplied 
to us with respect to the Company and do not assume any responsibility with respect to it. We 
have made physical inspection of the assets of the Company. 
RESTRICTIONS OR LIMITATIONS IN THE SCOPE OF WORK OR DATA 
AVAILABLE 
None 
ADDITIONAL THIRD PARTY SPECIALISTS RELIED UPON IN THIS VALUATION 
ENGAGEMENT 
The parties to this divorce agreed to engage Ron Liese to appraise the business equipment. We 
have relied upon his appraisal to determine value of the equipment owned by Brough Trucking. 
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VALUATION APPROACHES AND METHODS USED 
As part of the valuation of Brough Trucking we have analyzed the value of the company using 
the income approach and the asset approach. Within the income approach we have used the 
capitalized net income and capitalized cash flow methods. 
We have applied a weighting of 100 percent to the value determined using the asset approach. 
The asset approach acts as a floor, or minimum, value for a business entity. 
DISCLOSURE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 
None 
CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE VALUATION ASSIGNMENT 
We have performed a valuation engagement, as that term is defined in the Statement of Standards 
for Valuation Services No. 1 (SSVS) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking on a control, nonmarketable basis as of 
December 31, 2007. Subject to the Statement of Assumptions and Limiting Conditions, based 
upon our analysis as described in this summary valuation report, and the facts and circumstances 
as of the valuation date, the fair market value of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough 
Trucking as of December 31, 2007, on a control, nonmarketable basis is (See Schedule A): 
$492,000 
Four Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Dollars 
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ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITING CONDITIONS 
This valuation is subject to the following assumptions and limiting conditions: 
1. Information, estimates, and opinions contained in this report are obtained from 
sources considered to be reliable. However, we assume no responsibility for such 
sources. 
2. The company and its representatives warranted to us that the information they 
supplied was complete and accurate to the best of their knowledge and that the 
financial statement information reflects the company's results of operations and 
financial condition. Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC has not independently 
verified such information, and we express no opinion regarding such information. 
3. ' Possession of this report, or a copy thereof, does not carry with it the right to 
publish all or part of it, nor may the report be used for any other purpose without 
the previous written consent of the appraiser, and, in any event, only with proper 
authorization. This valuation report shall not be provided to any third party 
without the written consent of Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC. 
4. No investigation of titles to property or of any ownership claims to the property by 
any individuals or company has been undertaken. Unless otherwise stated in our 
report:, title is assumed to be free and clear of encumbrances and as provided to 
the appraiser. 
5. The terms of our engagement are such that we have no obligation to update this 
report or to revise the valuation because of events and transactions occurring 
subsequent to the date of the report. 
6. We are not required to give testimony in court, or be in attendance during any 
hearings or depositions, with reference to the company being valued, unless 
previous arrangements have been made. 
7. Unless otherwise provided for in writing and agreed to by both parties in advance, 
the extent of the liability for the completeness or accuracy of the data, opinions, 
comments, recommendations and conclusions shall not exceed the amount paid to 
the appraisers for professional fees, and then only to the party(s) for whom this 
report was originally prepared. 
8. The valuation of a business enterprise is a matter of informed judgment. The 
accompanying valuation has been prepared on the basis of information and 
assumptions set forth in this report and the attached exhibits. An actual 
transaction in the shares may be concluded at a higher value or lower value, 
depending on the circumstances surrounding the company, the appraised business 
interest, and the motivations and knowledge of both the buyers and sellers at that 
time. Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC does not guarantee the values 
individual buyers and sellers may reach in an actual transaction. 
0C0033 
The conclusions of value in this report are effective as of December 31, 2007, 
only and are to be used in the legal proceedings of Brough v. Brough. 
Valuation reports may contain prospective financial information, estimates, or 
opinions that represent the view of the appraiser about reasonable expectations at 
a particular point in time, but such information, estimates, or opinions are not 
offered as predictions or as assurances that a particular level of income or profit 
will be achieved or that specific events will occur. 
We assume that there are no hidden or unexpected conditions of the business or 
liabilities that would adversely affect value, other than as indicated in this report. 
CERTIFICATION 
We certify that, to the best of our knowledge and belief: 
1. The statements of fact in this report are, to the best of our knowledge, true and 
correct. 
2. The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited only by the reported 
assumptions and limiting conditions, and are our personal, impartial, and unbiased 
professional analyses, opinions, and conclusions. 
3. Neither the consultant nor any officer, agent, or employee of Norman Townsend 
& Johnson, LLC has any present or prospective interest in the property that is the 
subject of this report, and we have no personal interest with respect to the parties 
involved. 
4. We have no bias with respect to the property that is the subject of this report or to 
the parties involved with this engagement. 
5. Our engagement in this assignment was not contingent upon developing or 
reporting predetermined results. 
6. Compensation paid to Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC for completing this 
assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of a 
predetermined value or direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the 
amount of the value opinion, the attainment of a stipulated result, or the 
occurrence of a subsequent event directly related to the intended use of this 
appraisal. 
7. Our analyses, opinions, and conclusions were developed, and this report has been 
prepared in conformity with the Statement on Standards for Valuation Services as 
established by the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants for 
conducting and reporting on business valuations. 
8. This report was prepared under the direction of R. Brad Townsend, MBA, CPA/ 
ABV, DABFA. No one provided significant professional assistance other than 
professional staff of Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC. 
R. Brad Townsend, MBA, CPA/ABV, DABFA 
NORMAN TOWNSEND & JOHNSON, LLC 
July 8, 2008 
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Schedule A 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Summary of Value 
Weighted 
Schedule Value Weight Value 
Income Approach to Value 
Capitalized Net Income B $ 118,432 0 0% $ 
Capitalized Cash Flow C 123,644 0.0% 
Asset Approach to Value 
Adjusted Book value E 492,453 100.0% 492,453 
100.0% 
Control, Marketable Value $ 492,453 
Rounded $ 492,000 
Schedule B 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Capitalization of Adjusted Net Income 
Year 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Schedule 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Adjusted 
Net Income 
$ 4,400 
6,798 
(3,401) 
31,481 
12,918 
8,290 
47,972 
Weight 
Factor 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Weighted 
Net Income 
$ 
31,481 
12,918 
8,290 
47,972 
Total 
Weighted Average Net Income 
Divide by: Capitalization Rate 
Control/Marketable Operating Value of Company 
Indicated Value of Company on a Control, Marketable Basis 
Marketability discount at 10.0% 
Estimated Value on a Control, Nonmarketable Basis 
$ 
$ 
$ 
100,660 
25,165 
19.12% 
131,591 
131,591 
(13,159) 
118,432, 
0 u U 0 3 7 
Schedule C 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Capitalization of Projected Cash Flow 
Projected Net income 
Depreciation 
Capital Expenditures 
Debt Repayments 
Working Capital Needs 
Cash Flow 
$ 25,165 
25,150 
(25,795) 
1,089 
$ 25,609 
Calculation of Value 
Cash Flow 
Divide by: Capitalization Rate 
Indicated Operating Value of Company on Control, Marketable Basis 
Indicated Value of Company on a Control, Marketable Basis 
Less Discount for Lack of Marketability at 
Estimated Operating Value on a Control, Nonmarketable Basis 
$ 25,609 
18.64% 
$ 
10% 
$ 
137,382 
137,382 
(13,738) 
123,644 
0u0038 
Schedule D 
Brouuh Trucldng aad Crane Service, Inc. 
Adjusted Income Statements 
For Years Endiag December 31,2001-2007 from Tax Returns 
l,K«„* (S-lo.) S643.Q92 S43S.813 
Adj«>tcd 
Adjustment* Nolo 1003 
Adjusted 
Nutw 1004 
Accounting & Legal 
Advertising 
Dank Clui/gc.% 
CunipcuxuiioD ufOflii.cn 
GmlribtflioiK 
Delivciy UIIJ I'fcitKt 
OUCA ucxl Suli*cri|>tH>n<i 
Fuel Jt Oil 
GilU 
In-ufiince 
Interest 
M u U A tiilciluiuMKnt 
MisKollajlCilUN 
Oflite Kxpcnse 
Oul>ide Service. 
rtumolioo* 
llcnUi 
Repair* and Muintcnaocc 
Suluric. und Wayes 
So|.,.lic.i 
Tuxe> u.iJ liccnxa. 
Tulephon. 
2.740 
1.436 
2.740 
1.436 
1.S00 
1.946 
I.S0Q 
1.946 
2,157 
1.985 
3 J. 526 
19.228 
137 
1.261 
176.336 
S07 
1.191 
3H.357 
KSACA 
J 30.741 
23.452 
4.297 
7.53J 
51.833 
972 
32.270 
34.526 
19.221 
(M.442) 
1461 
176.336 
807 
1.191 
38.357 
85.400 
130.748 
23.452 
4.297 
7.533 
51.221 
1.319 
12.162 
$9,912 
27.133 
2ft 
937 
114.124 
550 
693 
20.549 
32.049 
60.981 
20.019 
4.081 
2.234 
51.221 
1.319 
12.162 
59.912 
27.133 
2B 
(10.938) 
937 
114.824 
550 
693 
20.549 
32.049 
60.981 
20.019 
4.061 
2.234 
41.254 
1.009 
9.769 
48,295 
12.836 
30 
U 7 7 
161.159 
675 
5459 
38.026 
55,304 
90J39 
17.469 
4.196 
11.231 
41.2S4 
1,009 
9.769 
48,295 
12.836 
30 
(17.883) 
1.377 
161.159 
675 
5459 
38.026 
55.304 
90.339 
17,469 
4.196 
11,231 
50.397 
1.409 
32.251 
56.263 
4.603 
185 
2.170 
247.751 
525 
14.413 
36.710 
95.451 
97.561 
20.962 
4.622 
16.621 
50.397 
1.409 
32.251 
56.263 
4.603 
185 
(17.959) 
2.170 
247.751 
525 
14.413 
36.710 
95.451 
97.561 
20.962 
4.622 
16.621 
19 
8.H6 
.-1 AJJiutnicab 
Scoit'io 179 Dcfvccluiion 
t<on£-Turi>i Cupilul Cuin 
..I.I K-l Adju.tn.niU 
M-l Ailju>lmcnb 
OcpiucisliOH 
Travel and Enterinmmcn 
Tciicltlci 
I'uUl M-l AdjiulaiciuiU 
lb«h Nee t.H...mc 
tocianc Tax Adjustment «l 
Nd IiKvtnr After Tucw 
13.525 
(83B) 
(28) 
(350) 
13.733 
(1.295) 
(28) 
(350) 
(30) 
(3.280) 
$ (3.280) S 
(769) 
648 
(121) 
C 
(30) 
(4.049) 
S (3.401) 
3.399 
(5.996) 
$ 34.078 S (Z597) 
A) Adjusted lut fuiroui>cn cninpcnution. 
U) Adjusted lur pcruinal expense*. 
C)Adjunei)loru\M. 
CD 
O 
CD 
CD 
CO 
co 
SBJ3.366 S 431.795 
AJjiafcn! 
AJJmtmtwto Nolo 1006 
$431,795 $403,977 
_A£i 
ZB88 
1.086 
593 
46.388 
1.2K5 
56.158 
9.045 
52 
284.227 
2.014 
17.076 
28.629 
117.868 
132.807 
30.693 
5490 
23.067 
10.361 
46.388 
1.285 
56.158 
9.045 
52 
(19.978) 
284.227 
Z 0 N 
17.07G 
28.629 
117.868 
132.807 
30.693 
5490 
23.067 
66.670 
41.325 
50 
252 
7.356 
2.895 
15.644 
24.450 
111.718 
70.693 
23.846 
4.734 
5.414 
6.151 
1.28* 
16.372 
1.100 
10 
20.153 
729 
66.670 
41,325 
. 2.561 
2.016 
-
11.097 
7.356 
2.895 
15.644 
24.450 
1 M.7I8 
70.693 
23.846 
4.734 
5.414 
10.930 
153420 
17.128 
40.178 
90.897 
24.554 
. 
-
2.561 
I5.S20 
17.128 
40.178 
90.897 
(1.963) 
(2.461) 
S 17,341 fM23) 
(3.890) 
(1.579) 
(2445) 
(9.137) 
$ 8490 S 59354 $ (U.382) 
Schedule E 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service 
Adjusted Balance Sheets 
As December 31, 2007 
Adjusted 
2007 Adjustments Notes 2007 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash $ 2,566 $ 2,566 
P/R Advances -
Total Current Assets 
Other Assets 
Deposit (Progressive/ WCF) 
Loans to Shareholders 
Total Other Assets 
Fixed Assets 
Land 
Machinery & Equipment 
Accumulated Depreciation 
Total Fixed Assets 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt 
Other Current Liabilities 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-Term Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Loans from Shareholders 
Total Long-Term Liabilities 
Shareholders' Equity 
Capital Stock 
Beginning Balance 
Ordinary Income (Loss) 
K-l andM-1 Additions 
K-l and M-l Deductions 
Distributions 
Total Shareholders" Equity 
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity 
Control, Marketable Value 
Less: Discount for Lack of Marketability 
Noncontrol, Nonmarketable Value 
Notes: 
A) Adjusted land and building for appreciation, added value 7/8ths of the 81.03 acre 
property and the value of the 4 acre property. 
B) Adjusted equipment values to appraisal done by Ron Liese. 
C) Adjusted retained earnings to reflect prior adjustments. 
2,566 
1,938 
1,938 
50,000 
493,342 
(442,661) 
100,681 
$ 105,185 $ 
$ 5,337 
7,522 
12,858 $ 
10,879 
21,773 
32,651 
10,000 
40,438 
13,758 
(4,521) 
59,675 
$ 105,185 $ 
-
-
179,126 
(134,292) 
442,661 
487,495 
487,495 
-
-
487,495 
487,495 
487,495 
A 
B 
B 
C 
10% 
2,566 
1,938 
1,938 
229,126 
359,050 
588,176 
$592,680 
$ 5,337 
7,522 
12,858 
10,879 
21,773 
32,651 
10,000 
527,933 
13,758 
(4,521) 
547,170 
$592,680 
$547,170 
(54,717) 
$492,453 
Schedule F 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service 
Summary of Equipment and Apprasicd Vaiue 
Apprasial Done by Ron Liese 
ITEM UNIT U YEAR DESCRIPTION APPRAISED VALUE COMMENTS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
n 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
2007 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
2004 
2003 
1998 
1991 
1978 
1979 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
1980 
2000 
1982 
1984 
1998 
1998 
2001 
1989 
1981 
1980 
1981 
1981 
1995 
1980 
1981 
N/A 
44 
Pressure Washer 
Tool Box with Tools 
A.O. Smith DC Welder 
Metal Chop Saw 
Air Compressor 
Cutting Torch w/Valves, hose and cart 
Hobart Welder 
Transmission Jack and Engine Hoist 
Clean Bum Waste Oil Shop Heater 
Clean Bum Waste Oil Shop Heater 
Pneaumatic Jack 
Dell Dimensions E520 Computer 
Dell 966 
Skill 8 Inch Drill Press 
1 Inch Air Impact Wrench 
Heavy Duty Electric Grinder 
966D Wheel Loader w/GP Bucket, Teeth, EROPS, 26.5 X 25 Tires, NOTE: 
No Serial Number available for this asset and not able to determine year of 
MFG. Value based upon photo as provided by owner. 
Portable Welder Trailer w/Vise, Torch, work area 
4 Bay Steel Framed and Sided Shop and Office, NOTE: No square footage 
and no land size provided by owner. 
Chevrolet 2500 4X4 Crew Cab Pickup VINI GCGK13U73F166854 
GMC 3500 4X4 Dually Flatbed Rig Up Truck w/Gin Poles, Winch, 
VIN1GDJK34284E395030 
GMC Yukon 4X4 SUV VIN1GKEK13R8WJ33114 w/V8, Auto Trans. 
GMC Top Kick S/A Winch Rig Up Truck VIN1GDM7H1J7MJ507072 
Kenworth W900 T/A Winch Tractor VIN not provided 
Kenworth W900 T/A Boom Truck VINI79627S W/National Hyd. Crane 
Capacity Unknown 
Kenworth W900 T/A Winch Tractor VIN161965S 
Kenworth W900 T/A Winch Tractor VIN1NKWGGGGX07883843 
Grove 35 Ton Hydraulic Truck Crane No Crane SN available NOTE: Unable 
to determine boom legnth and diesel power unit MFG. Valued as average 
condition 
Caterpillar 930 Wheel Loader No SN w/ Gp Bucket, Enclosed Cab, 17.5 X 25 
Tires 
See Item # 17 Cat 966D already valued N/A 
Lufkin T/A Spread Axle Step Deck Trailer 1L01B4823W1130788 
SPCN T/A Single Srop Lowboy Trailer VINUTTT17965 
XL110HD 50 Ton 3Axle Double Drop Detachable Gooseneck Trailer 
VIN4U3J053371L003085 
Commercial 40 ft. T/A Flatbed Trailer VINILOB4525K1084640 
Traileze 3 Axle Lowboy Trailer w/Mechanical Folding Gooseneck Trailer 
VIN1DA73E398BM006692 
Lufkin T/A Flatbed Trailer VINIL01B3627B1059246 
Lufkin T/A Flatbed Trailer VINI L01B321XB159058 
Fufkin T/A Flatbed Float Trailer VIN not available 
Ranco T/A Single Gate Belly Dump Trailer VIN1R9BSE507SL008490 
Load King T/A Single Gate Belly Dump Trailer VIN8907 
Blue and Red Skid Mount Fuel Tank w/Pump 
2 Each Silver Fuel Tanks w/pumps 
Parts Not Able to Value without Inspection N/A 
80 Acres In Ballard NOTE: Not able to value with limitedinfonnation and no 
ability to establish comparable sale data N/A 
$200 Fair Condition 
400 Fair Condition 
100 Poor Condition 
200 Good Condition 
300 Fair Condition 
100 Fair Condition 
500 Good Condition 
700 Good Condition 
800 Good Condition 
800 Good Condition 
300 Fair Condition 
400 Good Condition 
100 Good Condition 
300 Good Condition 
250 Fair Condition 
100 Fair Condition 
40,000 Good Condition 
1,000 Fair Condition 
Unable to Vaiue with limited data 
12,000 Good Condition 
20,000 Good Condition 
3,000 Fair Condition 
16,000 Good Condition 
8,000 Fair Condition 
32,000 Good Condition 
14,000 Fair Condition 
50,000 Good Condition 
35,000 Fair Condition 
12,000 Fair Condition 
9,000 Good Condition 
3,000 Fair Condition 
32,000 Good Condition 
2,500 Fair Condition 
12,000 Fair Condition 
4,500 Good Condition 
4,500 Good Condition 
4,500 Good Condition 
12,000 Good Condition 
4,500 Fair Condition 
10,000 Fair Condition 
12,000 Good Condition 
Total Appraised Value Fair Market Value $359,050 
Schedule G 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Calculation of Capitalization Rate 
Risk-free Rate at December 31, 2007 
Average Equity Risk Premium 
Micro-Cap Size Premium 
Company Specific Risk Premium 
Composite Cash Flow Discount Rate 
Additional Increment for Earnings Discount Rate 
Net Earnings/Cash Flow Discount Rate 
Less: Expected Earnings Growth Rate 
Net Earnings/Cash Flow Capitalization Rate 
Adjustment for Current Year Net Income/Net Cash Flow Capitalization Rate 
Current Year Net Jncome/Net Cash Flow Capitalization Rate 
For 
Net Income 
4.50% 
7.10% 
6.27% 
5.00% 
22.87% 
0.50% 
23.37% 
3.56% 
19.81% 
103.56% 
19.12% 
For 
Cash Flow 
4.50% 
7 10% 
6.27% 
5.00% 
22.87% 
0.00% 
22.87% 
3.56% 
19.31% 
103.56% 
18.64% 
OuO 
Schedule H 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Consumer Price Index 
1996 - 2007 
Average 
Annual 
Year 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Index 
156.9 
160.5 
163.0 
166.6 
172.2 
177.1 
179.9 
184.0 
188.9 
195.3 
201.6 
207.3 
Growth 
2.95% 
2.29% 
1.56% 
2.21% 
3.36% 
2.85% 
1.58% 
2.28% 
2.66% 
3.39% 
3.23% 
2.83% 
Average Compounded Growth Rate 
2.56% 
Sources: 
www.bis.gov 
Schedule I 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Income Statements 
For Years Ending December 31,2001-2007 from Tax Returns 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Income (Sales) 
Deductions 
Accounting & Legal 
Advertising 
Bank Charges 
Compensation of Officers 
Contributions 
Delivery and Freight 
Depreciation 
Dues and Subscriptions 
Fuel & Oil 
Gifts 
Insurance 
Interest 
Meals & Entertainment 
Miscellaneous 
Office Expense 
Outside Services 
Postage 
Promotions 
Rents 
Repairs and Maintenance 
Salaries and Wages 
Supplies 
Taxes and Licenses 
Telephone 
Tires 
Travel 
Utilities 
Total Deductions 
Ordinary Income 
K-l Adjustments 
Sections 179 Depreciation 
Capital Gain/Investment Income 
Total K-l Adjustments 
M-l Adjustments 
Depreciation 
Travel and Entertainment 
Penalties 
Total M-l Adjustmennts 
$ 643,092 
1,800 
2,069 
48 
24,480 
26 
51,833 
972 
32,270 
34,526 
19,228 
137 
1,261 
176,336 
807 
1,191 
38,357 
85,460 
130,748 
23,452 
4,297 
7,533 
16,298 
653,129 
(10,037) 
1,750 
1,750 
$438,813 
2,740 
1,436 
125 
19,380 
51,221 
1,319 
12,162 
59,912 
27,133 
28 
937 
114,824 
550 
693 
20,549 
32,049 
60,981 
20,019 
4,081 
2,234 
11,702 
444,075 
(5,262) 
(28) 
(350) 
(378) 
$508,006 
1,800 
1,946 
155 
41,254 
1,009 
9,769 
48,295 
12,836 
30 
1,377 
161,159 
675 
5,259 
38,026 
55,304 
90,339 
17,469 
4,196 
11,231 
9,127 
511,256 
(3,250) 
(30) 
(30)* " 
$785,250 
2,157 
1,985 
25 
11,888 
50,397 
1,409 
32,251 
56,263 
4,603 
185 
2,170 
247,751 
525 
14,413 
36,710 
95,451 
97,561 
20,962 
4,622 
16,621 
19 
8,846 
706,814 
78,436 
(44,173) 
(44,173) 
(185) 
(185) 
$843,366 
2,888 
1,086 
25 
6,066 
206 
32,150 
593 
46,388 
1,285 
56,158 
9,045 
52 
284,227 
2,014 
17,076 
28,629 
117,868 
132,807 
30,693 
5,290 
23,067 
10,361 
807,974 
35,392 
(18,000) 
(18,000) 
(51) 
(50 
$431,795 
6,151 
1,288 
2,631 
1,100 
10 
20,153 
729 
66,670 
41,325 
50 
252 
7,356 
2,895 
15,644 
24,450 
111,718 
70,693 
23,846 
4,734 
5,414 
10,930 
418,037 
13,758 
$403,977 
2,561 
2,016 
11,097 
632 
153,220 
17,128 
40,178 
90,897 
24,554 
342,283 
61,694 
(2,500) 
160 
(2,340) 
Book Net Income $ (8,287) $ (5,640) $ (3,280) $ 34,078 $ 17,341 $ 13,758 59,354 
0G0044 
Schedule J 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Common-Size Income Statements 
For Years Ending December 31,2001-2007 from Tax Returns 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Income (Sales) 
Deductions 
Accounting & Legal 
Advertising 
Bank Charges 
Compensation of Officers 
Contributions 
Delivery and Freight 
Depreciation 
Dues and Subscriptions 
Fuel & Oil 
Gifts 
Insurance 
Interest 
Meals & Entertainment 
Miscellaneous 
Office Expense 
Outside Services 
Postage 
Promotions 
Rents 
Repairs and Maintenance 
Salaries and Wages 
Supplies 
Taxes and Licenses 
Telephone 
Tires 
Travel 
Utilities 
Total Deductions 
Ordinarj' Income 
K-l Adjustments 
Sections 179 Depreciation 
Long-Term Capital Gain 
Total K-l Adjustments 
M-l Adjustments 
Depreciation 
Travel and Entertainment 
Penelties 
Total M-l Adjustments 
100.0% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
3.8% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
8.1% 
0.2% 
5.0% 
0.0% 
5.4% 
3.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.2% 
27.4% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.2% 
6.0% 
13.3% 
20.3% 
3.6% 
0.7% 
1.2% 
0.0% 
2.5% 
101.6% 
A.6% 
0.0% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
100.0% 
0.6% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
4.4% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
11.7% 
0.3% 
2.8% 
0.0% 
13.7% 
6.2% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.2% 
26.2% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.2% 
4.7% 
7.3% 
13.9% 
4.6% 
0.9% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
2.7% 
101.2% 
-1..2% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
-0.1% 
-0.1% 
100.0% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
8.1% 
0.2% 
1.9% 
0.0% 
9.5% 
2.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.3% 
31.7% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
1.0% 
7.5% 
10.9% 
17.8% 
3.4% 
0.8% 
2.2% 
0.0% 
1.8% 
100.6% 
-0.6% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
100.0% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
1.5% 
. 0.0% 
0.0% 
6.4% 
0.2% 
4.1% 
0.0% 
72% 
0.6% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.3% 
31.6% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
1.8% 
4.7% 
12.2% 
12.4% 
2.7% 
0.6% 
2.1% 
0.0% 
1.1% 
90.0% 
10.0% 
-5.6% 
0.0% 
-5.6% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
100.0% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.0% 
0.7% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
3.8% 
0.1% 
5.5% 
0.2% 
6.7% 
1.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
33.7% 
0.0% 
0.2% 
2.0% 
3.4% 
14.0% 
15.7% 
3.6% 
0.6% 
2.7% 
0.0% 
1.2% 
95.8% 
4.2% 
-2.1% 
0.0% 
-2.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
100.0% "" 
1.4% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
0.6% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
4.7% 
0.2% 
15.4% 
0.0% 
9.6% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
1.7% 
0.7% 
0.0% 
3.6% 
5.7% 
25.9% 
16 A% 
5.5% 
1.1% 
1.3% 
0.0% 
2.5% 
96.8% 
3.2% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
100.0% 
0.0% 
0.6% 
0.0% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
2.7% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.2% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
37.9% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
4.2% 
9.9% 
22.5% 
0.0% 
6.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
84.7% 
15.3% 
-0.6% 
0.0% 
-0.6% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
Book Net Income -1.3% -1.3% -0.6% 4.3% 2.1% 3.2% 14.7% 
Schedule K 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service 
Balance Sheets 
As of Year End December 31,2001-2007 from Tax Returns 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash 
P/R Advances 
Totnl Current Assets 
2001 
(6,107) 
(6,107) 
2002 
893 
406 
1,299 
2003 
3,852 
90 
3,942 
2004 
795 
795 
2005 
2,081 
2,081 
2006 
2,566 
2007 
2,566 $ 210 
210 
Other Assets 
Other Assets 
Loans to Shareholders 
Total Other Assets 
Fixed Assets 
Land 
Machinery & Equipment 
Accumulated Depreciation 
Total Fixed Assets 
1,941 
67,601 
69,542 
50,000 
323,650 
(185,313) 
188,337 
1,938 
1,938 
50,000 
386,744 
(236,534) 
200,210 
1,940 
1,940 
50,000 
386,744 
(277,788) 
158,956 
1,940 
54,078 
56,018 
50,000 
495,525 
(372,358) 
173,167 
1,941 
54,078 
56,019 
50,000 
493,342 
(422,508) 
120,834 
1,938 
1,938 
50,000 
493,342 
(442,661) 
100,681 
10,431 
10,431 
50,000 
495,842 
(456,258) 
89,584 
Total Assets $ 251,772 $ 203,447 164,838 229,980 178,934 105,185 $100,225 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt 
Other Current Liabilities 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-Term Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Loans from Shareholders 
Total Long-Term Liabilities 
42,441 
5,779 
201,839 
42,441 
2,409 
162,524 
42,441 
1,805 
62,624 
4,921 
42,441 $ 
4,816 
127,799 135,564 111,186 
5,337 
7,522 
32,651 
$ 5,567 
9,471 
48,220 
201,839 
44,850 
162,524 
44,246 
113,976 
13,823 
67,545 
111,741 
23,823 
47,257 
87,363 
23,823 
12,858 
10,879 
21,773 
15,038 
4,845 
21,773 
26,618 
Shareholders'Equity 
Capital Stock 
Beginning Balance 
Ordinary Income (Loss) 
K-l andM-1 Additions 
K-l andM-1 Deductions 
Distributions 
Total Shareholders' Equity 
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity 
10,000 
33,192 
(10,037) 
1,750 
(33,192) 
1,713 
10,000 
(8,287) 
(5,262) 
(378) 
(3,927) 
10,000 
(13,927) 
(3,250) 
(30) 
(7,207) 
10,000 
(17,207) 
78,436 
(44,358) 
26,871 
10,000 
16,871 
35,392 
(18,051) 
(23,721) 
20,491 
10,000 
40,438 
13,758 
(4,521) 
59,675 
10,000 
49,677 
61,694 
160 
(2,500) 
(60,462) 
58,569 
203,447 164.838 229,980 178,934 105,185 $100,225 
0G0O46 
Schedule L 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service 
Common-Size Balance Sheets 
As of Year End December 31, 2001-2007 from Tax Returns 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash 
P/"R Advances 
Total Current Assets 
Other Assets 
Deposit (Progressive/ WCF) 
Loans to Shareholders 
Total Other Assets 
-2.4% 
0.0% 
-2.4% 
0.8% 
26.9% 
27.6% 
0.4% 
0.2% 
0.6% 
1.0% 
0.0% 
1.0% 
2.3% 
0.1% 
2.4% 
1.2% 
0.0% 
1.2% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
0.3% 
0.8% 
23.5% 
24.4% 
1.2% 
0.0% 
1.2% 
1.1% 
30.2% 
31.3% 
2.4% 
0.0% 
2.4% 
1.8% 
0.0% 
1.8% 
0.2% 
0.0% 
0.2% 
10.4% 
0.0% 
10.4% 
Fixed Assets 
Land 
Machinery & Equipment 
Accumulated Depreciation 
Total Fixed Assets 
Total Assets 
19.9% 
128.5% 
-73.6% 
74.8% 
J00 0% _ 
24.6% 
190.1% 
-116.3% 
98.4% 
100.0% __ 
30.3% 
234.6% 
-168.5% 
96.4% 
100.0% 
21.7% 
215.5% 
-161.9% 
75.3% 
100.0% 
27.9% 
275.7% 
-236.1% 
67.5% 
100J)% _ 
' 47.5% 
469.0% 
-420.8% 
95.7% 
100.0% 
49.9% 
494.7% 
-455.2% 
89.4% 
100.0% 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt 
Other Current Liabilities 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-Term Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Loans from Shareholders 
Total Long-Term Liabilities 
16.9% 
2.3% 
80.2% 
20.9% 
1.2% 
79.9% 
25.7% 
1.1% 
27.2% 
2.1% 
23.7% 
2.7% 
77.5% 58.9% 62.1% 
5.1% 
7.2% 
31.0% 
5.6% 
9 4% 
19.2% 
80.2% 
O0%_ _ 
22.0% 
79.9% 
0.0% _ 
26.8% 
69.1% 
8,4% __ 
29.4% 
48.6% 
_ J04% _ 
26.4% 
48.8% 
13.3% __ 
12.2% 
10.3% 
20.7% _ 
15.0% 
4.8% 
21,7% 
26.6% 
Shareholders* Equity 
Capital Stock 
Beginning Balance 
Ordinary Income (Loss) 
K-l andM-1 Additions 
K-l andM-1 Deductions 
Distributions 
Total Shareholders' Equity 
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity 
4.0% 
13.2% 
-4.0% 
0.7% 
0.0% 
-13.2% 
0.7% 
100.0% __ 
4.9% 
-4.1% 
-2.6% 
0.0% 
-0.2% 
0.0% 
-1.9% 
J00.0% ___ 
6.1% 
-8.4% 
-2.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
-4.4% 
100.0% __ 
4.3% 
-7.5% 
34.1% 
0.0% 
-19.3% 
0.0% 
11.7% 
100,0% __ 
5.6% 
9.4% 
19.8% 
0.0% 
-10.1% 
-13.3% 
11.5% 
_ipo,o%_ __ 
9.5% 
38.4% 
13.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
-4.3% 
56.7% 
_ _ .100.0% _ 
10.0% 
49.6% 
61.6% 
0.2% 
-2.5% 
-60.3% 
58.4% 
1000%^ 
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Schedule M 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Statement of Cash Flows 
For the Years Ending December 31, 2002 - 2007 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Ntt Income 
Cash Flow from Operating Activities 
Depreciation 
Change in P/R Advances 
Change in Deposits 
Change in Current Liabilities 
Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities 
Cash Flows from Investing Activities 
Change in Machinery & Equipment 
Change in Loans to Shareholders 
Net Cash Flow from Investing Activities 
Cash Flow from Financing Activities 
Change in Current Long-Term Debt 
Change in Notes Payable 
Change in Loans from Shareholders 
Change from Tax to Internal R/E 
Section 179 Depreciation 
Distributions 
Net Cash Flow from Financing Activities 
Net Increase (Decrease) in Cash 
Beginning Cash 
Ending Cash 
$ (5,640) 
51,221 
(406) 
3 
(3,370) 
41,808 
(63,094) 
67,601 
4,507 
(39,315) 
(39,315) 
7,000 
(6,107) 
__$ 893 
$ (3,280) 
41,254 
316 
(2) 
(604) 
37,684 
-
-
(48,548) 
13,823 
(34,725) 
2,959 
893 
$ 3,85_2_ 
$ 34,078 
50,397 
90 
3,116 
87,681 
(108,781) 
(54,078) 
(162,859) 
20,183 
(2,235) 
10,000 
44,173 
72,121 
(3,057) 
3,852 
$ 795 
$ 17,341 
32,150 
(1) 
(105) 
49,385 
2,183 
2,183 
(20,183) 
(24,378) 
18,000 
(23,721) 
(50,282) 
1,286 
795 
$ 2,081 
$ 13,758 
20,153 
3 
2,706 
36,620 
0 
54,078 
54,078 
(37,104) 
(76,484) 
(2,050) 
29,947 
(4,521) 
(90,213) 
485 
2,081 
_$ 2,566 
$ 59,354 
11,097 
(8,493) 
1,949 
63,907 
(2,500) 
(2,500) 
230 
(6,034) 
0 
2,500 
(60,462) 
(63,765) 
(2,357) 
2,566 
J 208 
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Schedule N 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Calculation of Marketability Discount 
Average 
Restricted Stock Studies Discount 
SEC, Overall Average 25.80% 
Milton Gelman 33.00% 
Management Planning Study 27.10% 
Robert Trout 33.50% 
Robert Moroney 35.60% 
Michael Maher 35.40% 
Standard Research Associated, Inc. 45.00% 
Silber Study 33.80% 
Average Marketability Discount 33.65% 
Schedule O 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Pre-IPO Studies 
Robert W. Baird & Co. Studies 
Calculation of Value of Marketability as Illustrated in Initial Public Offerings 
of Common Stock 
Study 
1995-1997 
1994-1995 
1991-1993 
1990-1992 
1989-1990 
1987-1989 
1985-1986 
1980-1981 
Number of IPO 
Prospectuses 
Reviewed 
732 
318 
443 
266 
157 
98 
130 
97 
2241 
Number of 
Qualifying 
Transactions 
Willamette Manajgement Associates Studies 
91 
46 
54 
35 
23 
27 
21 
13 
310 
Discount 
Mean 
43% 
45% 
45% 
42% 
45% 
45% 
43% 
60% 
44% 
Median 
42% 
45% 
44% 
40% 
40% 
45% 
43% 
66% 
43% 
Summary of Discounts for Private Transaction P/E Multiples 
Compared to Public Offering P/E Multiples Adjusted for 
Changes in Industry P/E Multiples 
Time Period 
1975-78 
1979 
1980-82 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Number of 
Companies 
Analyzed 
17 
9 
58 
85 
20 
18 
47 
25 
13 
9 
17 
27 
36 
51 
31 
42 
17 
34 
14 
22 
13 
Number of 
Transactions 
Analyzed 
31 
17 
113 
214 
33 
25 
74 
40 
19 
19 
23 
34 
75 
110 
48 
66 
22 
44 
21 
28 
15_ 
Median 
Discount 
54.7% 
62.9% 
55,5% 
60.7% 
73.1% 
42.6% 
47.4% 
43.8% 
51.8% 
50.3% 
48.5% 
31.8% 
51.7% 
53.3% 
42.0% 
58.7% 
44.3% 
35.2% 
49.4% 
27.7% 
31.9% 
48.4% 
0u0050 
Schedule P 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
Analysis of Factors Impacting Discount for Lack of Marketability 
Factor 
Baseline Marketability Discount Based on Results of Restricted Stock and 
Pre-IPO Studies 
Factors Impacting Marketability 
Financial Statement Analysis 
Capital Structure (Debt v. Equity) 
Dividend/Distribution Policy 
Nature of the Company 
Management 
Amount of Control in Subject Shares 
Impact on Lack of 
Marketability 
Discount Notes: 
33% Baseline indicator of discount derived from Restricted Stock and Pre-IPO Studies (See 
Schedules N and O) 
Neutral 
Decreases 
Discount 
Neutral 
Increases 
Discount 
Neutral 
Decreases 
Discount 
The Company has experiences both losses and net income. Recent years have generated 
positive income. 
The Company has a low level of debt compared to fair market value of equity. 
The Company has made distributions in the past. 
The Company operates in an industry that experiences frequent cycles in growth and 
retraction. 
Strength of management is reasonable. 
Control position has the ability to operate the company and dispose of assets. This 
control position results in a downward influence on the marketability discount 
Restrictions on Transferability 
Holding Period for the Stock 
Company Redemption Policy 
Costs of Public Offering 
Neutral No restrictions on transferability of ownership interests. 
Neutral No intentions to liquidate assets. 
Neutral No mandatory policy to redeem ownership interests. 
Neutral No intentions of ownership to pursue a public offering. 
Overall Recommendation 10% 
ATTACHMENT ONE 
0oU052 
N O R M A N , TOWNSEND & JOHNSON 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
Forensic Accounting, Valuation, and Economic Loss Consultants 
R. BRAD TOWNSEND, MBA, CPA/ABV, DABFA 
Curriculum Vitae 
R. Brad Townsend is a Managing Member of the firm of Norman, Townsend & Johnson, a Salt Lake 
City-based accounting firm which specializes in business valuation, forensic accounting and economic 
loss consulting. He was previously with the Financial Analysis Group of the international accounting 
firm of KPMG Peat Marwick and the consulting firm of Norman Loebbecke Associates prior to forming 
Norman, Townsend & Johnson. Mr. Townsend has 21 years of experience providing business valuation, 
investigative accounting, and economic loss services to the business community. 
Professional Experience 
Mr. Townsend's professional experience includes substantial involvement in over 800 engagements in a 
wide variety of business settings. He has provided services in both general business as well as litigation 
settings. His experience includes providing diverse consulting services in the following areas: 
Business/Intellectual Property Valuation - Valuation of businesses and intellectual property in a variety 
of industries 
Investigative Accounting/Fraud Analysis - Determination of flow, possession and ownership of business 
and personal assets and liabilities 
Business Interruption - Determination of total and insured losses resulting from various types of business 
interruptions 
Economic Loss/Damage Calculation - Calculation of monetary damages incurred in a variety of business 
and personal settings 
Contract Evaluation - Evaluation of economic effects of compliance/non-compliance with contract terms 
in connection with contract disputes and litigation 
Feasibility Studies - Projection of operating results and debt service coverages and preparation of 
projected financial statements 
Market Studies - Evaluation of economic and competitive environment affecting subject company 
Asset Search/Identification - Identification and valuation of assets through analysis of accounting records 
Statistical Analysis - Projection of population characteristics using statistical sampling methods 
Troubled Loan Analysis - Evaluation of debtor ability to service debt through financial analysis 
Mr. Townsend has provided expert witness testimony on 128 occasions in State and Federal court 
proceedings as well as Arbitration and Governmental Agency hearings. He has appeared as an expert 
witness in the states of Utah and Idaho. He has provided testimony on a wide variety of business 
valuation, investigative accounting and economic loss matters. 
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Mr. Townsend has provided consulting services in a variety of business settings including general 
consulting as well as litigation consulting services. He has been retained to provide services in the 
following business arenas: 
General Corporate Litigation 
Accountant Liability Actions 
Personal Injury/Wrongful Death Actions 
Insurance Claim Adjusting and Litigation 
Troubled Loan Monitoring 
Business and Personal Financial Planning 
Wrongful Termination Litigation 
• Dissenting Shareholder Actions 
• Marital Dissolutions 
• Business Mergers and Acquisitions 
• Offerings of Registered Securities . 
• Bankruptcy 
• Utility Rate Setting 
• Income Tax Reporting 
Mr. Townsend has experience in financial matters related to a number of different industries. He has 
provided services and performed analysis in the following general industries: 
Health Care 
Industrial Wholesale 
Commercial Retail 
Real Estate 
Insurance 
• Financial Institution 
• Manufacturing 
• Agriculture 
• Utilities 
• Professional Services 
• Hotel 
• Professional Sports 
• Local Government 
• Steel Milling 
• Construction 
• Automobile 
• Leasing 
• Oil Refining 
• Car Rental 
• Mining 
Mr. Townsend has served as an instructor in a number of seminars and workshops for various 
professional groups. He has taught courses for financial planning, professional accountant and legal 
practitioner organizations. Mr. Townsend has lectured on such topics as business valuation, asset 
identification and tracing, income assessment and aspects of financial planning. 
Professional Licenses and Affiliations 
Mr. Townsend is a Certified Public Accountant, a member of various professional organizations and has 
served in volunteer business-related positions as follows: 
Certified Public Accountant, licensed in the State of Utah 
Accredited in Business Valuation, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Member, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Member, Utah Association of Certified Public Accountants 
Member, American College of Forensic Examiners 
Diplomate, American Board of Forensic Accounting 
Member, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
Member, International Association of Collaborative Professionals 
Former Board Member, Finance Committee Chairman and Treasurer, HawkWatch International 
Former Vice-Chairman, UACPA Litigation Services Committee 
Educational Background 
Mr. Townsend graduated from the University of Utah, with honors, with a Bachelor of Science degree in 
Accounting. He also earned a Master in Business Administration from the University of Utah. He has 
participated in various continuing education programs during the last 21 years with emphasis in business 
valuation, economic loss theory, taxation and fraud investigation. 
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ATTACHMENT TWO 
0u0055 
Brough v. Brough 
Documents Available to NTJ 
|No. Document Discription 
1. Equipment appraisal done by Ron Lease 
2. HUD Settlement Statement for 81 acre property 
3. Tax assessment on 4369 East Main Street property 
4. Tax assessment on 6.6 acre property 
5. Warranty Deed on 81 acre property 
6. Lease agreement between Brough Trucking and Cardwell Distributing 
7. Warranty Deed between Pine Tech Industries and Richard and Kathy Brough 
8 Tax assessment on 151 North 4217 East property 
9. Brough Trucking & Crane Service tax returns 2001 - 2007 
10. Credit card statements for Brough Trucking 
11. Appraisal of personal residence at 3091 W. 7875 N 
12. 2001 - 2002 check registers for Brough Trucking 
13. N J Trucking Inc. Tax Returns 1993, 1995-1997,1999 
14. Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. Tax Returns 2001-2005 
15. Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. Financial Statements for December 31,2001 -2006 
16. Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. Financial Statements for March 31, 2005 
17. CC Statements 0031 11/12/03 - 03/12/03 04/12/03 - 05/13/03 
18. CC Statements 1688 12/22/03 -10/19/03 
19. CC Statements 2760 05/12/06 - 07/27/06 09/03/06 - 09/13/06 
20. CC Statements 3052 07/13/03 - 05/01/06 
21. CC Statements 3383 01/05/02 - 03/18/02 
22. CC Statements 3455 09/05/06 - 09/05/06 
23. CC Statements 4682 11/18/04 03/03/04 - 03/19/04 
24. CC Statements 7518 05/30/02 - 06/14/02 08/29/02 - 09/11/02 10/28/02 - 12/16/02 01/26/03 - 09/07/03 
25. 10/22/03 - 12/05/03 01/24/05 - 04/13/05 
26. CC Statements 7624 12/09/99 - 04/03/00 05/07/03 -11/27/03 02/10/05 - 07/08/05 
27. CC Statements 5846 04/29/04 - 07/14/04 08/20/04 - 10/11/04 
28. Respondent's Response to Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Doc. 
29. October 7, 2007 letter to NTJ regarding financial statements and other documents requested 
30. Asset holdings sent by Mr. Brough 
31. Warranty Deeds on land 
32. Property tax notices 
33. Documentation on company fraud against Brough Trucking 
34. Deposition of Richard James Brough 
35. Average annual expenditure and characteristics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2005-2006 
O u O 
DUD-;, . / --OMTY.UTAH 
ROEAL1 GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for the Respondent 
1 59» West 300 South Broadway #105 
SaltLalce City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHR.™ C. BROUGH, J
 M O TION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
> 
) 
) 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, j ^ J 0 H N *" A N D E R S O N 
) 
Respondent. ) Case No. 054000084 
The Respondent, by and through his attorney of record, hereby moves the Court to 
grant a new trial in these proceedings on all or part of the issues; or in the alternative 
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of CM Procedure and that the Court amend the 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, entered September 4, 2008 without Notice, or to 
alio* for oral argument. In the next alternative the Respondent requests the Court issue 
a Memorandum Decision as required by Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of CM, Procedure and 
a „eW Decree of Divorce. This Motion is based upon the following grounds and reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the procedure of the Court exist in these proceedings 
because the Minute Entry and the ruling issued by the Court from the bench after the trial 
1 
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indicates that the Court would prepare a written ruling. No findings were announced in 
open court. No ruling was issued by Memorandum Decision or otherwise. The Court has 
never explained the adoption by the Court of the documents prepared by the Attorney for 
the Petitioner. 
2. Under the facts and circumstances, the Respondent requests either a new 
trial, a written ruling of the Court, and/or an opportunity to present final oral argument. 
3. The current procedure followed by the Court has denied the Respondent 
a fair and equitable divorce trial. 
4. Counsel for the Respondent complied with the court ordered procedure 
in submitting a "proposed" findings to the Court. 
5. The Judgment awarded against the Respondent is excessive under Rule 
59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in any of the following aspects and should 
be reconsidered on any of the following grounds: 
a. The Decree of Divorce awards to the Petitioner substantial pre-
marital business property and pre-marital property owned by the Respondent without 
required findings as to separate property. 
b. The award of $386,500.00 grants to the Petitioner an award of the 
value of the business which does not fairly allocate liabilities of the business and 
therefore the award is unfair and inequitable. 
c. If the Court did not rule that the pre-nuptial agreement was void 
0 o u h I t 
ox non-effective, then the evidence and exhibits have shown that Mr. Brough owned 
ouch of the equipment which was used for value of the business prior to the marriage. 
d. The Decree of Divorce awards the Petitioner in excess of 
$20,000.00 in legal fees and costs. This award is inequitable and excessive in that it 
requires the Respondent to pay that amount to the Petitioner in light of the fact that she 
has been awarded a substantial cash settlement from which she can pay her promissory 
note for legal fees. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the manner in 
which the Judgment was entered appears to have been given under the influence of 
prejudice against the Respondent in that the Court adopted 100% of the proposed finding 
submitted by the Petitioner and failed to include any proposed findings, rulings or 
language submitted by the Respondent even if based on objective, undisputed evidence 
introduced by the Respondent at trial. 
7. The Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce is an 
error of law in this divorce case in that best practice in divorce matters require 
consideration by the Court of separate property owned prior to the marriage and an 
equitable balancing of issues and awards. 
8. The ruling concerning the pre-nuptial agreement constitutes and error in 
law and is contrary to the evidence introduced at trial, including the closing argument of 
the Attorney for the Petitioner who indicated that the pre-nuptial agreement was effective. 
U b f H / b 
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rieie foire the Court should determine the scope of the pre-nuptial agreement. 
9. The manner of entry, lack of notice and error in law has denied the 
Respondent the opportunity to object to the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Mvorce or to receive a copy of the proposed Judgement. 
10. An Affidavit of Randall Gaither, Attorney for the Respondent, is 
submitted in support of this Motion. 
11. A Memorandum is submitted in support of this Motion. 
DA.TED this day of September, 2008. 
RA ALL GAINER 
Attorney for the Respondent 
0 u U G 6 0 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL was delivered to: 
CLARK B.ALLRED 
Alired & McClellan, P.C. 
72 North 300 East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Fax: (435)722-3928 
DATED this day of September, 2008. 
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FILED 
DISTRiCT COURT 
DUCHEC^L COUNTY, UTAH 
RANDALL GAITHER #1141; 
Attorney for the Respondent 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
SEP 12 2008 
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IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATFIRYN C. BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PENDING MOTIONS 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Case No. 054000084 
POINT I 
BASED UPON IRREGULARITIES THAT EXIST THE COURT SHOULD 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL OR RELIEF WHICH AFFORDS THE RESPONDENT A 
FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ARGUMENT AND OBJECTIONS TO THE 
COURT AS TO THE ADOPTION OF PROPOSED FINDINGS DRAFTED BY 
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL. 
As set forth in the Affidavit of Randall Gaither, Attorney for the Respondent, the 
Court signed without modification the set of proposed Findings of Fact and a Decree 
which was submitted to the Court by the Petitioner. No Memorandum of Decision of the 
Court was filed or any ruling issued by the Court. 
b U \J o L) / 
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The Respondent submits that it is highly unusually to .allow the Attorney for one 
party in a divorce action to unilaterally draft 100% of the findings and a Decree to be 
adopted in totality by the Court after a contested trial. This procedure is not consistent 
with the rules and gives an impression of unfairness and prejudice. 
Counsel for the Respondent has tried cases before the Roosevelt Department of the 
Duchesne District Court and never encountered this procedure. The Court's apparent 
procedure in ruling on a contested divorce by either accepting or rejecting proposed 
findings in totality and adopt one or the other findings is unique. The procedure raises 
issues of an inappropriate abdication or delegations 5of judicial function. 
i 
UMoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah 1990) the Court stated: 
As to appellants' strange assertion that the court should not draft its own findings, rule 
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the court the responsibility of finding 
the facts and stating its Conclusions of law and judgment. See Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 
567 P.2d 1112, 1113-4 (Utah 1977). The court may ask the prevailing counsel to 
submit findings to aid the court in making these necessary findings. Id. at 1113. 
However, the court should not "mechanically adopt" these findings. Id. The trial 
court thus has the ultimate discretion in determining the findings of fact and Conclusions 
of law. 
In Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1113-4 (Utah 1977), the Court heard 
objections from counsel before adopting findings of opposing counsel that the court ruled 
had prevailed. The finding of facts "is an important part of the judicial function," one that 
is designed to flesh out the rationale for the decision and one that "the Judge cannot 
surrender... to counsel." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2578 
(1971) Pursuant to article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, "the judicial power of 
2 
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the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction . . ., 
and in such other courts as the Legislature by statute may establish." Utah Const, art. VIII, 
§1 
\r\Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476, 2008 UT App 11 (Utah App. 
01/10/2008), the Court noted the importance of the findings in a divorce matter stating: 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs findings of fact, 
states that "[i]t will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or 
appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a); see also Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In 
assessing the sufficiency of the findings . . . we are not confined to the contents of 
a particular document entitled 'Findings', rather, the findings may be expressed 
orally from the bench or contained in other documents . . . . " ) . Furthermore, 
ff[a]dequate findings are . . . necessary for [appellate courts] to perform [their] 
assigned review function." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Here, 
the trial court entered two documents summarizing its findings the July 5, 2005 
Memorandum Decision and the January 3, 2006 Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. The trial court also made oral findings at the Clarification Hearing. Below, 
we consider the challenge to the findings of fact as we address each substantive 
issue. In doing so, we review the written and oral findings of fact together to 
determine if they are sufficient to support the trial court's rulings. We note, 
however, that for purposes of appellate review, written findings are the better 
practice because they reduce the likelihood of ambiguity created by an incomplete 
or unclear record. We can find no indication, either in the oral and written 
findings or elsewhere in the record, of the classification of the relevant items as 
marital or separate property. Furthermore, despite careful review of the trial 
transcript and the written and oral findings, we can find no place where the trial 
court assigned values to the various items of property. 
The procedure in this matter is even more prejudicial because Mr. Brough and his 
attorney were awaiting a ruling by Memorandum and were never given notice of findings 
3 
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tkat the Court adopted and filed without an order to have the de facto ruling served on the 
parties. Further, the final Decree should have been submitted to counsel for the 
Respondent with an opportunity to object to the Decree and Judgements. Rule 7 of The 
lltdih Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: 
(f) Orders. 
1. (f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the 
payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a 
judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made 
without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the 
judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state whether 
they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon 
the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's 
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days 
after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order 
upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to 
object. 
The Petitioner was not the prevailing party until the Court adopted the findings 
drafted by the Petitioner. Any Decree should have been submitted to allow objections to 
be filed. The Petitioner's attorney was never requested in open court or by any written 
order to prepare a final judgement to be submitted without notice to the Respondent. 
POINT II 
NO DIVORCE DECREE HAS mm ENTERED IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. 
'• Uuuo/w 0uGQ65 
A clerical error has occurred because Counsel for the Respondent was asked by the 
Court to prepare a Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage relationship and ruled in 
open Court that a Decree would be signed when submitted. Counsel prepared and 
submitted the Decree and no objection was filed as of the date by Memorandum of 
opposing counsel. The Decree actually divorcing the parties has not been entered by the 
Court even though this is the only ruling from the bench made in the presence of both 
parties. 
POINT HI 
THE DIVORCE DECREE PREPARED AND AUTHORIZED BY THE 
ATTORNEY FOR THE PETITIONER AWARDS EXCESSIVE DAMAGES AND 
SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED. 
The Respondent requests and opportunity to file objections and have a hearing as 
to the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and to present evidence or arguments 
concerning the Judgment and the terms of the Decree. Further the Decree should be set 
aside and vacated because of the procedural irregularities. This is not a default 
proceeding but a contested trial. 
The following excessive Judgments in the Decree and any findings should be 
amended or vacated because: 
1. The Decree of Divorce awards to the Petitioner substantial pre-
marital property owned by the Respondent based upon findings drafted to suggest joint 
5 
marital interest which is contrary to the evidence. 
2. The award of $386,500.00 grants to the Petitioner an award of the 
value of the business which docs not take into account the liabilities of the business and 
the award is unfair and inequitable. 
3. The evidence has shown that Mr. Brough owned most of the 
equipment which was used for value of the business prior to the marriage. The 
Respondent's pre-marital property has been unfairly awarded by adopting and entering 
tie findings and Decree unilaterally prepared by Counsel for the Petitioner. 
4. The Decree of Divorce awards the Petitioner in excess of 
$20,000.00 in legal fees and costs. This award is inequitable and excessive in that it 
requires the Respondent to pay that amount to the Petitioner in light of the fact that the 
Petitioner has been awarded a substantial cash settlement and can afford to pay for her 
own attorney fees and costs. Any findings as to legal fees must take into account the 
judgements in the action. 
5. The Petitioner should be required to pay for at least one-half, if 
not all, of the Petitioner's expert witness fees for which Mr. Brough was required to 
advance funds prior to the trial. This award is excessive in light of the ruling of the Court 
granting her one half of the business and a cash award. 
It is inequitable and unfair to shift the costs of the Petitioner' 
s expert witnesses and 
the Petitioner's attorney fees to the Respondent if the Petitioner is obtaining over 
$300^000.00 as a result of the divorce proceedings. The Petitioner testified that she had 
been making payments to her attorney and can clearly pay off any promissory note of 
legal fees from the Judgement. Further, the only reason Mr. Brough had to pay one-half 
of her expert witness fees was because she could not afford them during the proceedings 
and common sense dictates that if she is given any kind of substantial award she can 
afford to pay at least one-half of the costs. 
Further, the Petitioner stated that she was not interested in the equipment and 
property Mr. Brough owned prior to the marriage and the ruling awarding her one-half of 
the business which the value was based substantially on equipment has resulted in her 
receiving a wind-fall of property. Therefore good cause exists to set aside the Judgemtn 
and order a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE RELIEF REQUESTED IS SUPPORTED BY THE FOLLOWING 
RULES OF PROCEDURE. 
Rule 52 of Civil Procedure . Findings by the court 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to 
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
7 
> UUUU 'J I 0U0068 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally 
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear 
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court The trial 
court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a 
brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on 
more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make 
additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The 
motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. 
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, 
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in 
the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to 
amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. New trials; amendments of 
judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party 
was prevented from having a fair trial. 
8 
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(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding 
on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination 
by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Delay in execution. No execution or other writ to enforce a judgment 
may issue until the expiration often days after entry of judgment, unless the 
court in its discretion otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and on 
such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the 
court may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a 
judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter 
or amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for 
relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict 
made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to the findings 
or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). 
9 
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(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a 
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is othenvf I 
prohibited by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time 
of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the superseded 
bond is approved by the court. P 
DATED this day of September, 2008. 
^ uC^uc 
RANDALL GAITiJgR
 v 
Attorney for the Respondent 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF FENDING MOTIONS was delivered to: 
CLARK B.ALLRED 
Allred & McClellan, P.C. 
72 North 300 East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Fax: (435)722-3928 
DATED this \ 0 ^ day of September, 2008. 
11 
(juuJiW 0U0072 
RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for the Respondent 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESWF. COUNTY, UTAH 
SEP 12 2008 
JOANNE MCKBE, CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RANDALL GAITHER, 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT 
IN SUPPORT OF NEW TRIAL 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Case No. 054000084 
State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Randall T. Gaither, being first duly sworn upon oath hereby deposes 
states as follows: 
and 
1. In the above entitled case, as the trial attorney for the Respondent, it was 
my understanding that the Court would issue a written ruling which would be mailed to 
each party. (See Minute Entry of July 9, 2008.) 
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2. Having tried divorce cases for over thirty years in proceedings 
throughout the State of Utah each party may submit "proposed" findings which usually 
fu.notion as each parties' argument of legal position to the Court when the Court has not 
yet made a ruling. In this case I submitted "proposed" findings and not final Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law authorized by any ruling of the Court. Even if a prevailing 
party is directed to prepare findings based on an oral ruling, the opposing party is given 
an opportunity to object. 
3. As of the date of this Affidavit, I have not received any notice of ruling 
or Memorandum Decision from the Court. The first document that I received was a two-
page Notice of Entry of Divorce Decree signed by the Attorney for the Petitioner on 
September 4, 2008. This document was received on the late afternoon of Friday, 
September 5, 2008. 
4. As of Friday the 5th of September, I had not received any notice that the 
Court signed or entered the proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
 t which 
submitted by the Attorney for the Petitioner. 
5. I had prepared a Decree of Divorce and submitted it to the Court prior to 
August 8, 2008 after the Court bifurcated the proceedings and granted the divorce from 
the bench at the end of the divorce trial. 
6. On Monday, September 8, 2008,1 requested that the secretary from the 
Respondent's business go to the Court to retrieve a copy of the Findings of Fact & 
2 
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Conclusions of Law and Decree which had been entered but never served by the Clerks or 
counsel, PsX that time the agent for Mr. Brough was only given a copy of a signed Decree 
of Divorce in this matter which corresponds identically to the proposed findings 
submitted by the Attorney for the Petitioner in August of 2008 even though not requested 
by the Couit at the conclusions of the trial. 
7. I contacted the Clerk of the Court on Monday, September 8th, 2008 to 
attempt to obtain a copy of the Findings of Fact. The Clerk indicated that the proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum prepared and submitted by my 
office ^were at the Courthouse. I was also told that there was no ruling or Memorandum 
Decision on file. 
8. During my conversation with the Clerk of the Court, the Clerk indicated 
that there were undisclosed reasons why she needed to speak with Judge Anderson, but 
could not talk with him regarding this issue until Monday, September 15, 2008. At that 
time I inquired as to the first available date to have this matter scheduled before the Court 
was on the Court's calendar and the Clerk indicated the date of September 25, 2008 in the 
afternoon. Later, I checked the docket sheet and saw that a hearing was set. I again 
called the court desk and I was again told that Judge Anderson has ordered this hearing 
set. 
9. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce 
signed by the Court are identical to those prepared and mailed to my office by Clark 
3
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Mired on Aigust 7 2008, Attorney for the Petitioner. I have compared the two 
documents which appear to be a word for word verbatim copy or the original proposed 
findings from the Petitioner's Attorney's office. The only change is the deletion of the 
mailing certificate page on the findings of fact on the copy that I received. The final 
findings include footnotes which were discussed by counsel at the divorce trial as a means 
to make legal argument. The cover letter from Attorney Allred describes the findings and 
decree as "proposed" . 
10. I did not receive actual notice of the findings which were entered by the 
Court in August of 2008 until September 8, 2008 by a fax received from my client's 
secretary after she went to the Clerk's office and purchased a copy from the Clerk of the 
Findings at my request to check the status of this matter. While I have received actual 
notice as of September 8, 2008,1 have never been served with a signed copy by the clerk 
or any attorney. 
11. As Attorney for the Respondent, my assumption was that the Court 
would collaboratively use the proposed findings from either party, as well as make its 
own proposed findings and ruling on evidence and the various issues, then issue a Ruling 
or Memorandum Decision. In that regard, I submitted a cover letter with a disk with my 
proposed findings to assist the Court in drafting its own findings, a procedure used in 
other cases within the State of Utah. 
12. If I had known that the Court was using a procedure in which the Court 
4
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would cdoose between two sets of competing proposed Findings of Fact and then to enter 
one oi*tie other in its totality, then I would have framed the Respondent's proposed 
SLndirLgs; in a different fashion. Further, I would have requested oral argument in order to 
respond and object to any final findings in light of the evidence. 
13. In light of my practice and litigation of divorce matters, I have been 
surprised by the procedures and lack of notice of the trial court and request that relief be 
granted on relevant Motions filed with this Affidavit. 
14. This Affidavit is being submitted to set forth to supplement the record 
concerning procedures and notice in the above entitled proceedings. The docket sheet 
does not reflect that the proposed findings submitted by the Respondent's Attorney have 
been made part of the record. Attached hereto is as Exhibit One is the cover letter and 
documents received from the Petitioner's Attorney. Attached hereto as Exhibit Two is 
the cover letter and documents submitted by the Respondent's Attorney. 
/L DATED this / ( day of September, 2008. 
RANI 
Attorney foiAiie Respondent 
000077 
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State of Utah ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the \\ fj-4 day of September, 2008 , personally appeared before me Randall 
Gaither who having read the foregoing Affidavit, swears that the contents thereof are true 
according to the best of his information and belief and has executed the same 
Notary Seal: 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
RANDALL T. GAITHER was delivered to: 
CLARK B. ALLRED 
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C. 
72 NORTH 300 EAST 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066 
FAX: (435) 722-3928 
DATED this I %, day of September, 2008. 
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EXHIBIT ONE 
0UGQ79 U 
148 South Vernal Avenue Suite 101 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Phone (435) 789-7800 
Fax (4)5)789-7820 
E-mail allredmcclellanfyubtanet com 
Allred & McClellan, P.C. 
Law Offices 
Clark B Allred 
Clark A McClellan 
Brad D. Brotherson 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Phone (435) 722-3928 
Fax (435) 722-3920 
E-mail clarka(a),ubtanet com 
A u g u s t 7 , 2 0 0 8 
The Honorable Judge Anderson 
Eighth District Court 
255 South State 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
RE: Brough v. Brough 
Civil No. 054000084 DA 
Dear Judge Anderson: 
Pursuant to the Court « q 7-<=>rmoo+- +-v^  ^ *. • x. . 
herewith s u i t i n g h e r ^ o f e ^ ^ If l l T ^ L ^ l i " * T '' 
and Decree o£ Divorce, on the above r e f e r e n c e d " a t t e r ° LaW 
yours, 
CCLELLAN, P.C. 
CBA/cb 
enclosures 
p c : K. B r o u g h 
R. Gaither 
B A l \UZ-i 
'uU''-'^ 
0 U 0 0 8 0 
ft/{\/9-, 
CLSR.K B A.LLRED - 0 05 5 
CL^ R-K k . McCLELLAN - 6113 
AIXJR ED & McCLELLAN, P . C . 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
72 Ufortti 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84 066 
TeLeph-one: (435)722-3928 
TN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYW C. BROUGH, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
YS. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 054000084 
) Judge John R. Anderson 
The above case came before the Court for trial on the 9th day of 
July, 20O8, Petitioner was present with her attorney, Clark B Allred. 
Respondent was present with his attorney, Randall Gaither, Evidence was 
received by the Court in the form of testimony and exhibits. Argument 
was received by counsel and the Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and after being fully 
advised, makes these findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . Petitioner was a resident of Duchesne County, State of Utah, 
and had been for more than three months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action, ikjC^'uJ 
0vi0081 v 
Auc rciitioner worked for the Respondent from 1993 to 1995. 
She then worked for her husband, Mr. Baum, until they separated. In the 
summer of 1997, she again started working for the Respondent at NJ 
Trucking. 
3. On December 1, 1997, the parties started living together and 
they married on July 14, 1998. 
4. At the time the parties married, the Respondent had two minor 
children from a previous marriage. One of the reasons the parties 
married was to assist the Respondent in obtaining custody of those two 
minor children. 
5. The Respondent also had two older children who were of 
majority age. Those children insisted that the Petitioner sign an 
agreement not to claim any assets the Respondent then owned if the 
parties divorced in the future. The Respondent stated that he thought 
the request was dumb. The Petitioner, to appease the two children, 
called an attorney, but, when informed of the cost of preparing a 
prenuptial agreement, elected to write out a one paragraph statement 
which she and the Respondent signed which is Respondent's exhibit 1. 
There was no discussion or disclosure of what each party owned. The 
testimony of the Petitioner, which was not rebutted, was that the 
statement was only to apply to assets owned on the date of marriage and 
not to further acquired assets or improvements to those assets. 
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Brough Trucking at the time of the trial is $492,000.00. See Exhibit 3 
rownsend appraisal. 
9. When the parties started living together and at the beginning 
of the marriage, they lived in a home in Duchesne that was owned by the 
Respondent. That home was subject to a substantial mortgage on which 
$11, 300.00 per month payments were made during the marriage. Those 
payments were made from earnings from Brough Trucking. 
10. The Petitioner, with her own labor and the assistance of her 
son, remodeled the Duchesne house, including making a room out of the 
patio, adding walls and windows, taking out a sliding glass door to open 
up an area, painting, installing sheet rock, carpet and siding, and 
replacing the old shower with a new bathtub. She also remodeled the 
dovmstairs and added a wall, sheet rocked, painted and added carpet 
downstairs, put in light fixtures, and did yard work. 
11. Shortly after the parties married in September of 1998, the 
Respondent's son, Bryan, age 14, came to live with the parties. He 
wanted to go to school in Roosevelt. Just prior to the parties starting 
to live together, the Respondent had purchased a shop m Roosevelt from 
Drillers Inc. to use for Brough Trucking. That shop was dirty and 
needed repairs. The parties decided to construct living quarters m the 
Roosevelt shop so that they could move to Roosevelt. 
12. The Petitioner, primarily by herself, but with assistance of 
her children and the Respondent's children, built a bedroom, bathroom 
0U0O84 ,,( .... 
™
 1 1 V l n 3 a r e a U P 3 t a i r S i n t h e
 "ooseveit1 shop including sheet rock, 
tile work and carpet. Downstairs, she put in 2 bedrooms,
 a kitchen! 
cxeaned the shop and added floor tiles to the shop. Carpets were addec 
to all living areas and an office was constructed downstairs. 
13. in August of i999, the Respondent's youngest daughter, Amanda, 
age 12, came to live with the parties. The parties and the children 
moved from Duchesne and started living in the Roosevelt shop. 
14. The parties then started looking for a more suitable home or 
property on which to construct a home. The Petitioner looked at many 
properties hut did not find anything acceptable to both parties, m the 
summer of 2000, the parties were talking to a Clare Duncan who said he 
had some acreage for sale. The parties went and looked at the property 
approximately
 1 8 acres near Neola, Utah, and made an offer of 
SSO.000.00. That offer was accepted and ' the transaction closed on 
August 3, 2000. The parties paid
 $20,000 down and jointly signed a note 
for the balance of Wo,000.00. The property was deeded jointly to the 
parties. The
 $20.000.00 down payment was paid from Brough Trucking just 
as all other bills were paid from Brough Trucking. 
15. The parties then took plans and hired a general contract 
Construction on the home started in early
 2ooi. The Petitioner 
responsible for coordinating the work. She went to the construction 
-it. on a daily basis. m addition to coordinating
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of the living quarters, the maintaining of the home and family and also 
woirlced at Brough Trucking. The parties seldom took salaries from the 
business. W2 records show the Petitioner was only paid $3,360 in 1999, 
$10,640.00 in 2000, $8,880 in 2001, $7,680.00 in 2002 and $6,876.00 in1 
20O3 . Both parties maintained separate checking accounts. The 
Petitioner deposited her checks in her account and then used those 
monies on the home, the family, and expenses for both her children and 
the Respondent's children. Respondent deposited his monies in his 
account and used those to pay child support and legal fees in the early 
part of the marriage and for personal and family expenses during the 
marriage. Since the parties took minimal salaries, almost all living 
expenses, food, utilities, transportation, housing (including the 
remodeling of the shop and Duchesne house, mortgage payments and 
building of the home) were paid with checks or credit cards from Brough 
Trucking. i 
20 . The Respondent claimed that he should have credit against the 
value of the home for premarital assets that were sold. However, the 
evidence did not support that claim. He was unable to trace those assets 
and monies . The evidence showed that monies from the sale of assets 
were used for purposes other than the home including paying operating 
expenses of Brough Trucking when the Respondent had a broken leg. 
21. Respondent claimed that the money from the sale of the Bandana 
Ranch was used for the down payment of the 18 acres in Neola where the 
0 u 0^ 0 8 7 *• b u C n ^ 
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22. Respondent clawed the
 raoney fro. the sale of the Duchesne 
shop should be a credit. He sold that shop on May 3,
 1999. T h e d o w n 
payment of $28,983 was two years before thP hnmo 
y *> oerore the home was constructed and the 
monies went into the genera! account at
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ia year before the home was constructed) and 
also went into the Brough Trucking general account
 anr1 
3 3 i*j. account and was used for 
Brough Trucking expenses. 
23. Respondent also claims a credit of S30, 000 for a rig he sold 
m ,une
 2000 and other equipment he sold in 2ooo. A g a i n, those sales 
occurred well before the construction of the ho.e, those monres went 
into the general account at Brough Trucking and they were spent before 
the land was bought or the home was constructed, 
2,. Respondent also makes a claim for the
 $2,,702.oo receded from 
the sale of the Ouchesne home
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did the cooking, cleaning and laundry. $he also paid some of their 
expenses from her bank account. 
29. Shortly after Amanda turned 18, she and the Petitioner had an 
axgwient . The Respondent then told the Petitioner to vacate the home. 
The Petitioner vacated the home on August 1, 2005, taking very fe 
personal items with her. She came back the next day and loaded s 
items into a horse trailer. The Respondent, however, took back the 
horse trailer with most of the items. 
30. The personal property is all used property and has minimal 
value. The values listed by the Respondent; are either new values, or 
exaggerated. 
31. After the parties separated, the Petitioner obtained 
employment as a laborer with Stance Insulation. She presently resides 
with her mother. she has purchased a used' trailer she is setting up 
next to her mother. Her present net monthly income is $1,656.00 and her 
i 
expenses are $1,695.00 per month. 
32. The Respondent has continued to r e s i d e in the home and operate 
Brough Trucking and continues to pay his personal expenses thru Brough 
Trucking. 
33. P e t i t i o n e r has incurred l ega l fees and cos t s m th i s matter. 
The a f f idav i t of the P e t i t i o n e r ' s a t torney shows tha t she had incurred 
$15,391.53 in fees th ru July 2, 2008. He t e s t i f i e d tha t he had incurred 
an addi t ional ^o hours xn prepara t ion prrof t o t r i a l a t $175.00
 p e r 
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6. The Duchesne house was subject td a mortgage when the parties 
married which mortgage was paid from earnings during the marriage. The 
home was alsp remodeled and improved by
 ( the Petitioner during the 
marriage. The monies from the sale of thq house were deposited in a 
general account which was spent for general living and business 
i 
expenses. There was no tracing or showing that the monies from the sale 
i I 
of the Duchesne house went into the Neola house. In addition, those 
monies became marital assets because of the* use of earnings during the 
s 
marriage to pay the mortgage and taxes £nd the remodeling by the 
Petitioner. 
7. The Bandana Ranch property was ij>eing purchased during the 
i 
marriage with earnings from the marriage, the money from the sale of 
I 
that property did not go to the down payment on the Neola property, as 
claimed by the Respondent, but was spent 6n general expenses. There 
should be no credit against marital assets given for those monies. 
8. The Respondent also claimed credit for a rig and oth^r 
property he asserted that he sold and used %he proceeds to pay on the 
Neola house. The Respondent originally denied having any documents t(o 
support his claim of premarital assets. Shortly before trial, hfe 
provided some documents and tried to introduce additional documents atp 
trial which the Court refused to receive because they had not be timely 
disclosed. There was evidence of $30,000.00 from a rig. There was noj 
evidence showing that those monies went into the home, but rather those 
fxirxds went into the Brough Trucking account and were spent on BrougH 
Trucking? expenses.2 
9 . The Neola home was purchased [jointly by the parties and 
remains titled in both parties' names. The Petitioner was the primary 
i 
! 
person involved in the construct ion of t ha t home, including doing much 
of the construct ion herse l f . The monies fo r , t he cons t ruc t ion of the home 
came from earnings in Brough Trucking, fronji P e t i t i o n e r ' s account where 
she deposited her sa la ry and from the Respondent 's account where he 
deposited his s a l a ry . I t i s a mar i ta l asset1. 
I 
10 . The Petitioner was actively involved in the expansion of 
Brough Trucking, she remodeled two living quarters and built the Neola 
I 
home, she raised the Respondent's two childrjen thru their teenage years 
and she was the person doing the cleaning and meals. The Respondent's 
i 
position, that all property was premarital 'and that Petitioner should 
i 
get no interest in it, would leave the Petitioner, at age 55, with 
nothing. The small wage she was paid results in less social security 
when she reaches retirement age than if she' had been working for full 
wages. Fairness and equity require that shd receive one half of the 
value of the Neola home and Brough Trucking (less $44,000. 00) .3 Brough 
2Dunn v Dunn 802 P. 2d 1314 (Ut.App. 1990') pre marital assets 
that have been consumed, commingled etc loss'their separate 
status. I 
3 
Hoaue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah Ct. App . 1992); Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). See alsio Haumont v. Haumont, 793 
IWM95 i . uiA-iJl 
Trucking has a value of $492,000.00 less $44,000.00 and the house has a 
value of $325,000.00. Therefore, the Respondent, if he wants to retain 
ownership of the home and Brough Trucking, should be ordered to pay to 
i 
the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00. In the alternative, the 
I 
Petitioner should be awarded the Neola homeland property with a value of 
i 
$325,000.00 and the Respondent awarded! Brough Trucking and the 
Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner the difference of $61,500.00 and to 
refinance the $160,000.00 debt to remove tljie home and Petitioner from 
liability on that loan. 
11. The Petitioner should also be awarded the vehicle she drives, 
subject to the remaining debt on it as of the date the decree is signed 
I 
and the personal property in her possession;and the property listed on 
i 
Exhibit 24. Respondent should be awarded the remaining personal 
property, the horse trailer and the vehicle Jhe drives. 
12. Petitioner waived her claim to alimony as her income presently 
meets her expenses. However, her income is not sufficient to pay her 
legal fees and costs. The financial declaration received by the Court 
seems to be accurate and the expenses listed thereon are reasonable. 
P,2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Barber v. barber, 792 P. 2d 134, lie 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Oliekan v. Oliekan, 200JS UT App 405, ^20; Dunn V. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990!) (using marital funds t|o 
make installment payments on separate property changes it to marital 
property); and Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2Id 304 (Utah 1988) (listing 
many factors the court considers). 
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e r s
 attorney werp no^ -L 
™ ~ ,
 I n addition, the P e t i .I " ^ " " ' ~ ^ 
Preparation and the
 tirae i n c u r r e d ^ j " " ^ » "»« hour. l n 
— a » i d a v i t s h o y l d ^ s u b m i t t e d ^ - ; - — - - * . te 
incurred. : C° t h e additional time 
13. The cost fm- t-v,^  
°
r t h e aPP«isal of Brobqh 7V,K-W 
tte valuation
 o f the business T h „ < 9 " * " e e d e d ^ r 
- « — — o, that
 b : ; R e ~ ? ™ be r e™ - -
indent for
 e x p e n s e s i n c u „ e d fay h i s J J - * - - a w a r d „ 
C
° "
e a
— - — .
 having ie I d e i n f 0 r r a a t l ° n 
— has the
 m u c h g r e a t e r a b m t y , ^ ; 0 n t r 0 1 °£ — 
-penses
 i n c l u d i n g 
11
 <-nzs c a s e . 
DATED t h i s * 
d a y of Augus t , 2 0 0 8 . 
BY THE COURT 
^
o l
^ ^ ~ A n d e T s t n ~ 
D a s t r i c t C o u r t !
 J u d g e 
4
^^-^^mmn, 812 P . 2 d „ 7 ? 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I , Cheree B r o t h e r s o n , am employed by t h e o f f i c e of ALLRED & 
! . 
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner helrein and hereby certify 
that I served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT\ AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWJ 
i 
i 
on Respondent by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an 
envelope addressed to: 
RANDALL GAITHER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
159 WEST 3 00 SOUTH BROADWAY #105 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
i 
1 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first,class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Rooseivelt, Utah, on the 7th 
day of August, 2008. 
CHEREE BROTHERSON 
000098 u U 4' 
C1ARK B ALLRED - 0 055 
CIARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
klLiRED 6c McCLELLAN , P . C . 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
12 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435)722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, ) 
) DECREE OFl DIVORCE 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, ) Civil No. 0540000084 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
The above case came before the Court for trial on July 9, 
2008. The Court has entered an order divorcing the parties and 
took the remaining issues under advisement. The Court has now 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based 
thereon, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECRjEED : 
1. Respondent, if he wants to retain ^ownership of the home 
and Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. '(Brough Trucking), is 
ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00 within 90 
days of the entry of this decree. He is td notify^ Petitioner's 
0UUD99 u b u ; ; t i l -^9-3 
counsel w i t h i n 1 5 d a y s o f e n t r y o f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
retain both assets. 
2. If the Respondent does not elect to retain ownership of 
*. ho„e and Brough Trucking as provided above, then the Petitioner 
» warded the
 K e o l a home and property, the Respondent is awarded 
Brougr, Trucking and the Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner 
*1, SOO .00 for the difference in the value within so days of entry 
of the decree. 
3. Respondent is ordered to refinance the SISO.OOO debt to 
remove the home and Petxtioner from liability on that loan. 
4 • The Petitioner is awarded the vehicle she drives (subject 
to the reining debt on it as of the date this decree
 1 8 signed) 
the personal property in her possession and ,he property listed on 
Exhibit 24. 
5- Respondent is awarded the remaining
 personal property 
the horse trailer and the vehicle he drives. 
6. Nexther party is awarded alimony. 
7. Respondent is ordered to pay to Pet it nor, -u 
pciy co Petitioner the amount she 
has incurred in leaaT fooo =„,* 
legal fees and costs m this matter. The 
$15.3,1.53 set forth on the affidavit sub^ted as Exhibrt 4
 10 
hours at
 $ 1 7 S . 0 O per hour for preparation and s hours at ?17S.00 
I) U L M ^  ° 
per hour for trial are awarded and ordered to be paid. In 
addition, the Petitioner's counsel shall 'submit a supplemental 
affidavit for the time spent on post-trial ;matters . If Respondent 
objects to the reasonableness of that amount, he shall file a 
l 
motion with the Court setting forth those objections and the Court 
will set for hearing those objections. 
8. Respondent is ordered to pay the posts of the appraisal 
performed by Brad Townsend. 
9. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver, without 
delay, any titles or other documents which a;re presented to either 
one by the other and which are necessary to e'ffectuate the transfer 
of property as has been hereinbefore set fotfth. 
DATED this day of August, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
John R. ^nderson 
D i s t r i c t
 tCourt Judge 
3 
00U101 ^ ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I , Cheree B r o t h p r ^ n n -,™ 
^ u c n e r s o n , am employed bv t h P ^ F ^ • 
r J " uy cne O f f i c e Of AI.TRPn r 
MCCLEL1AN, P.
 C attorns * 
^ / a " ° r n e y S '» — — * « „ a„d hereby certify 
-t r ~
 the actached DECREE op D I V O R C E on 
placing a true and correct com, t-v, . 
x e c c
 copy thereon irj an
 Pm,ci 
to.
 q a n envelope addressed 
RANDALL GAITHER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
159 WEST 3 00 SOUTH BROADWAY #105 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
and deposxted the same, sealed, with f i r s t ,la 
l a s s
 Postage prepaid 
thereon, m the United SfafB= •-, 
united States mail at Roosevelt nt-=,h j ^ u ' Utah, on the 7th 
day of August, 2008. 
CHE
^^BR^rl!i£I5F 
0U0I02 ub 
EXHIBIT TWO 
000103 UUU443 
RANDALL GA1THER 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AJT LAW 
I 159 West 300 South ' 
The Broadway Lofts, #105 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84161 
TELEPHONE: (801)531-199^ 
FACSIMILE: (801)672-1162' . 
Email: lostcanyon@msn.com 
August 8, 2008 
Duchesne County - Roosevelt 
Attn Judge Anderson 
255 South State 
P.O. Box 1286 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Re: Kakhryn C. Brough v. Richard James Brough 
(Cise No. 054000084) 
Dear Judge Anderson, 
Enclosed please find an 
Proposed Findings of Fact and 
faxed and mailed today to Atto 
disk with the Findings of Fact i 
use a potion of the document in 
priginal and courtesy copy of the Respondent's Post-trial 
[Conclusions of Law & Memorandum.. This document was 
jrney for the Petitioner, Clark Allred. Also enclosed is a 
Wordperfect and Word foninjat if the Court would like to 
preparation of any final Orders. Thank you for your time. 
ly yours, 
in 
JNDAEL GAITHER 
Attorney at Law 
RG/ac f 
cc C Allred / 
J Brough * 
UUU'-i 
0G0i04 
LAND ALL GAITHER #1141,' 
Attorney for the Respondent ! 
159 West 300 South Broadway j#l05 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
OV THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT! DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs, 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S POST-TRIAL 
PROPOSED BINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSION OF LAW & 
MEMORANDUM 
i 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Case No. 054000084 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OP J ^ £ T 
1. The Petitioner and Rejpondent were married on Julyl14, 1998 and seven years 
later on August 30, 2005, the Pejitioner filed for divorce in Spend ing action. The 
parties separated on August 1, 2<fo05. ' . 
2. The Petitioner had beef, married and divorced four previous times before ,h,s 
marriage and had a child from a [elationship with another individual prior to the firs, 
marriage. The Petitioner was 54lyears old at time of trial and Was 45 years old at the ome 
0uui05 
Uo>_V'i 
- n 8 * • » she had three c h | I d r e n , a„ o f age> ^ n o - w j ( h R e s p M t a | • 
3. At the time of the majriage the Respondent i ! 
was 50 years old. Mr. 
B
' ° "
8 h h a ! a h i g h s c h
° ° ' ^uei ion and after serving time in the M • 
• ,. , . I 8 m e m f16 M a n n « started working 
^ ^ ^
 R P d e n ' " ~ ^ - 4 w,oh
 Was ineo.ora.ed 
~ '
0 r l
°
 ,WS
 ' ^ T ^ - ' — * — U wth the i n d e n t 
as sole shareholder.2, 
aa™, * h had been ^ by fte Peti(ioner ^ ^ _ t e d ^ 
" "
 toman
—1-^dtheagreemen, . W e r n e r , 
P a i , i M e
'
S W e d t h M
 r h d d ^ C W m * - " ' ~ ! e s , assets or
 m oney of the 
S , 0 r e ,
°
r a n y P e r S O M l O r f a m i
^™Per* ie s of the Respond, ; , . ^ e s D , , 
Respondent's Exhibit 
Physical ^ ^ ^ Z ^ t Z ^ ^ 0 r k * H P " * ™ - was mos,,v 
laborer. She testified that she m fc^d ' 1 ' ' ^ f *BfU1" S h e « ^ K * as a 
after being hired on as a shoD h a n d l e ilk u f o u r t h h"sbapd in 1993 at har Z T 
December I, , 997 in h i s $ £ £ £ £ £ " £ ^ T ' " " ^ i n ^ 4 I w T ' 
not have a truck and only an interelt nendL ^ RtSt m e t Mr. Brough the 2 ™ ^ 
h"*a„d. At triai,the ^ i o ^ t ^ Z X T u T ^ T ^ ^ Z F * 
quarters ms.de toe residence as an Lp loyeT * " J ° b TOS '° *OTk "> &mg up the Hvtg 
had four cMdr^wM, Ms faSt^'*'?,'" " " " t * w i t h *« Respondent He 
Respondent's Exhibit 1,, the c o J ^ ^ ^ J T ! ^ B r ° U g h i n W ' 
owner of stoek. Respondent's Exhibit 32 S e a t e d thai T ' u ^ 1 B'°^h a s * e 100% 
was ,„ good standing
 w i t h t h e S t a t ot VtZT^ZtJ^ "* C™ S™«- ' -
OliOiOe . UL.C A ' j a u 
5. The Respondent agreid in the premarital agreement ithat the Petitioner would not 
fee; responsible for debts occurring from the listed properties and agreed to assume all 
business delts.4 (See Respondent's Exhibit 1) 
6 Prior to the marriage, [the Petitioner was the bookKeejper and receptionist at N. J, 
Trucking, Inc. She was an hourly employee at N. J. Truckingjin 1993 for two years until 
1995. The Petitioner was awar^ of the type of business owned by the Respondent and 
that the Respondent was the sold shareholder. 
7 The Petitioner did not!introduce any evidence or facts at trial to show that the 
premiptial agreement was signed on the basis of any claim of fraud or duress. 
I i 
8. After the marriage, thi Petitioner maintained separate financial accounts in her 
name only at Zions Bank and Mpuntain America Credit Union! She deposited the funds 
v/hich she received from employment at Brough Trucking and jCrane Service, Inc. into 
i i 
! i ! 
her separate accounts. The Petitioner also deposited the funds she received from a 
i 
premarital settlement as her sepajrate property which she used to pay of her premarital 
Tn relation to Respondent' 
Brough owned 100% of the shares 
Exhibit One, the Petitioner described business using "Inc." 
and she knew it was a corporation yhen she typed up the agreement! She was aware that Mr. 
and she was never issued anv shares of the corporation. 
Concerning Respondent's Exhibit One, Kathy Brough stated at trial, "The fact is 1 
don't v/ant and didn't want anything Jim had prior..." In relation to [Respondent's Exhibit One 
the Petitioner said during cross examination that she was aware the business using "Inc" and she 
knew it was a corporation when shd typed up the agreement. She was aware that Mr Brough 
owned 100% of the shares and she was never issued any shares of the corporation. 
0G0i07 o^°
J 
debts. 1 he Petitioner had separate four or five credit cards in her name. The Petitioner 
had $3,000.00 in her separate accounts at the time of separation with the Respondent in 
2O05. 
9. After the marriage, thfc Respondent, Richard James Brough, maintained 
separate, personal checking accounts in his name at Wells Fargo Bank and Mountain 
America Credit Union. 
10. The Petitioner and Rjespondent resided together prior to signing the premarital 
agreement. 
11. The Petitioner testified that she did not nave a motor vehicle prior to the 
marriage. After, the Petitioner rleceived a settlement from her fourth husband which she 
used the money to pay separate £>re-martial debts for her credit.cards. 
12. The parties maintained separate accounts until separation and never co-
mingled any funds which they received separately during the marriage in any joint-
i 
checking or joint-savijtigs account. 
13. The Petitioner never introduced any checks in evidence which proved any 
i 
expenditures which she actually |made to construct the residence in Neola, Utah that was 
jointly titled in both parties nam£s. 
14. The Petitioner spent ^noney on temporary landscaping at a local nursery for the 
Neola residence which was not cost to build and construct the residence. 
15. The W-2s of the Petitioner which were received as Respondent's Exhibit Ten 
\jv^ o 
OiiulOS 
state yearly income as a corporate employee of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. 
as follows: 
- '1 
YEAR i 
2000 j 
2001 | 
2002 
| 2003 
| 2004 
1 2005 (year of separati k> 
• — r 1 
TOTAL WAG^S, TIPS, OTHER COMP. | 
$10,640.00 | 
$8,880.00 1 
$7,680.00 j 
$6,876.00 | 
$10,588.50 
$4,765.60 
i 
16. The Petitioner kept ttfack of her hours worked as an employee during the time 
she was employed by N.J. Trucking Inc. and/or Brough Tructdhg and Crane Service, Inc. 
i I 
In the last part of her employment, a time-card system was implemented to keep track of 
her hours as an employee. The petitioner never received any cneck for dividends or the 
distribution of income. (See Respondent's Exhibit 18.) 
17. Prior to the marriage] the Respondent, Mr. Brough, pwned a single family 
j 
residence at 19487 East River Rjoad, Duchesne County, Utah which was sold after the 
marriage for approximately $114 ,^000.00. 
18. The Respondent received a check of $24,702.84 which was deposited in his 
account to construct the house iri Neola, Utah. (Respondent's Ejxhibit 15c and 35) 
0uUi09 
UUU-lu I 
19. In relation to the Duchesne procertv theRM„ A ' 
! ne property, the Respondent received a favorable tax 
- r e s , and placed a
 fct ^ o n h j s ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
EaSt River Road , D u c h e s n e ^ U ( a h ,o f m a n c e b u s j n e s | e q u i p m e m ^ ^ ^ 
was paid when the residence wa^ s sold. 
20. Prior
 t 0 the m a r n a g ^ M , B r o u g h o w M d fiw ^ ^ ^ ^ 
- r r e d .0 as the j.andana ^ h , w h l c h , s o M ^ ^ j ^ ^  ^ 
Si 8,521.51. (Respondent's Exhibit 35) 
2'. The Innds
 from t h e j a , e Qf s e p a r a ( e p r o p e r t y w r e ) n t e n d e d ^ ^ ^ ^ 
received the same month 
(Respondent's Exhibit 31) 
purchase .he real property for ,hfe r e s i d e n c e fa ^ UM ^ 
"
 W h e
"
 thC C
'
0 S i n
^
t 0 0 k
 P ' a « <f> ^ purchase of the property! 
22. Prior to the
 marriag j , the NX Trucking I n c . o w n e f certain l i e n free ^ 
- ,nc,uding o i , d e r r i c k s ^ M r fiough ^ t h e , w h ; c h ^ ^ ^ 
e,uipme„t a„d proceeds were 4ectly used to pay for construe on costs of the Neola 
residence. (Respondent's Exhibit 15c and 39) i ! 
23. The Respondent a, a | , i m e s i s fte s o l e 0 W M r rf J ^ ^ ^ 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc and ».
 aii . .1 
(ico. Inc. and at all relevant fntes he held 100% of stock 
in the corporation. 
24. Prior in the ! 9 9 , s , t r j e R e s p o n d e m ^ . ^ ^ ^ fa ^ ^ 
to move his residence and jhe shop to the Roosevelt 
area of Duchesne County, State 0f Utah. ! 
Utah and made a business decision 
O u O i l O 
\j u C 4 0 U 
* • A — the thne
 H new s h o p ln R o o s e v e k , U ( a h ^ opene ( j> ^ p e t i t i ^ 
« ~ - the Respondent
 c o n c e r n m g e m p I o y m e m ^ ^ , o n t o ^ ^ ^ 
655
 "
 a
 " " * ' " ^
 b
* — - — has ^
 t 0 W Q r k , 
c l e . n i „ g p r o j e c t s a l t h e b u s i n e s M t a n h o u r | y r a t e o f e m p l o y m , n t 
*"
 T
"
 P e t i U O n e r
 ^
 q 0 m P e
"
S a t e d & r h
" « * - - ^urly b a s i s w h e n s h e 
commenced maintenanrp w™^ L ^ i 
menance work ^nd construction work at the sfton Sh. •• 
, , , wesjpop. She continued to keep 
her hours and receive income fwr «,„ . • 
ncome ftfr ,he
 w o r k ln a s s i s t i n g fo ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
S,
"
eSS WWCh C O n t i
™
e d
 ' ^ - — " « " > — u+til
 the ta she qui( 
W r t i n 8 fOT B r
°
U g h T
— *
 &
- — - . by ^ ^
 w w d „Q u j t„ M ^ 
t-rae-oard on May 8, 2005. (Respondent's Exhibit 18) 
27. The Petitioner, exciufhng the pickup truck, had S3429.00 more i„ J o m t 
Person, proper, than
 a c q u i r e d , u r m g ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
fiuled to adequately itemize the personal property. 
- O n O e t o b e r 1 5 , 2 o 0 8 ! a l o a n f r o m 2 i o n s b a n k m t h ^ o u n t o f $ i 6 o o o o o o 
" °
M n e d usms
"
 Neola
 ***- - — - M
 was used t0 pay business 
debts of Brough Trucking
 a n d Cfme 
' "
d
 '
h e
 ' W a t t o n has paid all of the 
payments on the business loan.5 , 
» • The $260,000.00 loari was for . business
 pm>ose ^ M r . 
ien Mr. Brough was laid 
Respondent's Exhibit 9 ts the
 amortizatio„ schedule of the loan. 
O l i U i l l , U u ' - " i . -i ^ 
up with a broken foot and the company was having difficulty operating. The Petitioner 
i I 
signed the loan because she wa|s on the title to the property, j 
i 
30. The Respondent shduld be ordered to assume that loan and refinance the loan 
i j 
i I 
within a reasonable time and to!hold the Petitioner harmless ftom that loan on the Neola 
icsidence because the loan is a liability of the business. j 
31. At trial, the Respondent introduced exhibits which (indicated that the computer 
! 
contested in pretrial issues was burchased by a check from the!business. (Respondent's 
Exhibit 22) The Petitioner to th^ judgment should pay the costb of copying the disk due to 
j i 
the fact that the Respondent claimed was not a business asset ill the amount of $322.50. 
i | 
(See Respondent's Exhibit 37) | 
t 
32. For the Tax year 2007, Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. had one full 
1 ' 
time employee, Doris Hyatt, a secretary. 
33. For the year 2007, M(r, Brough's income from the business operation was 
: i 
$61,370.00 and he personally pajid the income taxes on 100 % 6f the business income 
based upon the Subchapter election filed by the business. 
I ! 
34. The Petitioner signed) a corrective deed changing thf title on the "Ballard" also 
referred to as the "Pine Tech" property to reflect the intent of the parties that the 
1 
I 
acquisition of that property was by Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. (Respondent's 
I I 
Exhibit 13) The Ballard property is a joint venture with Byron pibson and the trucking 
i 
i 
company. The business venture commenced when the business istarted acquiring property 
U b -w -l o < 
O G u i l Z 
in20O4. The 80 acres in Ballajd is not maritaJ property and is subject to the prenuptial 
agreement. 
35, The Respondent, wilth the assistance of his daughters, assembled an accurate 
accounting of substantially all of the costs to build the Neola residence which was not 
contested by the Petitioner at trial. The source of funds was segregated as to each 
checking account in which either the business or Mr. Brough personal account deposited 
funds which were used to pay ttjie construction of the residency.6 The Respondent aJso 
traced the source of funds into tfie checking accounts set forth Jin Exhibit 15 by deposit 
slips and other business records)7 (See Respondent's Exhibit l£) 
36. The Petitioner contributed personal assistance, timfe and effort in building the 
Neola Residence but did not contribute fluids. The Petitioner cfid not prove at trial any 
6
 Mr. Bough testified that Kathy Brough was never a s igna l on his personal checking 
account identified in the accounting of Respondent's Exhibit 15. 8 
7
 Exhibit 15c and Exhibit 2\9 were identified at trial as deposit slips and other 
memorandum corroborating the separate funds property deposited irito the separate accounts 
These deposits include: 
a. $30,000.00 from the sale bf the Duchesne Property from the buyers of $30 000 00 
(See also Respondent's Exhibit 31): ' 
b. A deposit on 05/01/2002 for sale of $10,810.82 for Jim's House (in Petitioner' 
handwriting). 
c. A deposit of$54,000.00 dn 05/01/2000 that was deposited (into the NJ truckin 
account 
d $50,000.00 for the sale of used oil field equipment owned for 15 years 
e$30,000.00 from Chotaw for a Derrick purchased from the (business. 
f. $5,000 Sale of used oil field equipment by cashier's check. 
g, A deposit of $3,000 for oilfield equipment sold. 
h A cashier's check in the amount of $30,0000 to Brough Tracking on 05/17/2001 
0u0il3 UUJ433 
monelary amounts contributed to the construction of the residence of any separate funds. 
3 7. As set forth in Respondent's Exhibit 15(a), (b) and| (c)the costs paid by the 
business or Mr. Brough from a personal fund to construct Neojla residence are as follows: 
I. Brough Trucking & Crane Service Inc. $166,373.89 
(Checking laccount) 
ii. N. J. Truckingj(checking account) $86,559.12 
iii. Jim Brough, (personal checking account) $73318.10 
TOTAL $326,251.11 
38. The premarital and separate property of the Respondent was used to construct 
the Nfeola residence and the totall costs and expenses contributed by the Respondent from 
his premarital or separate funds lexceeds the present market Value of the Neola residence. 
39. The Petitioner is noi [entitled to alimony and she admitted during her 
deposition that she resided with iNed Ross prior to this trial and she was self sufficient 
and could pay her expenses. 
40. A.fter the marriage, the Petitioner continued to receive an income from Brough 
Trucking and Crane Service Inc.* which she deposited in her separate accounts at Zions 
Bank and Mountain America Credit Union. 
41. The Petitioner testified at trial that she was financially able to make at least 
$7,000.00 in payments prior to tljie time of trial to her attorney. In addition, after the time 
of separation, the Petitioner was jaot paying rent since March 2007 and she was buying a 
double wide trailer for $10,000.0,0 to place free of charge on hef Mother's property. 
42. The Petitioner's attorney was accepting monthly payments on the continuing 
10 
000114 
obligation for attorney's fees afld he Petitioner is able to contijnue to pay for her obligatior 
for attorney's fees from her pre'sent income. 
43. The Respondent incprred $3,798.75 to Randall Gkither, Attorney at Law, for 
reasonable attorney's fees and qosts necessary to provide documents, other information 
and to coordinate with the two appraisers concerning the business appraisals retained by 
the Petitioner by Court order. (Respondent's Exhibit 28) 
44, The Respondent's business incurred $8,672.08 in Expenses as set forth in 
Respondent's Exhibit 8 which sets forth the expenses of Amaijda Hansen and/or Kristy B. 
Claybum, employees of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Ihc. in assembling material 
and assisting in Court ordered appraisals of the business equipment. This is an 
unnecessary costs which is a facjtor in requiring the Petitioner t!o assume and pay her own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
45. The expert witness, $rad Townsend, was selected by the Petitioner and her 
attorney to act as her expert durijng trial. The appraiser in his report stated that he was 
unable to determine a value for N.J. Trucking, Inc. at the time (bf the marriage. 
(Respondents Exhibit 40) Brad Townsend's total bill was $12,j707.00 and he testified that 
he had been paid by Mr. Bough for a retainer on October 26, 2Q07 for $2,500.00 and 
received a check on August 24, 2007 in the amount of $2,918.C|5. In June 2008 Mr. 
Brough paid $1,500.00 for the appraisal by equipment appraiser, Ron Liese.8 
8
 On August 6, 2008, counsel for the Respondent recived an invoice for $7,563.46 from 
Norman, Townsend &Johnson,LLC. 
11 
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46. The appraiser, Brad Townsend, did not find that there was any good will over 
the basic value of the equipmerit after receiving extensive accounting information and 
financial information supplied tjo him by the Respondent.9 
47. The expert, Brad Tolwnsend, testified that there was no enhanced value of the 
income stream of the business in excess of the amount to pay for the services of the 
owner/proprietor in providing services in the business. 
48. The basis for valuation was the value of the sale ofjthe equipment which was 
an enhanced book value based Upon an equipment appraisal b^ Ron Liese. Mr. Liese was 
retained only after the appraisaljby Brad Townsend which used traditional techniques for 
economic valuation of a small business and indicated that there was no value in the 
business except the value in thejused equipment and assets. 
49. Irregardless of the prenuptial agreement, the value jof the business does not 
exceed the value of the services !pf Mr. Brough and would not be subject to any 
9
 Brad Townsend testified that Mr. Brough made all payments even though retained by 
Kathy Brough. Information came through Respondent's information. He indicated that the 
returns on investment by net income had lower value than value of tangible assets which sit idle. 
He indicated that in May 2008 he reached a determination after reviewing the books that there 
was no good will in business over (tangible value of the assets. He indicated that income stream 
fair return for value of owner for fafir salary for his work effort no additional return on assets 
base. Brad Townsend's opinion of ^ fair salary for Mr. Brough including quantify generated 
income, adjusted for the payment o{f directly out of business for personal expenditures: 
2003 $15,000 
2004 $57,000 
2005 $40,000 
2006 $ 25,000 
2007 $53,000 
12 
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50. At the trial, the Petitioner did not object to the specific accounting set forth in 
Respondent's Exhibit 15 which demonstrated that the costs ofbuilding the Neola 
residence came from either the premarital business assets oftrfe Respondent or from the 
Respondent's separate property,1 in his personal checking account. 
51. Based upon the appraisals received concerning the real property, the Court 
finds that the Neola Residence was valued at the time of separation and at the time of trial 
ai approximately $320,000.00 which was less than costs contributed to build and 
construct the residence by Mr. Brough. 
52. The Petitioner never .accounted for the value of any! joint personal property and 
only testified as to the lists prepared by the Respondent. Based upon the evidence at trial 
and the fact that the Petitioner was allowed by the Respondent,to use a horse trailer to 
make several trips to remove personal property when she separated, each party should be 
found to have in their possession at the time of trial an equal arhount of joint marital 
property. 
53. As to attorney's fees,) the Petitioner incurred a substantial amount of attorney's 
ees in relation to her claims asserted at trial concerning her clajim to the business and the 
Respondent prevailed on the issue of a valid prenuptial agreement. 
the • H' ° a n b e n ° g ° 0 d Wil1 in a b u s i n e s s t n a t is dependent for its existence upon 
individual who conducts the enterprise and would vanish wfere the individual to die, 
ire or quit work." Stevens vs. Stevens, 754 P.2d at 956 (citing Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 
Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (11966)). 
13 
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54. The Petitioner testified that at the time of trial she was residing with her 
mctherrent free and had the ability to save sufficient funds tojpurchase a new residence 
for herself and the sum of $7,0()0.00 would have been sufficient but for the business 
claim in these divorce proceedings. 
55. The Petitioner was employed and her monthly inccjme at the time of trial 
exceeded her expenses. 
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In considering the equitable factors traditionally used by the courts in 
distributing property in a divorcfe proceedings, the Court has taken into account the 
relevant facts that both parties Were married and divorced multjiple times prior to this 
marriage, both parties had children from prior marriages, the advanced age of the parties 
at the time of marriage, and the position of each party prior to flhe marriage. In light of 
the marriage of six years prior to separation, where no children! were born and in which 
the couple was married later in life, the court should attempt tojrestore the parties to their 
premarital status. 
2. The notarized prenuptfal agreement dated July 9, 199J8 is a valid and 
enforceable contract. 
3. Under the prenuptial agreement, the ownership interest of Richard James 
Brough of N.J. Trucking Inc. which was changed by name only! to Brough Trucking and 
14 
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Crane Service, Inc. during the rparriage is not subject to distribution during these divorce 
proceedings to the Petitioner based upon terms of the prenupti'al agreement. 
4. Further, even if the business interest was subject to distribution, the Petitioner 
failed to show by adequate evidence that there was any good vWll or enhanced value to the 
business after the marriage over and above the value of the senvices of Mr. Brough, 
5. The income, profits, sind the liability including the loan to Zions Bank secured 
by the Neola residence, of the business are excluded from distribution to the Petitioner by 
the prenuptial agreement. The Respondent should be ordered to refinance the loan on the 
Neola residence within a reasoniable period of time and the Petitioner should be held 
harmless therefrom, 
6. The property in Ballard, Utah is a business asset owr)Led by Brough Trucking 
and Crane Service, Inc. as was demonstrated when a Corrected Deed was voluntarily 
signed and acknowledged by the Petitioner placing the property in the name of the 
business entity. Therefore, the property is within the scope of the premarital agreement. 
7. During the course of t^e marriage the parties acquired certain personal effects 
such as recreational vehicles, telbvision sets and furniture which were intended to be 
joint-marital purchases by the parties and the jointly purchasedlproperty are not included 
within the terms of the prenuptial agreement. 
8. The property in Neola, Utah was placed in joint names and therefore the 
Petitioner has a legal interest by virtue of in the Deed which w$s executed after the 
15 
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in arriage which indicated a joinjt-marital interest in the real property. 
9. The residence in Neola, Utah was purchased and constructed us' 
l n g t h e
 Premaritaj 
and separate funds of the Respondent as accounted for in Respondent'* n . 
Exhibit 15.
 T h e r e 
was no proof at trial that there was any enhanced or increased value over 
of constructing the residence by the Respondent's separate funds Th 
' '
 nerefore> *e Neola 
residence should be awarded to the Respondent free and clear of an 
y claims by the 
Petitioner and the Petitioner shojuld be required to execute all necess 
a i y docuinents to 
transfer that interest. 
10. Based upon the reservation of the allocation of costs hv *u 
°y the court, the 
Petitioner should be required to pay all of the costs and expenses ' 
£d in these divn 
proceedings to determine valuation of Brough Trucking and Cfa c . 
erVlCe> Ir*c. to 
reimburse the Respondent for al| out of pocket costs made nrinfc. * • 
P r "* 'o ,na , i n r e l a t . o 
valuating the assets of the corporation and hold him harmless the 
11. It is equitable under Hhe facts and circumstances of fk 
ce 
e
 case that each 
assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs, excent th ,*» " P a r t y 
P t t h e
 Petiti0ner s h Q u 
responsible for the amount of $3,798.75 in appraisal oreani™-
g m 2 a ta f e e s t o 
Gaither, Attorney at Law, and the Respondent is entitled to a J ' d 
Sment in ^ 
12. The Respondent's business incurred $8 67? n» • amount 
'
 ,UK ln
 Senses
 a , 0 
„
 a
 «S Set f}wL 
Exhibit 8 the Itemization of expenses of Amanda Hansen and/ ' in 
employees of Brough Trucking 4nd Crane Service Inc. in ass • ' a y b u r n ' 
a t e r i al and 
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assisting in Court ordered appraisals and this is a factor in determining that the Petitioner 
pa^y for her own attorney's fees ;and costs. The Respondent prevailed on the execution of 
the premarital agreement and thjis is a factor in requiring the Petitioner to pay her own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
13. The costs and expenses of the valuation by the expejrt, Brad Townsend, were 
unnecessary in light of the fact that any value that he found was based upon the 
equipment appraisal by a third party and using the Property Tax Assessment from public 
records. 
14. It is equitable to require the Petitioner, in light of the prenuptial agreement to 
assume and pay any of the costs; of the appraisal, which she requested including the two 
business appraisals and a Judgement shall be entered requiring! the Petitioner to reimburse 
all of the costs of the Respondent which has paid to Brad Townsend and Ron Liese. 
15. It is equitable that each party assume and pay the costs of the real estate 
appraisals of the Neola, Utah property which was received intb evidence and no 
judgement should be awarded for those costs. 
16. It is equitable in light of the Court*s consideration Qf the evidence that each 
party should be awarded the personal property presently in their possession. 
17. The Petitioner should be ordered to assume and pay! the debt owed on the 2001 
Blue Dodge pickup truck in the amount of $4,557.14 as of June 10, 2008 to Mountain 
America Credit Union, (Respondent's Exhibit 14) 
17 
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• 8. The Respondent'. premarita, assets were not co-raing,ed w i ( h ^ 
proper, and he maintained theh, as separate entities, exeep, ft*
 t h e N e o ] a J * 
v*,ch has no vaiue over and above the premarita, and separate assets traced ^ 
he constru ction of the residence. y l n t o 
19. The Respondent should be awarded a Judgment in f h. 
gnient m the amount
 0f $ 3 2 2 
casts ,n reiaUon to the business asset, the computer, taken by the P e t l t i o n e r 
20. Tne Respondent should be awarded all costs to be s ^ J ^ 
Judgment Affidavit. P ° S t 
PQIHII 
fatness obiiga,io„s upon divorce The sne.T ' " " ^ 
•
 I t l e
 specific naming of the (,„„• 
consideration of the hold harness from h • " ^ * e 
eSS fr0m b u s i
"«s debts reinforces th, , f 
* " " « - — 1 * * , rnc, the Cass Store d " " 
properties of the Respondent. W P e r S ° n a ' ° r famiI* 
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In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 161 Utah Adv. Rep. (Ct App 1991) the 
Court stated the facts as follows; 
The Rudmans were marrlied on April 18, 1981. Both palrties had previously been 
married and divorced. At the time of the marriage, Mrsj Rudman had been 
receiving $1,100 per mopth in permanent alimony frorrj her former husband. Part 
of Mr. Rudman's premarital property included several rhovie theaters in three 
states, two condominiums, and a cabin. Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman's 
counsel prepared a prenijptial agreement, which the parkies signed on April 15, 
1981. The agreement stajted that each party relinquished all claims and interest to 
property the other had aqquired prior to the marriage a4d that such property could 
not be deemed a marital asset following the marriage, t h e agreement was "not 
intended and does not apply to any property which is accumulated by the parties 
either individually or joihtly following the marriage of jthe parties." 
The court found that Mrj. Rudman's premarital asset*; were not commingled 
with marital property, land that he maintained themj as separate entities, 
including those that were improved through expansion or remodeling. Thus, 
under the parties' prenupjtial agreement, the loan receivables were properly 
characterized as premarital assets, as were the condominiums and the cabin. 
Mrs. Rudman contends the trial court erred in interpreting the prenuptial 
agreement. She argues tljiat the agreement specifies that any interest and 
appreciation accruing to [premarital property after the marriage becomes marital 
property. Mrs. Rudman also claims the court abused! its discretion in failing to 
find that she contributed labor and/or assets to his premarital property, thus 
converting it to marital property, Specifically, she cljaims the court abused its 
discretion by failing to find that she assisted Mr. Rudmjan in the operation of his 
business by helping to "remodel, clean, vacuum, paint,|run errands, make and hang 
drapes, purchase and prepare food... and work as a ticket taker," thus converting 
those businesses to marital property. She claims the cojjrt abused its discretion in 
failing to find that she irhproved and furnished the condominiums and the cabin, 
resulting in those propeitties becoming commingled intp the marital estate. She also 
claims the court abused its discretion in finding that lo^ns made to various 
business entities operating Mr. Rudman's theaters were due to Mr. Rudman alone, 
rather than to the marital estate. Mrs. Rudman claims that improper exclusion and 
improper valuation of this property reduced the marital estate by $472,589. 
19 
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In Rudman, the trial court found that a fair reading of the agreement clearly 
separated premarital property from property accumulated after the marriage. The trial 
court also found that, under the agreement, any premarital property, together with any 
interest or increase, would remain the property of the owner, ahd any property acquired 
after the marriage would be marital, "less that amount utilized (for its acquisition that can 
be traced to a point prior to the iinarriage.n The Court of appealjs stated: 
We find no error in the trial court's legal interpretation of the document. Under the 
terms of the prenuptial agreement, where each party relinquished all rights to 
previously acquired property of the other party, he or she would also have no right 
to any increase in value or additional earnings that mighlt accrue to that property. 
Likewise, any property acquired by the parties after the marriage would accrue 
earnings into the marital estate. Additionally, if any amq>unts used to acquire 
property during the marriage could be traced to premarital property, those amounts 
would remain the separate property of that individual Thus, to preserve the 
premarital integrity of an asset that has been arguably commingled with property 
acquired after the marriage, that asset, or its severable part, must be traced to its 
original source. 
In Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v, Blomquist, 112 P.2d 1382 (Utah 
1989) the Court indicated that a resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent is 
permissible only if the contract document appears to express the parties1 agreement 
incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement. Here, the Petitioner's 
comment that about what Mr. Brough's description of the premarital agreement was is 
irrelevant. 
The Respondent respectfully submits that the premarital agreement should be 
enforced in these proceedings. 
20 
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POINT II 
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ANY CO-MINGLING OF SEPARATE 
PROPERTY. 
In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing 
spouses and separate property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or 
similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse. Olsen y. Ohen> 169 P.3d 765 
Utah App. 2007) In the recent decision in Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476, 
20O8 UT App 11 (Utah App. 01/10/2008), the Court stated: 
The Utah Supreme Couft has determined that when .one party in a divorce 
proceeding uses separate property to purchase a marital home, that party is 
entitled to the equity in the home that resulted from his or her investment. See 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) (upholding trial court's 
ruling that the wife should receive credit for her inheritejd separate property that 
she invested in the partie^ home during the marriage). Bjut [t]he rule that property 
acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should be ^warded to that spouse . . . 
does not apply when the property thus acquired is consuhied, such as when a gift 
or an inheritance of money is used for family purposes; ivhen the property 
completely loses its identity and is not traceable because! it is commingled with 
other property . . . ; or whfen the acquiring spouse places !title in their joint names in 
such a manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property. Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304J307 (Utah 1988) (citations omjitted). 
The trial court treated the $81,000 of equity in the Family Home as Wife's separate 
property to compensate her for the $90,000 of her inheritance used to improve that 
asset, Although we are unable to evaluate the overall proiperty settlement because 
of the lack of findings on value, the recognition of Wife's separate property interest 
in the improvements to the Family Home was within the!trial court's broad 
discretion. 
In Cox v. Cox 877 P.2d 1262 (Ut Ct. App 1994), the Court recognized equitable factors 
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relevant to equitable factors to this proceedings. The Court stated: 
Where the marriage is of short duration, where no children were born and 
where the couple was married later in life, a trial cojurt may properly attempt 
to restore the parties to; their premarital status. See,je.g,, Georgedes v. 
Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44,:45 (Utah 1981) (trial court dicj not abuse discretion to put 
parties to short second marriage back into sole ownership of premarital properties); 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980} (where husband was 73 
and wife was 68 at time <&f marriage, and where marriage was short, trial court did 
not abuse discretion in awarding premarital home to wife even though she deeded 
it in joint tenancy to husband). 
In addition, a trial court ijiay properly consider other factors relating to distribution 
of premarital property including the amount and kind o£ property to be divided; 
whether the property was acquired before or during the jmarriage; the source of the 
property; the health of the parties; the parties' standard 6f living, respective 
financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the diiration of the marriage; the 
children of the marriage, the parties' ages at time of the marriage and of divorce; 
[and] what the parties gave up by the marriage. Hogue % Hogue, 831 P.2d 120, 
122 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Burke v. Burke, 733 Piid 133, 135 (Utah 1987)). 
In Cox, the Wife claimed, the trial court erred in finding ithat appreciation on the 
house was not due to her remodeling efforts. The Court affirmed the trial court in its 
memorandum decision which determined that once Husband's and Wife's expenditures 
were deducted from the $105,000.00 value of the house, the residence had not materially 
appreciated. 
As to the scope of the agreement, in Berman v, German 749 P,2d 1271,(Ct 
App. 1988) the Court of Appeals stated: 
i 
Plaintiff argues that the antenuptial agreement only concerned the defendant's 
business assets, not the ho.use, because the only asset specifically mentioned in the 
agreement was the billiard business. Defendant argues that the agreement means 
exactly what it says and exempts " real and personal property," including the 
22 
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house, from inclusion in the marital estate. The house should have been preserved 
as the separate property of defendant. We find the trial court erred when it did not 
include the house in the antenuptial agreement. 
At trial, the Petitioner testified that the parties kqpt their finances 
"separate". However, in the closing arguments at trial, the attorney for the Petitioner 
claimed that there was some type of a "marital pot" implying that there had been some co-
mingling of funds during the course of the marriage and the court should in some manner 
limit the premarital contract. 
However, an objective review of the evidence will show that each party maintained 
separate checking accounts and credit cards. For example, the Petitioner indicated that 
after the marriage she received some separate money from a prior divorce which she 
placed in here separate checking account and paid personal expenses on her separate 
credit cards from her personal account. The evidence concerning the fact that she kept 
hours, received W2 forms and received corporate checks and deposited those checks into 
her separate checking account prove the opposite of co-minglirig of funds by the parties. 
Mr. Brough sold business assets and property he owned prior to the marriage and placed 
them in separate checking accounts. 
In relation to the evidence of landscaping and doing some work on the Neoia 
residence, see Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329 (Utah App.2007), the court stated: 
Husband next argues that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied 
the law in determining that the appreciation on the real property was Wife's 
separate property, as opposed to marital property subject to an equal 
division among the parties. Husband does not dispute th&t the real property 
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was purchased from Wife's premarital funds and, thus, >vas initially Wife's 
separate property. Nor does he dispute that any appreciation on Wife's 
separate property would also be considered Wife's separate property. 
Husband appears to argue, however, that events within the marriage 
converted this separate property into marital property. 
Premarital property loses its separate identity and becomes a part of 
the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense 
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, 
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where 
the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other 
spouse." Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405,^20, 147 P.3d 464 (quoting 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)). 
We are not persuaded by Husband's arguments that his purported 
efforts-including doing some tile work in the home andj "supervising" 
landscaping and home theater installation-were sufficidnt to obtain an 
equitable interest in the home. Instead, we agree with tlje trial court that 
"[Wife] kept the asset separate" and that the facts do not support a finding 
that "[Husband] made any contribution to the house" otfyer than possibly a 
monetary contribution toward landscaping and tile—a portion of the one 
deposit made into Wife's separate account-for which the court ordered 
reimbursement to Husband. 
The Petitioner did not prove the separate property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling or exchanges. 
POINT III 
EACH PARTY SHOULD ASSUME AND PAY THEIR OWN ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY AND REIMBURSE 
THE COSTS OF THE EXPERTS. 
From the commencement of this action, the Respondent has been faced with an 
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expensive appraisal process. When the report was finished right before tr" 
lal> ^e expert 
witness fees totaled approximately $17,000.00. These pretrial costs were i 
because the Petitioner choose litigation to disregard her signed agreement 
substantial business interest in the business, going to far as to obtain an T D ^ 
n l
 K-O as to 
a 
the business. 
At trial, the expert Brad Townsend indicated that there was not « «, 
A . u
 r
 Efficient
 g r o u n d s 
to determine any enhanced value of the corporation during the mania e 
"
etitiorier 
who was familiar with the one man business, chose to litieate at ^ . 
S eat great cost to attempt 
obtain an interest subject to that agreement when she should h™. u 
known there
 W a s n o 
value to distribute. A graphic example of this point is the fact that 
brote his foot the business had to borrow funds on the Neola resid 
Since the Petitioner drastically increased the costs and
 PVn0 
Expenses of this legal action 
by making a claim for a substantial portion of the Respondents u • 
P
 '
 S b U 8 l n e s s
 and business 
assets. The Petitioner should be pay the costs. Concerning th*.** • . 
g a d m , m s t r a
«°n of
 j u s t i c e 
in all divorce cases, it is not sound policy to allow with a party th • 
.
 u u
 a S l g n e d a
 Premarital 
agreement to require the other spouse to advance substantial co 
s and expenses to the 
allow the spouse to attempt to "swing for the fence" The R 
espondent prevailed on the 
business issues and the Petitioner should pay for the pvn^o- ;. 
expensive litigation costs of her 
experts. otnerown 
The Respondent respectfully submits that in this sDecitt • 
P l l l c Nation the factors 
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require the Petitioner pay her own attorneys fees as well as the costs of the attempt to 
prove a business interest. The Court should take into account tie fact that Mr, Brough 
was required to pay extra business costs, lose of time to coordinate the appraisal, expend 
employee expenses, accounting fees and substantial attorneys fees. These costs accrued 
up until the expert announced his decision on the day before trial that there was no 
goodwill, no enhanced value or value over the return of Mr. Brough for his services and 
expertise. In light of the valid prenuptial agreement it is equitable that the Petitioner 
reimburse the Respondent for any attorney's fees and costs, including mailing costs, 
i 
incurred in preparing and organizing documents and information delivered to the experts 
for appraisals of the business of $3,798.75. The Respondent should be awarded of all 
costs of this action. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2008. 
ILL GAITJ 
Attorney for th^Respondent 
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FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF tAW AND 
MEMORANDUM was faxed and mailed to: 
CLARK B.ALLRED . _ ^ 
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C. / 
72 NORTH 300 EAST si _ Q ^ 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066 7(k^ 
FAX: (435) 722-3928 
2) day of AMSh DATED this 7_) _  of 
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ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84 06 6 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO: 
1. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
2. OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
4. MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 054000084 DA 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Petitioner submits the following memorandum in opposition to the 
following motions submitted by Respondent: 
1. Motion for New Trial 
2. Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
3. Motion for Relief from Judgement and Order 
4. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement 
Petitioner is submitting one memorandum rather than a separate 
memorandum for each motion since the arguments and issues raised in 
000133 ULu501 
each motion are essentially the same, and multiple memoranda would, 
therefore, be duplicative. 
BACKGROUND 
Trial was held in this case on July 9, 2008. Petitioner and her 
witnesses testified that, during the marriage, she remodeled the 
Duchesne house, built living quarters in the Roosevelt shop where the 
parties lived, supervised the construction of the Neola house and 
completed the construction when the Respondent ran off the 
contractor, raised the Respondent's two teenage children, prepared 
the meals and cared for' the home and also worked in the business 
helping enhance its growth and prosperity. She cosigned on loans and 
put what money she had into the properties. That evidence was not 
rebutted. Respondent claimed all the assets were his premarital 
assets or were acquired with premarital assets. However, the evidence 
showed that there was debt on premarital assets such as the Duchesne 
home and the Bandana Ranch property which debt was paid with marital 
funds, that any monies from the sale of assets were commingled and 
used to pay operating expenses, that numerous assets had been added 
to Brough Trucking and the nature of the business had changed thru 
the efforts of both parties, and that assets such as the Ballard 
property and the Neola home were jointly acquired and jointly titled. 
0u0I34
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Respondent was unable to trace any alleged premarital monies or 
assets to present assets. 
Both parties submitted pretrial briefs and both parties argued 
the case at the conclusion of the trial. Petitioner's position was 
that assets had been acquired during the marriage and/or improved, 
changed and enhanced during the marriage and should be divided 
equally. Respondent's position was that, despite the years of 
marriage, the raising of his children and the Petitioner's working to 
improve and enhance assets, everything belonged to him and Petitioner 
should get nothing and, in fact, should pay for the costs of the 
appraisals and Respondent's costs and fees incurred in responding to 
discovery. 
The Court took the case under advisement and asked each party to 
submit, by August 8th, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and a decree of divorce for the Court's consideration. Both 
parties submitted their versions prior to or on August 8th. The 
Court, apparently after reviewing those documents and doing such 
additional research and analysis as it felt proper, agreed that the 
Petitioner's proposed documents were consistent with the evidence and 
the law and signed them on August 28, 2008. 
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1. The procedure of having each party submit proposed 
findings and a decree is customary practice in Utah courts 
and was appropriate. 
Respondent's primary complaint is that the Court did not adopt 
his proposed findings and decree. As pointed out in State v. James, 
858 P. 2d 1012, 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), where the court signed 
findings prepared by the state, "the trial court may request counsel 
to submit proposed findings."1 Those findings will be affirmed unless 
the record shows "'that the trial judge failed to adequately 
deliberate and consider the merits of the case7". Jd. (Quoted 
authority omitted). Unless the record shows "that the findings 
[signed by the court] don't reflect the judge's view, the appellate 
court 'must assume that he found them satisfactory in all 
particulars.'" Id. (Quoted authority omitted). "Findings prepared by 
counsel for a prevailing party and adopted verbatim by a trial court 
are considered to be those of the trial court and may not be rejected 
out-of-hand, but they will stand if supported by evidence." Id. 
In Automatic Control Products v. Tel-Tech, 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 
1989) , the trial judge, at the conclusion of the trial, took the case 
under advisement, allowed both parties to submit memoranda and later 
i 
See also Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah 
1998) (stating that it is common practice in Utah for the trial 
court to have counsel submit proposed findings). 
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requested both parties to submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The court signed the defendant's proposed 
documents and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the court had 
mechanically adopted the findings prepared by counsel for Tel-Tech. 
The appellate court ruled that "there is no indication from the 
record here that the trial judge failed to adequately deliberate and 
consider the merits of the case." Id. at 1260. The plaintiff also 
complained (as Respondent does in this case) that it was not notified 
of the court having signed the findings. The appellate court rejected 
that argument, stating: 
Nor was there any error in the failure of the trial court 
to notify ACP's counsel promptly after he had signed his 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment. 
Our rules do not require the court to give notice but put 
the burden on counsel to check periodically with the clerk 
of the court as to the date of entry of the findings and 
judgment so that post-trial motions may be timely filed. 
Id. 
2 . The evidence fully supports the Findings of Fact signed 
by the Court. 
Respondent also alleges that certain findings are not supported 
by the evidence. The following are the findings challenged by 
Respondent and the name of the witness(es) whose testimony supports 
those findings. 
Finding No. 5 is supported by the unchallenged testimony of 
Petitioner. 
5 
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Finding No. 8 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner, 
Respondent and Brad Townsend, as well as numerous exhibits relating 
to the checking accounts, the appraisal and the loan for the 
$160,000.00. 
Finding No. 12 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner and 
her son and was not challenged. 
Finding No. 14 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner and 
Respondent and by exhibits including the deed, closing statement and 
check. 
Finding No. 18 is supported by the appraisal by Mr. Barneck, the 
deed and the testimony of both Petitioner and Respondent. 
Finding No. 2 0 is supported by the testimony of Respondent, 
especially on cross-examination, and the exhibits demonstrating that 
the monies from the sale of assets went to pay operating costs, not 
to acquire the home or other assets. 
Finding No. 21 is supported by the exhibits regarding the sale 
of the Bandana Ranch, the documents regarding the purchase of the 
Neola property and the cross-examination testimony of Respondent. 
Finding No. 22 is supported is supported by the testimony of 
Respondent on cross-examination and the exhibits regarding the sale 
of the Duchesne shop and the checking account records. 
6 
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Finding No. 23 is supported by the documents regarding the sale 
of the rig, the documents regarding the construction of the home and 
the checking account and the testimony of the parties. 
Finding No. 24 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner, the 
testimony of Respondent and the documents regarding the sale of the 
home. 
Finding No. 33 is supported by the affidavit of fees and the 
testimony at the trial by counsel for Petitioner which was not 
rebutted. 
Finding No. 34 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner and 
her financial statement exhibit. 
Finding No. 35 is supported by the testimony of Respondent and 
the pleadings. 
3. The award of fees is supported by the evidence. 
Respondent also complains about the Court's awarding to 
Petitioner her attorney fees incurred. Primarily, he contends that 
the Court did not deduct fees she had managed to pay on her bill. In 
making that complaint, Respondent misunderstands or ignores the law 
on this issue. The trial court has discretion as to whether to award 
fees and the amount of fees. Arnold v. Arnold, 2008 UT App 17, Ijll. 
The Court should make findings on the financial need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability to pay by the payor spouse and the reasonableness 
7 
of the fees. Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, flO. There is no 
requirement that the Court deduct fees a party may have paid. In this 
case, the Court made findings on those required issues. See findings 
of fact 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 and conclusions of law 12 and 13. 
4. Respondent's claims of prejudice, that the judgment is 
excessive, that the Court did not address the prenuptial 
agreement and did not make findings on separate property is 
without merit and not supported by any facts, the law or 
the findings signed by the Court. 
Respondent also alleges that the Court's decision was under the 
influence of prejudice and the award was excessive. He makes that 
assertion without any sustaining facts. The Court rejected his greedy 
and unsupported position that he was entitled to everything, despite 
the parties' years of marriage, the Petitioner's years of work to 
improve the Duchesne house and the Roosevelt shop and to build the 
Neola property, the Petitioner's raising of his children, the 
Petitioner's providing of cooking, cleaning and housekeeping, the 
Petitioner's working in the trucking business, the Petitioner's 
acquiring debt personally and putting her own funds into the home, 
and the joint titling of assets. Respondent was unable to trace any 
of his alleged premarital properties and the documents were contrary 
to his position. The facts and the law fully support the Court's 
decision to divide equally the assets acquired or enhanced during 
this marriage. 
8 
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Respondent also makes the bold unsupported assertions that the 
Court did not address the prenuptial agreement and his claims to 
separate property. The findings of fact, the conclusions of law and 
decree address each of those issues in detail, and those findings are 
fully supported by the evidence. The Respondent's claims are without 
merit. 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Court deny the 
post-trial motions submitted by Respondent. 
DATED this 0^>^day of September^008 . 
ALLREl/& MCCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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I, Carrie Weight, am employed by the office of ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner herein and hereby certify 
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DUCHESNE COUNTY; SEPTEMBER 25, 2 005 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're on the record. This is Brough vs, 
Brough. 
Gentlemen, I thought probably the thing to do to 
expedite this, I understood there was some questions about my 
handling the case. I had asked each of you to prepare 
findings, conclusions, and a decree and then I was going to 
look them over and decide which one that I would sign and 
that's all I did. I didn't intend to write another decision or 
make any amendments. I furnished to you notes, findings of 
fact, conclusions and a decree which I dictated to my secretary 
in Vernal the day after this trial and if you'll read through 
those there are some holes that are missing but basically you 
can get the concept of what my thinking was. If you read that 
and go through that, you'll see that Mr. Allred's findings and 
conclusions pretty much paralleled my own thinking and that's 
the road that I took and that's why I executed his documents. 
Now at this point I guess we better hear from counsel 
and see if I can satisfy your questions. 
Mr. Gaither? 
MR. GAITHER: Your Honor, I've seen this document 
000145 
(inaudible) went into the clerk's office and asked for the file 
and so I've read and looked at this and I would submit there's 
a substantial difference between Mr. Allred's and the Court's 
findings and this does, I would submit support our position 
that the judgment and decree should be set aside as being 
mechanically adopted and if that was the Court's intention, as 
I put in my affidavit, I had no idea that it was going to be, -
you were going to accept one or accept the other. I've never-
THE COURT: I thought I was pretty clear on that. 
MR. GAITHER: No, I don't - I guess the evidence 
which shows what my position was is that I sent over a disk and 
a letter saying if you need to use this because a lot of courts 
do that, they'll take some findings from one party and some 
from the other party and put it together. So I was assuming it 
was suppose to be we were going to state the case in the light 
most favorable to each party and then the Court equitably 
weighs it and issues a ruling and there was an indication that 
the Court was going to issue a ruling. So I was - I did not 
submit it on that basis and I would submit that in light of the 
confusion that's happened in this case, I received no notice — 
THE COURT: Notice of what? 
MR. GAITHER: Well, there was no ruling. 
THE COURT: After the trial I indicated that I wanted 
you to prepare findings, conclusions and a decree and I could 
pick one or the other or make one up somewhere in between. I 
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thought I was pretty clear on that. 
MR. GAITHER: I think - I listened to the tape, it 
says you prepare proposed findings. I don't think there was 
language of decree as to my recollection but I didn't prepare a 
decree because the decree I prepared was the Court indicated, 
well, the parties are divorced so I prepared a decree of 
divorce which was never entered and the parties aren't divorced 
as they sit here today even though that should have been 
entered about a month ago. So there's been some substantial 
procedural problems. 
THE COURT: Let's see if we can fix them today. 
MR. GAITHER: Well, I would like to and I would think 
that the first step if I could and - can I make a suggestion? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. GAITHER: That the divorce decree be set aside, 
the one that was entered on September the 4th and that — 
THE COURT: I thought you told me the parties weren't 
divorced? 
MR. GAITHER: You didn't divorce the parties, that 
was a partial decree. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GAITHER: So I would suggest first is there is 
sitting in the file and unsigned divorce decree which 
bifurcates the issues, divorces the parties, reserves the 
property issues and then we could set this for a hearing and 
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then I would be happy to address these proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law of the - the rules provide that the 
Court can consider those issues. But the problem with the 
divorce decree is it's putting a lot of pressure on my client. 
He's down to 60 days to come up with over $300,000 and the way 
that's drafted, he's had to make a contested election because 
the way that counsel prepared it they only had 15 days from 
that date. So it's been very difficult for him to do that. 
And one of the things, if the Court adopts some 
findings, as far as the mechanics of the decree, it's my 
position that this was done by petitioner's counsel for 
petitioner's benefit and placed my client in a very difficult 
situation and if the decree is set aside, I understand which 
way the Court is leaning. I believe that there are some errors 
that can be shown to the Court and there's a ruling here, I 
mean, as I read this one — 
THE COURT: Please understand that isn't a ruling, 
that's just some notes to — 
MR. GAITHER: Some notes, right. 
THE COURT: - solidify my thinking from the day after 
the trial. 
MR. GAITHER: I understand that and what I would 
propose is that I be able to file some - we have a hearing on 
the objections that I've made to the decree and to the findings 
and I will try on behalf of my client to take this new tact of 
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saying, okay, well, we're going to try - instead of trying to 
object to everything, find the best shot that he has to try to 
convince the Court of the equities of the situation which I 
didn't do in the last one, and maybe we can do in the next one 
and then the Court can then - I'll submit a proposed decree on 
the property issue which I've never done and I'd like to be 
able to produce something that would separate the house from 
the business so that's it's possible he could do a partial 
settlement of the house as opposed to the business, try to keep 
those separate. So I would move the Court to grant the Motion 
to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce entered on September 4 and 
set this matter for further hearing and I've got my calendar. 
THE COURT: Okay, the way this would normally work I 
suppose would be after we hear from Mr. Allred, let me give it 
some thought. Let me find the decree you're talking about. 
Was that the one Allred prepared? 
MR. GAITHER: Yes, it was the one -
THE COURT: What's the date on that? 
MR. GAITHER: It's signed on August 29, entered on 
September 4th. 
THE COURT: It's come to my attention also that the 
personal property items from the evidence that I heard, there 
wasn't too big of a dispute about those and I was going to 
order that the parties either get those settled on their own or 
go to mediation. As I recall Mrs. Brough wasn't claiming a 
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substantial amount of personal property. 
MR. ALLRED: That was, I think Exhibit 24 or 
something like that. Most of the stuff she had before they got 
married. 
THE COURT: Okay, I want to hear from Mr. Allred. 
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, at the conclusion of the 
trial, the Court indicated it was going to take the matter 
under advisement. Counsel for the respondent asked if the 
parties could get divorced while it was under advisement and 
the Court indicated, yes, and bifurcated it. So I agree - and 
Mr. Gaither did send shortly after the trial a proposed decree 
to the Court. I saw it, did not object to it. All it did was 
divorce the parties and the paperwork I prepared at the other 
request made by the Court was that the parties submit by the 
8th of August proposed findings, conclusions, I understood a 
decree. I drafted those shortly after the trial and submitted 
those as requested by the Court as to counsel for the 
respondent and the decree I furnished did indicate that the 
Court had already entered an order divorcing the parties but 
that's not been signed. That probably needs to be done that 
they need to get divorced. 
I see no basis for the Court to set aside what has 
happened here or to have more hearings. We had a full date 
trial, both parties submitted briefs before the trial that went 
to their issues and then we had the trial and then the Court 
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indicated what it wanted and it was my understanding, it's not 
the first time the Court has asked for proposed decrees nad 
findings or orders and findings and sometimes the Court will 
agree with one or the other or do something in between and so I 
drafted it so that I thought it was consistent with the 
testimony, much of which was undisputed. 
I've just barely seen what the Court has handed out 
but just going through that quickly, it seems very consistent 
with exactly what was drafted here. Basically what we have 
here is that the respondent says everything is mine, petitioner 
doesn't get anything and not only that she ought to pay my fees 
and costs. Our position has been they'd been married 10 years, 
my client remodeled his Duchesne house, she remodeled the 
Roosevelt shops, she constructed the Neola home, she worked in 
the trucking business as they built that up and was making 
about $170,000 some odd when they married and was making 
$800,000 when they separated and had significant more assets 
and a name change and change of business. So she was involved 
in the increase and that. She raised two of his children, did 
all the homemaking, put whatever money she had into this family 
and into the assets — 
THE COURT: Mr. Gaither, let me ask you a question. 
Are the parties divorced or not? 
MR. GAITHER: No. 
THE COURT: You prepared a bifurcated decree 
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divorcing them and Mr. Allred says he approved it and I don't 
see it in the file. So what — 
MR. GAITHER: It's in the file. It's there, I saw it 
a few minutes ago. It's just not signed. 
THE COURT: It's not been signed? 
MR. GAITHER: It's unsigned. 
THE COURT: Okay, well that's an oversight on my part 
probably. 
MR. ALLRED: It just needs to be done. It's not a 
big deal. 
The facts again - all that was undisputed and I think 
both the Court felt that as I look what the Court did here and 
the documents I've put forth shows that and it's very 
consistent with the case law. There's a ton of cases that say 
when parties work like that jointly even though he may have 
kept the title in his name and other things, it becomes marital 
property and all those are footnoted in the findings. 
The argument, well, the Court can't mechanically 
adopt the findings which is really the basis of the motions by 
the respondent is the case law says that he has the burden to 
show that the Court did that and the Court has pretty well made 
it clear right here now that that didn't happen. The Court 
actually drafted out its thoughts the day after and I'm sure 
read all the documents carefully and adopted those that were 
consistent with the facts of what the Court decided. 
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The respondent's got the burden and I don't think 
there's anything to show that. The findings that he listed as 
not being supported, in the memo I've submitted went through 
and listed the exhibits and the witnesses to support those 
findings. A lot of the findings that he objected to were his 
own client's testimony on cross examination where he conceded 
that, you know, they intermingled funds and they spent monies 
for various things and monies he claimed for premarital things 
were actually two years before the house was built or anything 
like that and had been used in the business for other reasons. 
A lot of the monies were used to support the family and support 
the business for the year plus that he had a broken leg. 
I don't see any reason for the Court to change 
anything the Court has done. I'd ask the Court just to sign 
the bifurcated decree so they're divorced and be done with it. 
I really object to counsel's new suggestion is that he be given 
time to write some more motions and have another argument. 
It's just time to move forward. I don't know if the Court has 
any question for me but what the Court has done is fully 
supportable and very consistent with the facts and the law in 
this case. Thanks, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Gaither? 
MR. GAITHER: Your Honor, I haven't argued all the 
objections. That would take at least an hour, an hour and a 
half but if you look at the finding, the potential finding, you 
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indicated N.L. Trucking was worth $200,000 as of the date of 
the marriage. That hasn't been backed out of Mr. Allred's, so 
there's a $200,000 difference between the decree you signed and 
this document and so there is a substantial difference, it's 
not the same and this document talks about the house value of 
$312,000 where Mr. Allred took his $325,000 appraisal and 
didn't take into - this is what I expected - a usual balancing 
of the case and then — 
THE COURT: I thought there was -
MR. GAITHER: - there is a substantial difference. 
THE COURT: - I thought you guys stipulated on the 
value of the house? 
MR. GAITHER: No. 
THE COURT: Was there opposing -
MR. GAITHER: There's two appraisals, one for $305 
and that's why the day after you took the $305 and the $325 and 
you split it down the middle which was a balancing and 
equitable consideration of the case that I expected in ruling 
that never came and now that we have this, Your Honor, I 
suppose we need to have this marked as an exhibit. I think 
that in light of the problems that exist I would ask the Court 
to just set aside the divorce decree. The mechanics of the 
divorce decree are very difficult. It says my client has got 
to come up with $385,000 which doesn't give him the value of 
his premarital property and he's got to come up with that in 60 
10 
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days from now essentially because a month has gone by in a 
financial market that's very difficult for him to borrow money 
and at the very minimum there should be some equitable 
situation and if the Court entered the findings, we should at 
least have some input in the decree under Rule 7, that talks 
about decrees, we're able to see that and what the Court did 
here was adopt Mr. Allred's in total, his mechanical approach 
which just favored his client and put the clamps on my client 
in a very difficult situation and so I would request that there 
be a hearing on my motion for a new trial, especially in light 
of the fact that we've just seen this situation. I think that 
the rule for a new trial provide that the Court in an equitable 
consideration like this can amend the findings but I would 
submit that these are, by mechanically adopting and I found 
cases that support my position, mechanically adopting one side 
or the other in any civil case is in error and by doing it in a 
divorce where there's got to be weighing and balancing on each 
issue, on attorney's fees issues, on the house, on the business 
and what's happened here is we've got the argumentative 
position of counsel which the Court is adopting and I don't 
believe that that's been fair. It doesn't have the - I can 
indicate to my client it does not have the appearance of 
fairness and we would ask that the decree be set aside and so 
there be no final judgment and order. Otherwise we're in 
another mess because we've got a final judgment and order that 
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requires an election. He's been forced to make that election 
under protest but the time is running and so if we set this for 
30 days down the road to give us a change to show the Court the 
errors, there's also an error about the liabilities. This 
$160,000 that's owed on the house was never on the business and 
if she's going to get the business, then she gets half that 
$160,000 debt. That's another $80,000. So there's a $280,000 
swing that the Court has never really considered but if we come 
back in a month and then the Court denies it then he's -
without setting aside the divorce decree, he's still under the 
gun, he's facing the gun of having to come up with $385,000 
within 30 days and that's not fair. 
THE COURT: Okay. I guess the parties having been 
heard, let me indicate that when I reviewed both of your 
proposed findings and conclusions I did not mechanically adopt 
Allred's findings but they were consistent with my own 
thinking. The only reason I show you those notes from my 
dictation the day after trial was just to show you where I was 
and what I was thinking. If Allred's findings vary somewhat 
from those notes, that's fine. When I reviewed his I totally 
agreed with what he put down and how it was presented. I'm 
sorry that the time frames are not consistent with what's going 
on. I expect the attorneys could work something out on that, 
given the situation that's before us but I'm not going to set 
aside the findings and conclusions and the decree. I will sign 
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the decree divorcing the parties. They will divorced today as 
soon as my clerk enters it and I'm not going to - you know, if 
you want to make a motion for a new trial I'll hear that but 
I'm not going to set this aside and allow you to reargue the 
case. We already did that. 
MR. GAITHER: Your Honor, first order of business is 
we need to make these findings I've been handed as part of the 
record in this case. 
THE COURT: I don't know. I guess I have no 
objection to that but it wasn't intended to be part of the 
court file when I prepared it. So with that having been said, 
if you want to make it an exhibit you're welcome to do that. 
MR. GAITHER: All right, I'd like to make this an 
exhibit then. At this time I'd offer Defendant's Exhibit 1 
pending motion for a new trial. 
THE COURT: I'll receive it. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1 received) 
MR. ALLRED: And I just want to (inaudible) I assume 
the record has the Court's comments on the purpose of that? 
THE COURT: Yeah. I don't want the record that goes 
to the Court of Appeals to have anyone say that this is a 
proposed ruling. All it is is a matter of formulation of 
present thought impressions the day after the trial and I 
dictated those in some hurry and I didn't intend them to be 
actual final conclusions of decree. I just wanted to recall in 
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my own mi nd what I was thinking and I only offer this Exhibit 1 
a s e / i d e i i c e c f 11 1 a f I I a • r j i i g r e ^  r j e v i e d t h e c o n c e p t o f t h a t 
Exhibit. 1 and reading Mr. Allred'' s pleadings that he filed, I 
found them to bo consistent in 1erms of my thinking and 
weighing I h< jm I. i o. " >, 1 ,jnrpr v i " ,• << > mnfusf^d 
about my ruling and why 1 did it, that's why 1 did it. 
ME. GAITHER: Well, Your Honor, you've just - that's 
not t T \\r
 f that' s i 10 t: correct Tl lere i s <\ >. 'fu i , i n n i 11 i f f e n n c r 
between those two. In the one that ynn indicated you said the 
] -jsiness was worth $200,000 before the marriage. Hi Allred 
cidid it was - didn't account tor IIML i, n ,111111 1I1 11 " < 1 
$200,000 difference. So for the Court to state that they are 
essr»mt i,j 1 1 ' l lie same is not a correct statement and — 
THE COURT: Maybe it isn' t : I d:i dn' t he iv« > 1 .1 le 1 "c score] 
in front of m e . I'm just going off the top of my head. 
MR, i;MTHF,P* And 1 hm*. f i h d ,i Motion f-n 1 New 
Trial and is the Court denying the Motion for a New Liial. 
THE COURT: Yes, I wid 1. 
Mil- , 1 lAITUEb , ml 1 Iht tt ilnnyinn tin' Motion to 
Amend and Correct the findings of tact? 
THE COURT. „ j , I thought I was pretty clear on 
t t ia1 :. 
MR. GAITHER: And let me make sure what other motions 
I have pending. 
THE COURT: I' 11 give yoi 1 tl le address of tl le C01 irt of 
14 
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Appeals if you want. 
MR. GAITHER: I know the address. I have a notice of 
appeal right here, Your Honor. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: All right. 
GAITHER: All right, I filed objections to 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and I've supported 
those with a memorandum. I prepared this (inaudible) with oral 
argument. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
the Judgment? 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Yeah, I've read those. 
GAITHER: All right. Is the Court denying those? 
COURT: Yes. 
GAITHER: I filed a Motion for a New Trial. 
COURT: Denied. 
GAITHER: I'm filing a Motion to Alter and Amend 
COURT: Denied. 
GAITHER: Filed a Motion to - well, to Stay the 
Proposed Judgement and Order? 
THE COURT: That was on the basis of what? ! 
MR. GAITHER: That was on the basis that the 15 days 
in the decree would run before today and it was just a matter 
of simple accommodation of a party - the Court did sign it so 
my client had to file a notice of election under protest. So I 
guess that one would be moot because counsel does acknowledge 
that (inaudible) received a notice of election. 
15 
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•.• M R . ALLRED : No, havon't seen if. 
MR. ^AITIlEf" i .-in . klivrr.'l tli. I,M1I,\- , f rO.ec.fi .JI b> 
his office? 
MR. BROUGH: Got a receipt. • 
MR. ALLRED: (I: laudi 1 : ] e) . 
MR. GAITHER: What's that? 
MR. .ALLRED: I've been in my office all morning, 
nob ; / :. , 
MR. GAITHER: No, It jas a ;• k ','r~ :r Friday. 
MR. RROUGH: We got a receipt. 
MR. ,, 1 L R h L>: L g c L ( J na< ] d i \ I e j 1 i di i • t r e c e i v e 11 ia t 
THE COURT: I guess -
MR. ALLRED: But I'] ] get a copy of i t. 
MR. GAITHER: What's that? 
THE COURT: i ., , i'1 i 1 i, A .? 
MR. ALLRED: It would be moot. If he wants to appeal 
then he can file a new motion to stay based on that. 
MR GAITI IEI :,: \ h 0 1 , 1 .1 I ; : ic :i t \ JOI; .] di i' t 1 e r i, :>i >t 
thei i I,r d ask the Cour t to give us until today as far as 
filing the election and — 
-.-.-.. (:i i I a u d i b 1 e) c o p ^  (i n a i i d i b 1 e) 
seen it but -
MR.. GAITHER: I prepared and my client has elected 
Option. I under Mr. Allred's decree. .-• 
16 
Ohli i h Q 
THE COURT: What is the purpose of that? How does 
that help your client? 
MR. GAITHER: Your Honor, the decree that Mr. Allred 
prepared which you adopted says that he has to give notice to 
keep his business by paying an amount of money in 90 days and 
he has to do that 15 days from the date of the divorce decree 
which is the 4th and he did that prior to the — 
THE COURT: I think in all fairness -
MR. ALLRED: That's not what it says. He was given 
the option to either, if he wanted to keep the house and pay 
her some money for it or if he didn't she could have the house 
THE COURT: Did he have to do that within 15 days? 
MR. GAITHER: That's what the decree said and so I 
filed a motion to stay that until today and then when I didn't 
get any ruling any on that my client, I prepared a notice of 
election on a date on September 11th and it was delivered on 
the 12th. 
THE COURT: Let's see if we can solve that. It 
seemed to me because of the numbers involved here and the 
gravity of the - not the gravity but the short time frame, I 
would offer on my own at this time to extend that deadline. If 
it was up today, I'll extend it another 21 days. 
MR. GAITHER: All right, so he had 90 days from the 
date of the election. 
MR. ALLRED: That's fine too. 
17 
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MR. GAITHER: And I would ask that order be prepared. 
MR. ALLRED: Motion for New Trial, Objection to 
Findings and Motion for Relief — 
MP. CAfTHEF; N.itn-n 'f IVli^f f, om Judgment and 
Order and I've supplied the reasons for that and the memorandum 
and I would add to that the ruling, the - I would add to that 
t h e E x 1 1 i b i t 1 11: I a t' s 1: E 31 I r e c e :i i;; r e d i i I t : e v :i d e n c e t o d a y, 
THE COURT: Okay. I don't know how that's different 
from the other motions you've filed and that I've denied. Tell 
me how j t/s differer it. 
MR. GAITHER: What/s that? 
THE COURT: Tell me how that's different. 
MR. CA1TJJEP T h j t i : d j L t e i e n I "'", I h a t 
that incorporates the procedural issues that were raised about 
i he C• :>i 1r: t i I :»t :i s sI ii n g a ri 11 i ng about no not i ce of the Cour 1:' s 
decision ever being mailed to my o lit ice. I il < JJI urp >i J1 < b 
the Court's making a mechanical adoption of pleadings prepared 
I i ^  !:  1 I e p e t :i t :i o i I e r' s a 1 1 o r n e y a i I d abandoning - there is a 
constitutional objection which I've made ana the Court nas 
seen, that the Court has abandoned - L^'s :u: position and 
we• re > • : m a i n , : r nr.cr va.s 
abandoned his constitutional duties as a juacc rj•} -\. . .- * • 1:1: i e 
petitioner in a divorce proceedino to : repare findings wh.ch a 
Court adopts with pi' p» r juJi ' io . ' , .-
18 
difficult position here. Your Honor made statements from the 
bench and I'm not able to cross examine the Court but I would 
submit that the Court by its indications and the mistakes that 
have been made in this case, is a proceedings fraught with 
error, fraught with mistakes, not giving adequate notice to an 
attorney and not giving adequate notice that the Court was 
going to essentially a flip of a coin of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law — 
THE COURT: I resent some of your language here, Mr. 
Gaither. You're getting awfully close to pissing me off. Now 
I don't know - I always give notice to counsel. 
MR. GAITHER: Your Honor, the findings say that 
you're going to issue a ruling. There's never been a ruling to 
this minute issued by Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I thought I was -
MR. GAITHER: That is as far as a practicing 
attorney, that's very disrespectful that I'm telling my client 
oh, we're going to get a ruling and we don't get anything. 
THE COURT: Well here's the thing. I heard this 
case, I was attentive, I submitted my thinking with that little 
note that's been marked Exhibit 1 and as I recall, your 
proposed findings said, well, your guy got everything and she 
didn't get anything and I thought that was a ridiculous 
position for you to take. When I looked at Allred's 
conclusions and findings, I did not just mechanically adopt 
19 
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those I reviewed those, they squared with my thinka ng and I 
s i :j" i • :: :I 1 1 i e i i: i. a: 1 i I n: i 1 : I: :j o :i i 1 g I > '( 1 1 1 i( i r i : a s i d e . ' : ' i • I :j i i < E s s 
we're really done here except for you to file your appeal. 
MR. GAITHER: And I've cfot it riqht here but I'm 
goi i I• g to ai Isv, : • n Honor, in preparing the 
findings of fact is 1 got a CD from the Court and my findings 
are prepared objectively based upe:~ th~ evidence and you're 
t i<;1 " , " I 1 prepared rhem in my - --• *"-' - favor on aJ 1 the 
issues because the usual procedure as I set forth in my 
affidavit is that's uhe way div *---.' . • parti es g:i e 
their position and then the Court has the obligation to make an 
equitable decision based upon it'F a divorce proceeding and 
THF '^OHPT < f J t 1 it ' " .» " ' " " ' " h d . 
MR. GAITHER: And I think you didn't. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's where we disagree. 
MR. GAITHER: I o) ] i::i :jl: il I. I: I • : i il 1 f. i .3 e : : 1: Jc :»1 i, .e of 
Appea1 , You r Honor ? 
THE COURT: You can do that on your way out I quoss. 
MK. iiA.LTHER: Now as far as the Motion to I II be 
filing a Motion to Stay Execution for a stay of the judgment on 
appeal. 
THE COURT: A:.J 1 Li:.:.k 'hat Mi. Allied can either 
agree, disagree or make you post a bond. I th i nk we're done 
here, counsel. 
'"•'.MR. ALLRED: If the Court would like 1/11 prepare an 
order that denies the motions and extends that 21 days from 
today and 90 days from the election. 
THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate -
MR. GAITHER: Well I -
MR. ALLRED: (inaudible) on the record. You 
indicated your would like an order? 
MR. GAITHER: Yes and I would like to be served a 
copy of that and I would — 
MR. ALLRED: I will. 
MR. GAITHER: — like an opportunity to respond to 
that. 
THE COURT: To what? 
MR. GAITHER: To his proposed order. 
THE COURT: As to what we've done here today? 
MR. GAITHER: I'd like the rules to be followed. 
MR. ALLRED: I will mail a copy. 
THE COURT: I guess now I'm tracking with what you 
said. If you'll help me, direct me to the decree divorcing the 
parties I'll sign it now. Is that - can you give me a date on 
that? You said you saw it in the file. 
MR. GAITHER: There's two files. Does the Court have 
two files there? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. GAITHER: It might be in the other one. It's 
loose in the other file. It was right below those proposed 
21 
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findings that you had — 
• ... . : (11 1 a. i i d i t J e) f i r s t p a r t o f An g u s t i f I 
recall. No wait, it was in middle of July, we tried this the 
9zh of July, wasn't i t? 
THE COURT: I J J tel ] y oi i wi lat 
find it and bring it up here and I'M 1 sign it. 
MR. GAITHER: There's a yellow folder, Your Honor. 
. I: > o i i J : o ] :: c i I 11 I e r e, 11 I e r e'" s s o m e 1: t h e r e 11: i a t s a y s s i g n 
on there. It's right there. 
MR. ALLRED: This document here, Your Honor, says 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Do we need to formally deal with the 
3 s i i E :> f t h e p e r s o n a ] p r o p e r t y ? 
MR. GAITHER: Your H o n e , .• ' s my p o c . : . ! 
^ .on ' t w a n t t o g e t i n t o c o n t e m p t buT tha*~ you a r b i t r a r i l y 
: i o f j t ed In i I i I 'In i i I i i in lu ' lod f i '- I u if ^ , f u r n i s h i n g s a n d 
d e l e g a t e d t h a t f i n d i n g t o t h e a t t o r n e y i o r t h e p e t i t i o n e r a n d 
x t ' s t o t a l l y u n f a i r and w e ' r e g o i n g t o t a k e an a p p e a l . 
(Wlif r. t-iUpun tin liL.ai.ijj'1 I I i i i i i i ' ludt i I) 
2 0 
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Respondent's Exhibit Number Eight 
Itemization of expenses of Amanda Hansen and/or Kristy B. Clayburn, employees of 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. in assembling material and assisting in Court 
ordered appraisals. 
Hrs 
12 
12 
6 
6 
4 
4 
7 
51 
Employee's 
Name 
Amanda Hansen 
Kristy Clayburn 
Amanda Hansen 
Kristy Clayburn 
Amanda Hansen 
Kristy Clayburn 
Amanda Hansen 
TOTAL(s) 
Description 
12 hrs. x 26 days x 13.00 
12 hrs. x 26 days x 13.00 
Appraisal photos and tour 
of shop & office 
File adjustment overlook 
of shop & office 
Photo file folder 
Premarital house finance 
breakdown 
Fuel for errands 
Rate 
338.00 
338.00 
13.00 
13.00 
13.00 
13.00 
42.86 
Amount 
$4,056.00 J 
$4,056.00 1 
$78.00 
$78.00 
$52.00 1 
$52.00 
$300.08 
$8,672.08 
0 G G I 6 7 
T?« 
,-Ac-. 
BROUGH TRUCKING 
\ \ ^ e 
Date: Name Ck# Amoun' Discrip Deposits 
05-16-01 
05-25-01 
05-29-05 
06-03-01 
06-05-01 
06-21-05 
06-21-05 
07-05-01 
07-05-01 
07-11-01 
07-12-01 
07-16-01 
07-26-01 
08-07-01 
08-07-01 
08-10-01 
08-13-01 
08-13-01 
08-13-01 
08-16-01 
08-17-01 
08-17-01 
08-27-01 
08-27-01 
09-05-01 
09-07-01 
09-07-01 
09-10-01 
09-13-01 
09-13-01 
09-13-01 
09-14-01 
09-17-01 
09-18-01 
09-21-01 
09-25-01 
09-25-01 
09-26-01 
09-26-01 
09-26-01 
09-27-01 
09-28-01 
10-08-01 
10-08-01 
10-08-01 
10-11-01 
10-11-01 
10-11-01 
Stewarts 
Duncan 
Bircheil 
Wade Huxford 
•cr /» 
1 
ivieiabasa 
IFA 
Allreds 
Basin Builder 
Brett Rasmussen 
Duncan 
Lowes 
Lowes 
Lowes 
Lowes 
Sears 
Western Farm 
Duncan 
Swains Elec 
George Kenedy 
Esquire Estate 
Woody Stone 
Rick Shivers 
IFA 
Basin Builders 
George Kenedy 
Roofing World 
Reciept 
Sears 
Longs Plumbing 
Wade Huxford 
Wyatt Huxford 
Lowes 
Duncan 
Economy Floor 
AMSO 
B & B Rental 
Lowes 
B Brothers 
Anderson Lum Rec 
Tom Montoya 
Lowes 
BlueBell Store 
IFA 
Jones Paint 
Basin Builders 
CC 
1523 
1537 
1541 
CC 
1585 
1586 
1618 
1619 
, , , 
1669 
1697 
1698 
cc 
1701 
1735 
1703 
1737 
1738 
1740 
1743 
1744 
1769 
1773 
1781 
1786 
CC 
CC 
'803 
7 
) 
t 
; 
1816 
1819 
1828 
1829 
1831 
1829 
1848 
1849 
1851 
1866 
1876 
1867 
$351.14 
$579.98 
$1582 
$500 
$38.99 
$579.98 
$426.20 
$10000 
$219.28 
$164.10 
$63.66 
$7000 
$579.98 
$1712.92 
$280.50 
$2041 
$267.53 
$1500 
$78.74 
$579.98 
$2000 
$3000 
$778.74 
$1941.71 
$620 
$54.42 
$14.81 
$3032 
$119.91 
$39.02 
$1261.35 
$3000 
$1150. 
$50 
$1622.97 
$579.98 
$4000 
$3187.69 
$1761.84 
$1202.58 
$1761.84 
$1405.69 
$50. 
$382.22 
$3835.18 
$441.96 
$134.77 
$94.20 
Well 
Fence 
Supply 
Land 
Supply 
Labor & Supply 
Supply 
Land Scape 
Supply 
Labor & Supply 
vVood & Supply 
Wood & Supply 
Supply 
Wood & Supply 
Appliance 
Irrigation Pipe 
Land 
Elect 
Fire Place 
Supply 
Fire Place 
Sheet Rock 
Supply 
Supply 
Fire Place 
Supply 
Supply 
Appliances 
Plumbing 
Fence 
Labor 
Supply 
Land 
Flooring 
Windows 
Sheet Rock 
Supply 
Labor 
Supply 
Labor 
Supply 
Tin 
Supply 
Paint 
Supply 
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07-28-03 
08-25-03 
09-29-03 
10 28-03 
10-20-08 
11-24-03 
12-22-03 
01-21-04 
02-27-04 
03-15-04 
04-19-04 
04-26-04 
06-14-04 
07-08-04 
08-09-04 
09-08-04 
10-06-04 
11-22-04 
11-22-04 
12-09-04 
12-20-04 
01-05-05 
02-09-05 
03-04-05 
03-21-05 
04-22-05 
04-22-05 
05-19-05 
06-01-05 
06-28-05 
07-26-05 
08-11-05 
08-29-05 
Duncan 
D.--
Duncan 
Duncan 
Nielsons 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Leon Ross 
Leon Ross 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Duncan 
Desert Splash 
Duncan 
Basin Builders 
Harward Irr 
Harward Irr 
Duncan 
Hank Hansen 
Hank Hansen 
Basin Builder 
3250 
3314 
3357 
3419 
4242 
3417 
3544 
3602 
3676 
3716 
3808 
3810 
3930 
3963 
4053 
4117 
4209 
4316 
4335 
4363 
4404 
4439 
4518 
4580 
4633 
7693 
4700 
4752 
4806 
4873 
4946 
4968 
5003 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$1500 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$3648.75 
$3648.75 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$579.98 
$3871.10 
$579.68 
$402.78 
$1000 
$1240.73 
$579.98 
$112 
$178.50 
$1435.27 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Insert 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Second Well 
Second Well 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Land 
Pool 
Land 
Deck 
Pipe For Well 
Pipe For Well 
Land 
Labor Deck 
Labor Deck 
Decking 
0U0I70 
N. J Trucking 
Date 
08-30-00 
08-04-00 
12-19-00 
08-14-00 
01-22-01 
02-15-01 
02-21-01 
02-02-05 
03-01-01 
03-06-01 
03-19-01 
03-21-01 
03-21-01 
03-23-01 
03-28-01 
04-10-01 
04-16-01 
04-17-01 
04-17-01 
04-20-01 
04-20-01 
04-30-01 
05-03-01 
05-04-01 
Name 
Farm & Title 
DOWR 
Berry Birchell 
Frontier Lum 
Duncan 
Byron Gibson 
Sid Scholes 
Duncan 
Duchesene County 
Byron Gibson 
Byron Gibson 
Moon Lake 
Moon Lake 
Kielabasa 
Duncan 
Christensen 
Duncan 
Wimelson 
Kielabsa 
Stripper Oper 
National Farm 
Frontier Lum 
Wimelson 
BigT 
ck# 
279334 
15929 
1230 
15964 
1284 
1313 
1331 
1332 
1345 
1347 
1372 
EFT 
1374 
cash ck 
1398 
1415 
1451 
1452 
575013 
2319 
1461 
1474 
1477 
1479 
Amount 
$20,105. 
$75.00 
$1120. 
$1500. 
$579.98 
$250.00 
$178.50 
$579.98 
$1287.84 
$3000. 
$1000. 
$2433 
$811 
$15000 
$579.98 
$800. 
$579.98 
$142.97 
$20000 
$2677.50 
$269. 
$8434.39 
$173. 
$5000. 
Discrip Deposits 
Land $20,105 
Permits $75.00 
Well 
Logs $1500. 
Land 
Perk Test 
Blue Prints 
Land 
< Permits 
Dirt Work 
Dirt Work 
' Electric 
\ Electric 
Labor & Supply 
Land 
;Labor 
\ Land 
Labor & Supply 
Labor & Supply 
iLabor 
Supply 
Logs 
Labor 
Furnace 
0GUJ.71 
Jims Personal 
ID i!E;i!!!!!M||:::]i ci sits; Date •: Nai i le: 
4/26/2001 Frontier LUM. 
775/2001 Kielbasa 
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RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for the Respondent 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNt COON rY, U i w 
AUG \ \ 2008 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK^ 
IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, RESPONDENT'S POST-TRIAL 
BINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSION OF LAW & 
MEMORANDUM 
Petitioner, Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
vs. 4-.. 
Case No. 054000084 ./( 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner and Respondent were married on July 14, 1998 and seven years 
s pending action. The later on August 30, 2005, the Petitioner filed for divorce in thi 
parties separated on August 1, 2005. 
2. The Petitioner had been married and divorced four previous times before this 
marriage and had a child from a relationship with another individual prior to the first 
marriage. The Petitioner was 54 years old at time of trial and ivas 45 years old at the time 
„ O o u b ^ 
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of marriage. The Petitioner's first 1 i lan iage was wl lei 1 si le \< /4s se v enteen yeai s of age, 
During her life she had three children, all of age, and no children with Respondent.1 
3. At the time of the marriage the Respondent was 50 years old. V-
B: l l i L . . S'Jii'. 
in the trucking i: du i> 
a^unoi, aiu: .iiLcr serving UI..L 
R L " N P I ^ i 1 >' * r-M't- d 
1 1 1 l i ! V. > larines started working 
17 years prior to this marriage in 1982 as a corporate business 
as sole shareholder/ 
entity with the Respondent 
agreement which had been typed by the Petitioner. ! he Petitioner contacted an attorney 
first and then in an effort to save costs typed the agreement. In that agreement, the 
Petitioner stated that she hem m- wann to any personal properties, assets or money of the 
R espoi ident, v < • r :!; Sei \ ice, Ii :ic ) tl: le Glass 
Store, or any personal or family properties of the Respondent. !(See Responds 
1
 At trial the Petitioner testified that the type of work she had performed was mostly 
physical labor, with some secretarial experience. At the time of thef trial, she said she works as a 
laborer, She testified that she met Mr. Brough and her fourth husbind in 1993 at bar. Some time 
after being hired on as a shop hand and laborer the Petitioner moved in with Mr. Brough in 
December 1, 1997 in his Duchesne residence. When she first met lJ4r. Brough, the Petitioner did 
not have a truck and only an interest pending in relation to divorce proceeding with her fourth 
husband. At trial, the Petitioner acknowledged her first job was to 
quarters inside the residence as an employee. 
jwork on fixing up the living 
mai ma: 
Nancy 
!
 f\ Ir. Brough had been married two times prior to the 
had four children with his first wife and he was divorced form 
Respondent's Exhibit 11, the corporate return for 2007 lists Richard 
owner of stock. Respondent's Exhibit 32 indicated that Brough TrUckin; 
was in good standing with the State of Utah as of the date of trial 
ge with the Respond;;. :. 
Brough in 1993. 
J. Brough as the 100% 
g and Crane Service, Inc. 
0u0.i7i '0 O U o 
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5. The Respondent agreed in the premarital agreement 
be responsible for debts occurring from the listed properties aijid agreed to assume all 
business debts.4 (See Respondent's Exhibit 1) 
6. Prior to the marriage, the Petitioner was the bookkeeper and receptionist at N. J 
Trucking, Inc. She was an hourly employee at N. J. Trucking] 
1995. The Petitioner was aware of the type of business owneld by the Respondent and 
that the Respondent was the sole shareholder. 
7. The Petitioner did not introduce any evidence or facts at trial to show that the 
prenuptial agreement was signed on the basis of any claim of fraud or duress. 
8. After the marriage, the Petitioner maintained separate financial accounts in her 
name only at Zions Bank and Mountain America Credit Unioit. She deposited the funds 
which she received from employment at Brough Trucking an4 Crane Service, Inc. into 
that the Petitioner would not 
in 1993 for two years until 
her separate accounts. The Petitioner also deposited the fund^ she received from a 
premarital settlement as her separate property which she used (to pay of her premarital 
3In relation to Respondent's Exhibit One, the Petitioner described business using "Inc." 
and she knew it was a corporation when she typed up the agreement. She was aware that Mr. 
Brough owned 100% of the shares and she was never issued any sbjares of the corporation. 
Concerning Respondent's Exhibit One, Kathy Brough stated at trial, "The fact is I 
don't want and didn't want anything Jim had prior..." In relation t|o Respondent's Exhibit One 
the Petitioner said during cross examination that she was aware the business using "Inc" and she 
knew it was a corporation when she typed up the agreement. She wfas aware that Mr. Brough 
owned 100% of the shares and she was never issued any shares of jhe corporation. 
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debts. The Petitioner had separate four or five credit cards in her name. The Petitioner 
had $3,000.00 in her separate accounts at the time of separation with the Respondent in 
2005. 
9. After the marriage, the Respondent, Richard James JBrough, maintained 
separate, personal checking accounts in his name at Wells Far! 
America Credit Union. 
feo Bank and Mountain 
10. The Petitioner and Respondent resided together prior to signing the premarital 
agreement. 
11. The Petitioner testified that she did not have a mo tor vehicle prior to the 
marriage. After, the Petitioner received a settlement from her 
used the money to pay separate pre-martial debts for her credit cards. 
12. The parties maintained separate accounts until separation and never co 
mingled any funds which they received separately during the jnarriage in any joint-
checking or joint-savings account. 
13. The Petitioner never introduced any checks in evidence which proved any 
expenditures which she actually made to construct the residence in Neola, Utah that was 
jointly titled in both parties names. 
14. The Petitioner spent money on temporary landscaping at a local nursery for the 
Neola residence which was not a cost to build and construct the residence. 
15. The W-2s of the Petitioner which were received a$ 
fourth husband which she 
Respondent's Exhibit Ten 
0u0i?6 0Uuo4b 
state yearly income as a corporate employee of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc 
as follows: I 
YEAR TOTAL WAGES, TIPS, OTHER COMP. 
2000 $10,640.00 
2001 $8,880.00 
2002 $7,680.00 
2003 $6,876.00 
2004 $10,588.50 
2005 (year of separation) $4,765.60 
16. The Petitioner kept track of her hours worked as ah employee during the time 
she was employed by N J. Trucking Inc. and/or Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. 
In the last part of her employment, a time-card system was implemented to keep track of 
her hours as an employee. The Petitioner never received any 
distribution of income. (See Respondent's Exhibit 18.) 
17. Prior to the marriage, the Respondent, Mr. Brough 
check for dividends or the 
, owned a single family 
residence at 19487 East River Road, Duchesne County, Utah which was sold after the 
marriage for approximately $114,000.00. 
18. The Respondent received a check of $24,702.84 vyhich was deposited in his 
j 
account to construct the house in Neola, Utah. (Respondent5si Exhibit 15c and 35) 
0u(Ji77 DUU345 
[ 9. In relation to the Duchesne property, the Responds ;nt received a favorable tax 
interest and placed a first mortgage on his premarital residence which he owned 19487 
East River Road in Duchesne County, Utah to finance business equipment and that note 
was paid when the residence was sold. 
20. Prior to the marriage, Mr. Brough owned five acr^s near Fruitland, Utah 
referred to as the "Bandana Ranch", which he sold after the njiarriage and received 
$18,521.51. (Respondent's Exhibit 35) 
21. The funds from the sale of separate property were intended for and used to 
purchase the real property for the residence in Neola, Utah an(d received the same month 
as when the closing took place on the purchase of the property. (Respondent's Exliibit 31) 
22. Prior to the marriage, the N.J. Trucking Inc. owned certain lien free business 
assets including oil derricks and rigs. Mr. Bough sold the assets which included oil field 
! 
equipment and proceeds were directly used to pay for construction costs of the Neola 
residence. (Respondent's Exhibit 15c and 39) 
23. The Respondent at all times is the sole owner oft he business known as 
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. and at all relevant tjmes he held 100% of stock 
in the corporation. 
24. Prior in the 1990's, the Respondent had a residence and shop in Duchesne 
Utah and made a business decision to move his residence anjd the shop to the Roosevelt 
area of Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
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25. Around the time the new shop in Roosevelt, Utah jwas opened, the Petitioner 
contacted the Respondent concerning employment. The Respondent indicated that the 
business had a secretary and bookkeeper. The Petitioner has hired to work in cleaning, 
l 
constructing and helping to build and organize the shop, as w^ll as other maintenance and 
| 
cleaning projects at the business at an hourly rate of employment. 
26. The Petitioner was compensated for her work on an hourly basis when she 
commenced maintenance work and construction work at the s|iop. She continued to keep 
her hours and receive income for the work in assisting to construct the residence and 
business which continued through the course of the business ijntil the time she quit 
working for Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. by writing the word "Quit" on her 
time-card on May 8, 2005. (Respondent's Exhibit 18) 
27. The Petitioner, excluding the pickup truck, had $3,1 829.00 more in joint 
personal property than acquired during the marriage to the Respondent. The Petitioner 
failed to adequately itemize the personal property. 
28. On October 15, 2008, a loan from Zions bank in th amount of $160,000.00 
was obtained using the Neola Residence as collateral. The lo^n was used to pay business 
debts of Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. and the corporation has paid all of the 
payments on the business loan.5 
29. The $160,000.00 loan was for a business purpose vi^ hen Mr. Brough was laid 
Respondent's Exhibit 9 is the amortization schedule cbf the loan. 
7 
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up with a broken foot and the company was having difficulty joperating. The Petitioner 
signed the loan because she was on the title to the property. 
30. The Respondent should be ordered to assume that loan and refinance the loan 
within a reasonable time and to hold the Petitioner harmless ffom that loan on the Neola 
residence because the loan is a liability of the business. 
31. At trial, the Respondent introduced exhibits which! indicated that the computer 
contested in pretrial issues was purchased by a check from the business. (Respondent's 
Exhibit 22) The Petitioner to the judgment should pay the costs of copying the disk due to 
the fact that the Respondent claimed was not a business asset in the amount of $322.50. 
(See Respondent's Exhibit 37) 
32. For the Tax year 2007, Brough Trucking & Crane 
time employee, Doris Hyatt, a secretary. 
Service, Inc. had one full 
33. For the year 2007, Mr. Brough's income from the business operation was 
$61,370.00 and he personally paid the income taxes on 100 % 
based upon the Subchapter election filed by the business. 
of the business income 
34. The Petitioner signed a corrective deed changing the title on the "Ballard'5 also 
referred to as the "Pine Tech" property to reflect the intent of tjhe parties that the 
• • • I 
acquisition of that property was by Brough Trucking & Crane jService, Inc. (Respondent's 
Exhibit 13) The Ballard property is a joint venture with Byrorj Gibson and the trucking 
company. The business venture commenced when the businesi started acquiring property 
000x80 G o u o ^ ^ 
in 2004. The 80 acres in Ballard is not marital property and i£ subject to the prenuptial 
I 
agreement. j 
35. The Respondent, with the assistance of his daughters, assembled an accurate 
accounting of substantially all of the costs to build the Neola Residence which was not 
contested by the Petitioner at trial. The source of funds was Segregated as to each 
checking account in which either the business or Mr. Brough personal account deposited 
funds which were used to pay the construction of the residence.6 The Respondent also 
j i 
traced the source of funds into the checking accounts set forthj in Exhibit 15 by deposit 
slips and other business records.7 (See Respondent's Exhibit 1| 5) 
36. The Petitioner contributed personal assistance, tinie and effort in building the 
Neola Residence but did not contribute funds. The Petitioner (did not prove at trial any 
6
 Mr. Bough testified that Kathy Brough was never a sign^or on his personal checking 
account identified in the accounting of Respondent's Exhibit 15. i 
7
 Exhibit 15c and Exhibit 39 were identified at trial as deposit slips and other 
memorandum corroborating the separate funds property deposited jjnto the separate accounts. 
These deposits include: j 
a. $30,000.00 from the sale of the Duchesne Property from h^e buyers of $30,000.00. 
(See also Respondent's Exhibit 31) ! 
b. A deposit on 05/01/2002 for sale of $10,810.82 for Jim'i House (in Petitioner's 
handwriting). ! 
c. A deposit of $54,000.00 on 05/01/2000 that was deposited into the NJ trucking 
account. j 
d. $50,000.00 for the sale of used oil field equipment owne<ji for 15 years, 
e.$30,000.00 from Chotaw for a Derrick purchased from the business. 
f. $5,000 Sale of used oil field equipment by cashier's check. 
g. A deposit of $3,000 for oilfield equipment sold, 
h. A cashier's check in the amount of $30,0000 to Brough Trucking on 05/17/2001 
000181 | G u u 3 4 l 
monetary amounts contributed to the construction of the residence of any separate funds. 
37. As set forth in Respondent's Exhibit 15(a), (b) an<ji (c)the costs paid by the 
• ! | 
business or Mr. Brough from a personal fund to construct Neola residence are as follows: 
I. Brough Trucking & Crane Service Inc. 
(Checking account) 
ii. N. J. Trucking (checking account) 
iii. Jim Brough, (personal checking account) 
TOTAL 
$166,373.89 
$86,559.12 
$73318.10 
$326,251.11 
38. The premarital and separate property of the Respondent was used to construct 
the Neola residence and the total costs and expenses contributed by the Respondent from 
his premarital or separate funds exceeds the present market value of the Neola residence. 
i 
39. The Petitioner is not entitled to alimony and she admitted during her 
deposition that she resided with Ned Ross prior to this trial anjd she was self sufficient 
and could pay her expenses. 
40. After the marriage, the Petitioner continued to receive an income from Brough 
Trucking and Crane Service Inc. which she deposited in her separate accounts at Zions 
Bank and Mountain America Credit Union. 
41. The Petitioner testified at trial that she was financially able to make at least 
i 
$7,000.00 in payments prior to the time of trial to her attorneyj. In addition, after the time 
| 
of separation, the Petitioner was not paying rent since March 2007 and she was buying a 
i 
double wide trailer for $10,000.00 to place free of charge on l^ er Mother's property. 
! 
! 
42. The Petitioner's attorney was accepting monthly payments on the continuing 
10 
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obligation for attorney's fees and he Petitioner is able to continue to pay for her obligation 
for attorney's fees from her present income. 
43. The Respondent incurred $3,798.75 to Randall Cjaither, Attorney at Law, for 
'. i 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs necessary to provide docjiments, other information 
and to coordinate with the two appraisers concerning the busijness appraisals retained by 
the Petitioner by Court order. (Respondent's Exhibit 28) 
44. The Respondent's business incurred $8,672.08 in expenses as set forth in 
Respondent's Exhibit 8 which sets forth the expenses of Amahda Hansen and/or Kristy B 
Clayburn, employees of Brought Trucking and Crane Service nc. in assembling material 
and assisting in Court ordered appraisals of the business equipment. This is an 
unnecessary costs which is a factor in requiring the Petitioner |to assume and pay her own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
45. The expert witness, Brad Townsend, was selected by the Petitioner and her 
attorney to act as her expert during trial. The appraiser in his report stated that he was 
unable to determine a value for N.J. Trucking, Inc. at the time of the marriage. 
(Respondents Exhibit 40) Brad Townsend's total bill was $12,707.00 and he testified that 
he had been paid by Mr. Bough for a retainer on October 26, 2007 for $2,500.00 and 
I 
received a check on August 24, 2007 in the amount of $2,918]05. In June 2008 Mr. 
i 
• • I 
Brough paid $1,500.00 for the appraisal by equipment appraiser, Ron Liese.8 
8
 On August 6, 2008, counsel for the Respondent recived 
Norman, Townsend &Johnson,LLC. 
11 
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an invoice for $7,563.46 from 
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46. The appraiser, Brad Townsend, did not find that tjhere was any good will over 
the basic value of the equipment after receiving extensive accounting information and 
financial information supplied to him by the Respondent.9 
47. The expert, Brad Townsend, testified that there w^s no enhanced value of the 
income stream of the business in excess of the amount to pay I for the services of the 
owner/proprietor in providing services in the business. 
48. The basis for valuation was the value of the sale of the equipment which was 
an enhanced book value based upon an equipment appraisal tyy Ron Liese. Mr. Liese was 
retained only after the appraisal by Brad Townsend which us^d traditional techniques for 
economic valuation of a small business and indicated that thefe was no value in the 
business except the value in the used equipment and assets. 
49. Irregardless of the prenuptial agreement, the valui of the business does not 
exceed the value of the services of Mr. Brough and would not; be subject to any 
9
 Brad Townsend testified that Mr. Brough made all payments even though retained by 
Kathy Brough. Information came through Respondent's informatic|n. He indicated that the 
returns on investment by net income had lower value than value ofjtangible assets which sit idle. 
He indicated that in May 2008 he reached a determination after reviewing the books that there 
was no good will in business over tangible value of the assets. Hei indicated that income stream 
fair return for value of owner for fair salary for his work effort no Additional return on assets 
base. Brad Townsend's opinion of a fair salary for Mr. Brough including quantify generated 
income, adjusted for the payment of directly out of business for personal expenditures: 
2003 $15,000 
2004 $57,000 
2005 $40,000 
2006 $25,000 
2007 $53,000 
12 
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distribution in these proceedings. 10 
50. At the trial, the Petitioner did not object to the sp1 icific accounting set forth in 
Respondent's Exhibit 15 which demonstrated that the costs Of building the Neola 
residence came from either the premarital business assets of '^ he Respondent or from the 
i 
Respondent's separate property in his personal checking accbunt. 
51. Based upon the appraisals received concerning the real property, the Court 
ration and at the time of trial finds that the Neola Residence was valued at the time of sepa 
at approximately $320,000.00 which was less than costs contributed to build and 
construct the residence by Mr. Brough. 
52. The Petitioner never accounted for the value of ariy joint personal property and 
only testified as to the lists prepared by the Respondent. Bas^d upon the evidence at trial 
and the fact that the Petitioner was allowed by the Respondeat to use a horse trailer to 
make several trips to remove personal property when she separated, each party should be 
found to have in their possession at the time of trial an equal Amount of joint marital 
property. . | 
53. As to attorney's fees, the Petitioner incurred a substantial amount of attorney's 
j 
fees in relation to her claims asserted at trial concerning her c|aim to the business and the 
Respondent prevailed on the issue of a valid prenuptial agreement. 
10
 There can be no good will in a business that is dependent for its existence upon 
the individual who conducts the enterprise and would vanish yvere the individual to die, 
retire or quit work." Stevens vs. Stevens, 754 P.2d at 956 (citiijig Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 
Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (1966)). 
13 
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54. The Petitioner testified that at the time of trial she jwas residing with her 
mother rent free and had the ability to save sufficient funds toj purchase a new residence 
for herself and the sum of $7,000.00 would have been sufficient but for the business 
claim in these divorce proceedings. 
55. The Petitioner was employed and her monthly income at the time of trial 
exceeded her expenses. 
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OFUAW 
1. In considering the equitable factors traditionally usdd by the courts in 
distributing property in a divorce proceedings, the Court has tjtken into account the 
relevant facts that both parties were married and divorced multiple times prior to this 
marriage, both parties had children from prior marriages, the Advanced age of the parties 
at the time of marriage, and the position of each party prior to the marriage. In light of 
the marriage of six years prior to separation, where no childreji were born and in which 
the couple was married later in life, the court should attempt t<j) restore the parties to their 
premarital status. 
2. The notarized prenuptial agreement dated July 9, 19J98 is a valid and 
enforceable contract. 
3. Under the prenuptial agreement, the ownership interest of Richard James 
Brough of N.J. Trucking Inc. which was changed by name only to Brough Trucking and 
000186 i .. 00033^ 
Crane Service, Inc. during the marriage is not subject to distribution during these divorce 
proceedings to the Petitioner based upon terms of the prenuptjial agreement. 
4. Further, even if the business interest was subject to| distribution, the Petitioner 
l 
failed to show by adequate evidence that there was any good will or enhanced value to the 
business after the marriage over and above the value of the sejrvices of Mr. Brough. 
5. The income, profits, and the liability including the oan to Zions Bank secured 
by the Neola residence, of the business are excluded from distribution to the Petitioner by 
i 
the prenuptial agreement. The Respondent should be ordered to refinance the loan on the 
Neola residence within a reasonable period of time and the Petitioner should be held 
harmless therefrom. 
6. The property in Ballard, Utah is a business asset ovlned by Brough Trucking 
and Crane Service, Inc. as was demonstrated when a Corrected Deed was voluntarily 
signed and acknowledged by the Petitioner placing the property in the name of the 
business entity. Therefore, the,property is within the scope o the premarital agreement. 
7. During the course of the marriage the parties acquiijed certain personal effects 
such as recreational vehicles, television sets and furniture which were intended to be 
i 
| 
joint-marital purchases by the parties and the jointly purchased property are not included 
within the terms of the prenuptial agreement. 
8. The property in Neola, Utah was placed in joint names and therefore the 
Petitioner has a legal interest by virtue of in the Deed which was executed after the 
15 
000187 O
f '- A i \ ' M . v 0 U 6 o J 
marriage which indicated a joint-marital interest in the real property. 
9. The residence in Neola, Utah was purchased and constructed using the premarital 
and separate funds of the Respondent as accounted for in Respondent's Exhibit 15. There 
: ! 
i 
was no proof at trial that there was any enhanced or increased value over and above cost 
of constructing the residence by the Respondent's separate fijnds. Therefore, the Neola 
! 
i 
residence should be awarded to the Respondent free and cleaij of any claims by the 
Petitioner and the Petitioner should be required to execute all necessary documents to 
transfer that interest. 
10. Based upon the reservation of the allocation of cosjts by the court, the 
Petitioner should be required to pay all of the costs and expenjses incurred in these divorce 
proceedings to determine valuation of Brough Trucking and Cfrane Service, Inc. to 
reimburse the Respondent for all out of pocket costs made pribr to trial in relation to 
| 
valuating the assets of the corporation and hold him harmless [therefrom. 
j 
11. It is equitable under the facts and circumstances off the case that each party 
assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs, except th$ Petitioner should be 
responsible for the amount of $3,798.75 in appraisal organization fees to Randall 
Gaither, Attorney at Law, and the Respondent is entitled to a judgment in that amount. 
12. The Respondent's business incurred $8,672.08 in Expenses as set forth in 
Exhibit 8 the Itemization of expenses of Amanda Hansen and/or Kristy B. Clayburn, 
employees of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. in assembling material and 
16 
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assisting in Court ordered appraisals and this is a factor in deljermining that the Petitioner 
pay for her own attorney's fees and costs. The Respondent prevailed on the execution of 
the premarital agreement and this is a factor in requiring the petitioner to pay her own 
attorney's fees and costs. t ' 
13. The costs and expenses of the valuation by the expert, Brad Townsend, were 
unnecessary in light of the fact that any value that he found was based upon the 
equipment appraisal by a third party and using the Property Tax Assessment from public 
i 
records. I 
i | 
14. It is equitable to require the Petitioner, in light of ijhe prenuptial agreement to 
assume and pay any of the costs of the appraisal, which she requested including the two 
business appraisals and a Judgement shall be entered requiring the Petitioner to reimburse 
all of the costs of the Respondent which has paid to Brad ToWnsend and Ron Liese. 
15. It is equitable that each party assume and pay the costs of the real estate 
appraisals of the Neola, Utah property which was received irito evidence and no 
i 
! 
judgement should be awarded for those costs. j 
16. It is equitable in light of the Court's consideration of the evidence that each 
party should be awarded the personal property presently in their possession. 
17. The Petitioner should be ordered to assume and pay the debt owed on the 2001 
•I 
j 
Blue Dodge pickup truck in the amount of $4,557.14 as of Julie 10, 2008 to Mountain 
America Credit Union. (Respondent's Exhibit 14) 
17 
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18. The Respondent's premarital assets were not co-mingled with marital 
property, and he maintained them as separate entities, exceptjfor the Neola Residence 
which has no value over and above the premarital and separate assets traced directly into 
the construction of the residence. 
19. The Respondent should be awarded a Judgment iri the amount of $322.50 for 
costs in relation to the business asset, the computer, taken by 
20. The Respondent should be awarded all costs to bej 
Judgment Affidavit. 
the Petitioner. 
submitted by a post 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
POINT I 
THE NOTARIZED PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE IN THESE 
PROCEEDINGS. j 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-3(1953) states that "A premarital agreement must be 
in writing and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without consideration." In this 
matter there is adequate consideration in that the Petitioner w&s to be held harmless from 
business obligations upon divorce. The specific naming of the business and the 
j 
consideration of the hold harmless from business debts reinforces the enforcement of the 
of the agreement as to N. J. Trucking Inc., the Glass Store and any personal or family 
properties of the Respondent. 
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In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 161 Utah Adv. ftep. (Ct App 1991) the 
Court stated the facts as follows: I 
The Rudmans were married on April 18, 1981. Both parties had previously been 
married and divorced. At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had been 
receiving $1,100 per month in permanent alimony froiin her former husband. Part 
of Mr. Rudman's premarital property included several jmovie theaters in three 
states, two condominiums, and a cabin. Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman's 
counsel prepared a prenuptial agreement, which the parties signed on April 15, 
1981. The agreement stated that each party relinquished all claims and interest to 
property the other had acquired prior to the marriage and that such property could 
not be deemed a marital asset following the marriage. The agreement was "not 
intended and does not apply to any property which is accumulated by the parties 
either individually or jointly following the marriage oil the parties." 
The court found that Mr. Rudmanfs premarital assets were not commingled 
with marital property, and that he maintained theiji as separate entities, 
including those that were improved through expansion or remodeling. Thus, 
under the parties' prenuptial agreement, the loan receivables were properly 
characterized as premarital assets, as were the condominiums and the cabin. 
Mrs. Rudman contends the trial court erred in interpreting the prenuptial 
agreement. She argues that the agreement specifies that any interest and 
appreciation accruing to premarital property after the ljnarriage becomes marital 
property. Mrs. Rudman also claims the court abused its discretion in failing to 
find that she contributed labor and/or assets to his premarital property, thus 
converting it to marital property. Specifically, she claims the court abused its 
discretion by failing to find that she assisted Mr. Rudman in the operation of his 
business by helping to "remodel, clean, vacuum, paint; run errands, make and hang 
drapes, purchase and prepare food... and work as a ticlfet taker," thus converting 
those businesses to marital property. She claims the c0urt abused its discretion in 
failing to find that she improved and furnished the condominiums and the cabin, 
resulting in those properties becoming commingled into the marital estate. She also 
claims the court abused its discretion in finding that ldans made to various 
business entities operating Mr. Rudman's theaters were due to Mr. Rudman alone, 
rather than to the marital estate. Mrs. Rudman claims that improper exclusion and 
improper valuation of this property reduced the marital estate by $472,589. 
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In Rudntan, the trial court found that a fair reading of jthe agreement clearly 
separated premarital property from property accumulated aft^r the marriage. The trial 
court also found that, under the agreement, any premarital property, together with any 
interest or increase, would remain the property of the owner, and any property/ acquired 
after the marriage would be marital, "less that amount utilized for its acquisition that can 
be traced to a point prior to the marriage." The Court of appeals stated: 
! | 
We find no error in the trial court's legal interpretation; of the document. Under the 
terms of the prenuptial agreement, where each party relinquished all rights to 
previously acquired property of the other party, he or she would also have no right 
to any increase in value or additional earnings that migjht accrue to that property. 
Likewise, any property acquired by the parties after th£ marriage would accrue 
earnings into the marital estate. Additionally, if any amounts used to acquire 
property during the marriage could be traced to premarital property, those amounts 
would remain the separate property of that individual. Thus, to preserve the 
premarital integrity of an asset that has been arguably Commingled with property 
acquired after the marriage, that asset, or its severable part, must be traced to its 
original source. 
In Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382 (Utah 
i 
1989) the Court indicated that a resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent is 
permissible only if the contract document appears to express the parties' agreement 
incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement. Here, the Petitioner's 
comment that about what Mr. Brough's description of the premarital agreement was is 
i 
irrelevant. | 
The Respondent respectfully submits that the premarital agreement should be 
J 
enforced in these proceedings. ! 
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POINT II 
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ANY CO-MINGLING OF SEPARATE 
PROPERTY. 
In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing 
I 
spouses and separate property, which may include premarital:assets, inheritances, or 
similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse. Olseri v. Olseny 169 P.3d 765 
Utah App. 2007) In the recent decision in Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476, 
1
 i • 
i 
2008 UT App 11 (Utah App. 01/10/2008), the Court stated: .; 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that wheh one party in a divorce 
proceeding uses separate property to purchase a marital home, that party is 
entitled to the equity in the home that resulted front his or her investment. See 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah J987) (upholding trial court's 
ruling that the wife should receive credit for her inherited separate property that 
she invested in the parties' home during the marriage). But [t]he rule that property 
acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should b$ awarded to that spouse . . . 
does not apply when the property thus acquired is consjumed, such as when a gift 
or an inheritance of money is used for family purposes! when the property 
completely loses its identity and is not traceable because it is commingled with 
other property . . . ; or when the acquiring spouse placejs title in their joint names in 
such a manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property. Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988) (citations ohiitted). 
The trial court treated the $81,000 of equity in the Famjily Home as Wife's separate 
property to compensate her for the $90,000 of her inheritance used to improve that 
asset. Although we are unable to evaluate the overall pfoperty settlement because 
of the lack of findings on value, the recognition of Wife's separate property interest 
in the improvements to the Family Home was within the trial court's broad 
discretion. 
i 
In Cox v. Cox 877 P.2d 1262 (Ut Ct. App 1994), the Court recognized equitable factors 
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relevant to equitable factors to this proceedings. The Court stated: 
Where the marriage is of short duration, where no children were born and 
where the couple was married later in life, a trial court may properly attempt 
to restore the parties to their premarital status. See, e.g., Georgedes v. 
Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981) (trial court d^ d not abuse discretion to put 
parties to short second marriage back into sole ownership of premarital properties); 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 198(1)) (where husband was 73 
and wife was 68 at time of marriage, and where marriage was short, trial court did 
not abuse discretion in awarding premarital home to wife even though she deeded 
it in joint tenancy to husband). ! 
In addition, atrial court may properly consider other factors relating to distribution 
of premarital property including the amount and kind of property to be divided; 
whether the property was acquired before or during the marriage; the source of the 
property; the health of the parties; the parties' standard! of living, respective 
financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the cfuration of the marriage; the 
children of the marriage, the parties' ages at time of thd marriage and of divorce; 
[and] what the parties gave up by the marriage. Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120, 
122 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Burke v. Burke, 733 Pi2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987)). 
In Cox, the Wife claimed the trial court erred in finding that appreciation on the 
house was not due to her remodeling efforts. The Court affirmed the trial court in its 
memorandum decision which determined that once Husband's and Wife's expenditures 
i 
•j 
were deducted from the $105,000.00 value of the house, the residence had not materially 
i 
i 
I 
appreciated. j 
As to the scope of the agreement, in Berman v. Berman 749 P.2d 1271,(Ct 
App. 1988) the Court of Appeals stated: I 
I . - . . • • . 
i 
Plaintiff argues that the antenuptial agreement only concerned the defendant's 
business assets, not the house, because the only asset specifically mentioned in the 
agreement was the billiard business. Defendant argues that the agreement means 
exactly what it says and exempts " real and personal property," including the 
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house, from inclusion in the marital estate. The house: should have been preserved 
as the separate property of defendant We find the trial court erred when it did not 
include the house in the antenuptial agreement. | 
j 
At trial, the Petitioner testified that the parties kjept their finances 
"separate". However, in the closing arguments at trial, the attorney for the Petitioner 
claimed that there was some type of a "marital pot" implying-that there had been some co-
mingling of funds during the course of the marriage and the cjourt should in some manner 
limit the premarital contract. 
However, an objective review of the evidence will shojw that each party maintained 
separate checking accounts and credit cards. For example, thp Petitioner indicated that 
after the marriage she received some separate money from a $rior divorce which she 
placed in here separate checking account and paid personal expenses on her separate 
credit cards from her personal account. The evidence concerning the fact that she kept 
hours, received W2 forms and received corporate checks and jdeposited those checks into 
l 
her separate checking account prove the opposite of co-mingl^ng of funds by the parties. 
i 
Mr. Brough sold business assets and property he owned prior jto the marriage and placed 
them in separate checking accounts. 
| 
In relation to the evidence of landscaping and doing so|me work on the Neola 
i 
i 
residence, see Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329 (Utah |App.2007), the court stated: 
Husband next argues that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied 
the law in determining that the appreciation on the real property was Wife's 
separate property, as opposed to marital property subject to an equal 
division among the parties. Husband does not dispute that the real property 
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was purchased from Wife's premarital funds and, thus, was initially Wife's 
separate property. Nor does he dispute that any appreciation on Wife's 
separate property would also be considered Wife's separate property. 
Husband appears to argue, however, that events within the marriage 
converted this separate property into marital property.; 
Premarital property loses its separate identity ind becomes a part of 
the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by his or; her efforts or expense 
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, 
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where 
the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other 
spouse." Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405,1J20, ]47 P.3d 464 (quoting 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)). 
We are not persuaded by Husband's arguments! that his purported 
efforts-including doing some tile work in the home arid "supervising" 
landscaping and home theater installation-were sufficient to obtain an 
equitable interest in the home. Instead, we agree with the trial court that 
"[Wife] kept the asset separate" and that the facts do not support a finding 
that "[Husband] made any contribution to the house" other than possibly a 
monetary contribution toward landscaping and tile—a portion of the one 
deposit made into Wife's separate account-for which the court ordered 
reimbursement to Husband. ; 
The Petitioner did not prove the separate property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling or exchanges. I 
POINT III 
EACH PARTY SHOULD ASSUME AND PAY THEIR OWN ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY AND REIMBURSE 
THE COSTS OF THE EXPERTS. I 
I 
From the commencement of this action, the Respondent has been faced with an 
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expensive appraisal process. When the report was finished right before trial, the expert 
witness fees totaled approximately $17,000.00. These pretrial costs were incurred 
because the Petitioner choose litigation to disregard her signed agreement and claimed a 
substantial business interest in the business, going to far as to obtain an TRO as to the 
business. j 
At trial, the expert Brad Townsend indicated that there; was not sufficient grounds 
to determine any enhanced value of the corporation during the marriage. The Petitioner 
who was familiar with the one man business, chose to litigate;at great cost to attempt 
obtain an interest subject to that agreement when she should Have known there was no 
value to distribute. A graphic example of this point is the fact that when Mr. Brough 
broke his foot the business had to borrow funds on the Neola residence. 
Since the Petitioner drastically increased the costs and expenses of this legal action 
by making a claim for a substantial portion of the Respondent's business and business 
assets. The Petitioner should be pay the costs. Concerning the administration of justice 
in all divorce cases, it is not sound policy to allow with a part)jr that signed a premarital 
agreement to require the other spouse to advance substantial costs and expenses to the 
allow the spouse to attempt to "swing for the fence'5. The Respondent prevailed on the 
business issues and the Petitioner should pay for the expensive litigation costs of her own 
experts. "*,;'•'" 
The Respondent respectfully submits that in this specific situation the factors 
• | . 
i 
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require the Petitioner pay her own attorneys fees as well as the costs of the attempt to 
prove a business interest. The Court should take into accountjthe fact that Mr. Brough 
was required to pay extra business costs, lose of time to coordinate the appraisal, expend 
employee expenses, accounting fees and substantial attorneys fees. These costs accrued 
up until the expert announced his decision on the day before trial that there was no 
goodwill, no enhanced value or value over the return of Mr. Brough for his services and 
expertise. In light of the valid prenuptial agreement it is equitable that the Petitioner 
reimburse the Respondent for any attorney's fees and costs, including mailing costs, 
incurred in preparing and organizing documents and information delivered to the experts 
for appraisals of the business of $3,798.75. The Respondent should be awarded of all 
costs of this action. I ' 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2008. 
KNDALL GAITI 
Attorney for th^Respondent 
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FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing iRESPONDENT'S 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
MEMORANDUM was faxed and mailed to: 
CLARK B. ALLRED 
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C. 
72 NORTH 300 EAST 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066 
FAX: (435) 722-3928 
DATED this T) day of AMS£'• 
* 
2008. 
f l A A 
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EIGHTH DISTRICT CT-ROOSEVELT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs . 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent 
MINUTES 
BENCH TRIAL 
Case No: 054000084 DA 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Date: July 9, 20 0 8 
Clerk: brigittt 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney. CLARK B ALLRED 
Petitioner(s): KATHRYN C BROUGH 
Attorney for the Respondent: RANDALL T GAITHER 
Respondent(s): RICHARD JAMES BROUGH 
Audio 
Tape Number: cdl3 8roos Tape Count: 9:05:04 
TRIAL 
TAPE: cdl3 8roos COUNT: 9:05:04 
In chambers: Counsel state their witness and exhibit objections. 
One witness, Brad Townsend, will testify by phone at 1:30 today. 
COUNT: 9:20 
Open Court: opening statements are made. Mr. Allred offers exhibit 
1 and 3, these are received. Jake Welborn and Jared Jensen are 
sworn in and testify. Kathy Brough testifies. Respondent's exhibit 
1 is offered and received. Plaintiff's exhibits 27, 23, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 14, 15, 16, 18, 17, 24, 
25, 2, and 5 are offered and received. Mr. Gaither gives cross 
examination. Respondent's exhibits 6, 10, 15, 18, 22, 26, and 32 
are offered and received. Witnesses are excused. 
COUNT: 1:27 
in chambers. Brad Townsend is present by phone. Mr. Allred and Mr. 
Gaither are present. Mr. Townsend is sworn in and testifies. 
COUNT: 2:10 
back in open court: Mr. Allred proffers affidavit for attorney's 
(JOT280 0(j'u3 J. U 
Case No: 
Date : 
054000084 
Jul 09, 2008 
fees. Plaintiff's exhibit 4 is offered and received, 
rests. 
COUNT: 2:11:4 
Mr. Gaither calls Richard James Brough (Jim) to the 
Respondent's exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
17, 18, 19 is withdrawn, 20 through 25 are received, 
with objection, 29, 30, 31 through 40, 41 withdrawn. 
Mr. Allred gives cross examination. Exhibit 27, 28, 
offered and received. Kathy Brough is called back to 
rebuttal. 4:56:25/ closing arguments are given. The 
need to read some case law and then will make a writ 
ruling. Each attorney is to prepare a findings and 
decree and submit these to the Court. The Court hear 
and grounds and grants the divorce. Mr. Gaither is t 
divorce decree. Counsel is to have findings and 
conclusions in the mail by August 8th. 
Trial End: 5:31:45 
Plaintiff 
stand. 
14, 15, 16, 
Exhibits 28, 
and 2 9 are 
the stand for 
Court will 
ten 
conclusion and 
s jurisdiction 
o prepare the 
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
««"•**!•?, 
'-•'":o 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
v s . 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent 
) NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) 
) Civil No. 054000084 DA 
) 
) Judge John R. Anderson 
Please take notice that the Court entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce in the above captioned 
matter on September 4, 2008. 
I 
DATED this 4th day of September, 2008 
ALLRED 
Attorneys for Petit-i 
By: 
000202 ULiu3Y3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner herein and hereby certify 
that I served the attached NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE on 
Respondent by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an 
envelope addressed to: 
RANDALL GAITHER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
15 9 WEST 3 00 SOUTH BROADWAY #105 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 4th 
day of September, 2008. 
CHEREE BROTHERSON 
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EIGHTH DISTRICT CT-ROOSEVELT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
MINUTES 
MOTIONS HEARING 
Case No: 054000084 DA 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Date: September 25, 2008 
Clerk: brigittt 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: CLARK B ALLRED 
Petitioner(s): KATHRYN C BROUGH 
Attorney for the Respondent: RANDALL T GAITHER 
Respondent(s): RICHARD JAMES BROUGH 
Audio 
Tape Number: cdl41roos Tape Count: 3:21:23 
HEARING 
TAPE: cdl41roos COUNT: 3:21:23 
The Court reviews the file with counsel. Mr. Gaither asks that the 
divorce decree be set aside and enter a bifurcated decree of 
divorce. Mr. Gaither and Mr. Allred both address the issue of the 
findings and decree that have been entered. 
The Court denies the motion to set aside the findings and decree, 
but the Court will sign the divorce decree, to be final upon entry 
into the record. Exhibit 1 is offered and received. The Court 
denies Mr. Gaithers motions. The motion to stay the proposed 
new judgment and order is moot. Mr. Allred is to prepare the 
order. 
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RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for the Respondent 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
The above entitled matter came for trial on the 9th day of July, 2008 before the f 
Honorable Judge John R. Anderson. Based upon the testimony at trial, the Court enters 
the following findings of fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both parties are residence of Duchesne County, State of Utah and have been 
residents for more than three months prior to the date of filing of the Complaint for 
Divorce. 
2. Evidence was offered at trial proving irreconcilable differences between the 4 
1 
000205 " ^ U j 0 t 
FILED 
SEP 2 5 2008 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Case No. 054000084 
• 
parties which the parties are unable to reconcile. 
t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3. The parties are bona fid residence of Duchesne County, State of Utah and the 
Court has legal grounds to enter a Decree of Divorce. 
4. All other issues shall be reserved. 
DATED this T 1 day of f\M . 2008 
I/OWN R. ANDERSON 
•ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
000206 
FAX/MAIL CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was faxed/mailed to: 
CLARK B. ALLRED 
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C. 
72 NORTH 300 EAST 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066 
FAX: (435)722-3928 
/ 2 / 
DATED this _J_ day of July, 2008. 
3 
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RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for the Respondent 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
SEP 2 5 2008 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
BY lP>1 DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Case No. 054000084 
The above entitled matter came for trial on the 9th day of July, 2008 before the 
Honorable Judge John R. Anderson. Based upon the testimony at trial, the ruling from 
the bench awarding the Divorce and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDER, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a Decree of 
Divorce is granted in this case to be final upon signing by the Court setting aside, 
dissolving and vacating the grounds of matrimony hereto for existing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all property issues and other issues raised at trial 
shall be reserved for advisement by the Court. 
0U0208 0 L L- b 0 b 
DATED this ¥? 
^ 
day of Juiy, 2008. 
'JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
FAX/MAIL CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF 
DIVORCE was faxed/mailed to: 
CLARK B. ALLRED 
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C. 
72 NORTH 300 EAST 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066 
FAX: (435)722-3928 1 
DATED this day of July, 2008. 
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0 0 5 5 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P . C . 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P e t i t i o n e r 
72 N o r t h 300 E a s t ( 1 2 3 - 1 4 ) 
R o o s e v e l t , U t a h 84066 
T e l e p h o n e : (435) 7 2 2 - 3 9 2 8 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs . 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
(September 25, 2008 hearing) 
) 
) Civil No. 054000084 DA 
) 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for argument 
on the Respondent's Motion for New Trial, Objections to Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Motion for Relief from Judgment and 
Order, and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
Petitioner was present with her attorney, Clark Allred. 
Respondent was present with his attorney Randall Gaither. Both 
parties have submitted memoranda in support of their positions. 
Oral argument was received from counsel. The Court, on the record 
then stated its reasonssand analysis regarding the signing of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the issues raised in 
000210 
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the motions and then denied the motions. The parties further 
agreed that the objection to supplemental fees was based on the 
same reasons as the above listed motions and should also be denied. 
The court signed the bifurcated order divorcing the parties. The 
Respondent following the court's ruling filed his notice of appeal. 
Based thereon the Court rules as follows: 
1. The Respondent's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
2. The Respondent's Objection to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is denied. 
3. The Respondent's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order 
is denied. 
4. The Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is 
denied. 
5. The Respondent's Objections to Supplemental Request for 
Attorney's Fees is denied and Petitioner is awarded the fees set 
forth in her supplemental affidavit. 
6. Respondent is given 21 days from September 25, 2008 to 
make the election provided for in paragraph 1 of the Decree of 
Divorce signed August 28, 2008 and 90 days from September 25, 2008 
to pay the monies ordered in paragraph 1 or 2 of the Decree of 
Divorce signed August 28, 2008. 
000211 
DATED t h i s day of Oc tobey^2s008 . 
BY TRE qfoiF*: 
Randall" Gaith 
Attorney fojr Respondent 
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RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for the Respondent 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. • ' , 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, .] 
Respondent. ] 
> NOTICE OF ELECTION 
' 
) Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
) Case No. 054000084 
TO THE CLERK FOR JUDGE ANDERSON AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE 
PETITIONER: 
Subject to all pending Motions, the Respondent hereby elects to pay to the 
Petitioner the amount necessary to be awarded the business and residence within ninety i 
(90) days of the entry of the Decree as set forth in Paragraph One of the Decree entered n 
on September 4, 2008 AS MODIFIED ON September 25,2008 
1 
000213 
FILED RECEIVED 
DISTRICT COURf 
DUCHESNE COUNTY. I T * " Q Q J ^ -v,. 
OCT \h 2008 m f e n - ^ r , 
8m District Gout 
JOANNE McKEE. C 
BY 
"$f-
4 
QUO b ib 
DATED this day of October, 2008. 
(Randall cQaiiher 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for the Respondent 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
ELECTION was emailed, faxed and delivered to: 
CLARK B.ALLRED 
Allred & McClellan, P.C. 
72 North 300 East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Fax: (435)722-3928 
/} 
// 
DATED this 13 w/-n day of September, 2008. 
/ / /<p f-ftuJk-6£. i 
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THE COURT: Fourteen will be received. 
(Respondent's Exhibit 15 received) 
Q (BY MR. GAITHER) Now the next one is 15 and that 
would be the last one in the Court's courtesy folder and it's 
a big thick exhibit. Looking at the first page of Exhibit 
15, do you know who prepared that? 
A My daughters, Christie and Amanda. 
Q And previously we've seen some billing and have 
they billed for the time and effort for this? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you know where they obtained the information 
about where the costs - what does this document relate to? 
A Mostly the cost of the house. I think most 
everything on here is costs of building the house, putting 
everything together and getting ready to move into it. 
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, counsel - or the witness 
indicated he didn't prepare this. We don't have any 
objection to it being received and we've gone through it and 
believe that it accurately shows (inaudible) paid in the 
business. 
MR. GAITHER: All right, thank you. 
Q (BY MR. GAITHER) So, there is a folder that 
matches all these things up back in your — 
A Yes, sir. 
Q All right, and let's have you go to the last page 
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1 as far as Brough Trucking and the checks, what is the total 
2 amount there? 
3 THE COURT: Where are you at*? 
4 MR. GAITHER: On Page 3, three pages into the 
5 exhibit. I 
6 Q (BY MR. GAITHER) What is the total amount there? 
7 A • Looks like $166,373.89. 
8 Q All right, and then the next page, N.J. Trucking, 
9 is there a separate account for N.J. Trucking? 
10 A Yes, sir. 
11 Q And what is the amount from N.J. Trucking? 
12 A Looks like $86,559.12. I 
13 Q All right. Now the last page of the summary is to 
14 Jim's personal. 
15 A That's my personal checkbook! 
16 Q And where was that account at? 
17 -A The amount? 
18 Q No, the account, where was the account at? 
19 A Mountain America. j 
20 Q And was Kathy a signator on your account? 
21 A No. I 
22 Q And at that point in time did she have a Mountain 
23 American Account of her own? 
24 A Yes. 
25 I Q These are checks that you paid out of your account; 
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1 is that correct? 
2 A Yes sir. 
3 Q And what is the total for that amount? 
4 A $73,318.10. 
5 Q Okay, thank you. Now just a couple of other items. 
6 If you could just turn right before 15(c), there's about four 
7 or five pages of - if I could just assist you real quick and 
8 (inaudible) 
9 And Your Honor, these are documents that we 
10 delivered at a later time. 
11 MR. ALLRED: Oh, that's 15(c)? 
12 MR. GAITHER: 15(c) yeah. There should be a letter 
13 dated (inaudible). Thank you. 
14 Q (BY MR. GAITHER) Now, in relation to your personal 
15 account, your checking account, have you also, in addition to 
16 doing that determined where the deposits were made into the 
17 checking accounts where these expenditures came from? 
18 A Yes, sir. . 
19 Q And going to that - it looks like there's a 
20 document 4-12-2000, do you see that? 
21 A That's an N.J. Truckin' deposit slip showing 
22 Duchesne land which is Steed's over in Duchesne bought the 
23 shop and yard and made a payment of $30,000 that was 
24 deposited in N.J. Trucking. 
25 I Q And then the next page, it looks like Richard J. 
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Brough, 5-1-02? 
A That's a deposit that went into my personal - no, 
this went into Wells Fargo, looks like my personal Wells 
Fargo checking account and her handwritincr savs sale of Jim's 
house, $10,810.82. 
Q And her, who are you referring to? 
A Kathy. 
Q So where did you find this at? 
A In the deposit slip books in the office. 
Q Okay. And let's go over to the next page, N.J. 
Trucking, 5-1-2000. 
i 
A That's from Duchesne land, the Steed's over in 
Duchesne $54,000 went into N.J. Trucking as a deposit slip. 
Q And whose handwriting is that? 
A On the sticky is mine but on the checkstub is hers. 
Q Okay, thank you. It looks like there's kind of a 
poor copy of something that says Mountain America, what's 
that referring to? 
A $50,000 went into a money market account, 5-17-
2001. This would have been the sale of some used oil field 
equipment I had in the yard. 
Q And had you owned that — 
A For about 15 years. 
Q Okay. Next page, N.J. Trucking, there's one there 
for it says Chotah. 
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0 055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KATHRYN C. BROUGH, ) AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S 
) FEES 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, ) Civil No. 054000084 DA 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
COMES NOW, Clark B Allred, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states that: 
1. I am the attorney for the Petitioner in the above entitled 
action. I work for the law firm of Allred & McClellan, P.C. 
2. The law firm was retained by the Petitioner in the above 
entitled action pursuant to the terms of a written fee agreement. 
3. I am duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. 
My bar number is 0055. 
4. From August 22, 2005 through July 2, 2008, Allred & 
McClellan, P.C. expended $15,391.53 in legal services and costs to 
represent the Petitioner in this case. 
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5. The fees and costs incurred by the firm of Allred & 
McClellan, P.C., were for the following: 
Aug. 22, 2005 Office visit to discuss filing .60 $99.00 
for a divorce. 
Aug. 23, 2005 Filing Fee - Petition for Divorce $97.00 
Aug. 23, 2005 Preparation of Motion for Order 2.6 $117.00 
to Show Cause, Order to Show 
Cause, Affidavit in Support of 
Order to Show Cause, Petition for 
Divorce, Summons, correspondence 
with Eighth District Court and 
preparation of Court Cover Sheet 
Aug. 29, 2005 Work on the Petition and the .50 $82.50 
order to show cause documents 
Aug. 29, 2005 Revising and editing Summons, .40 $18.00 
Petition for Divorce, Motion for 
Order to Show Cause, Order to 
Show Cause and Affidavit in 
Support of Order to Show Cause 
Aug. 30, 2005 Correspondence with and telephone 1.0 $45.00 
call to Service Agent, 
correspondence with client and 
waiting at the Courthouse for a 
date for the Order to Show Cause. 
Aug. 31, 2005 Preparation of Financial .40 $18.00 
Declaration. 
Sept. 6, 2005 Correspondence with client .20 $9.00 
Sept. 8, 2005 Office visit and preparing for .60 $99.00 
OTSC hearing 
Sept. 9, 2005 Revising and editing Financial .30 $13.50 
Declaration. 
Sept. 14, 2005 Service Fee $37.00 
Sept. 15, 2005 Preparation of exhibits for .40 $18.00 
hear ing. 
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Sept. 27, 2005 Telephone call with Eighth .80 $36.00 
District Court, preparation of 
Default Certificate and Notice of 
Hearing 
Sept. 29, 2005 Correspondence with client .20 $9.00 
Oct. 13, 2005 Preparing for the Court Hearing, 3.5 $577.50 
Court Appearance on the Order to 
Show Cause and preparing the 
orders. 
Oct. 13, 2005 Preparation of Exhibits for Order .20 $9.00 
to Show Cause. 
Oct. 14, 2005 Researching cases and materials 2.3 $184.00 
on prenuptial agreements. 
Oct. 14, 2005 Preparation of Scheduling Order 1.2 $54.00 
and Order on Order to Show Cause. 
Oct. 14, 2005 Preparation of Petitioner's First 1.0 $45,00 
Set of Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of 
Documents. 
Oct. 16, 2005 Correspondence with Mary Ann .60 $27.00 
Hansen and client 
Oct. 16, 2005 Preparation of Order and .20 $9.00 
interrogatories for filing with 
the opposing counsel. 
Oct. 17, 2005 Work on the order, scheduling .80 $132.00 
order and the discovery 
Oct. 17, 2005 Revising and editing .30 $13.50 
Interrogatories, scheduling order 
and order on order to show cause 
Oct. 17, 2005 Preparation of Certificate of .30 $45.00 
Service. 
Oct. 20, 2005 Preparing summary for Clark .70 $56.00 
Allred on prenuptial agreement 
issues. 
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Oct. 31, 2005 Meeting with client. .10 $4.50 
Nov. 21, 2005 Preparation of correspondence .40 $18.00 
with opposing counsel. 
Dec. 14, 2005 Preparation of Answers to 3.0 $135.00 
Interrogatories. 
Dec. 15, 2005 Work on the response to discovery .50 $82.50 
Dec. 19, 2005 Preparation of Certificate of .30 $13.50 
Service and revising and editing 
of Answers to Interrogatories 
Dec, 22, 2005 Correspondence with Mary Ann .30 $13.50 
Hansen 
Jan. 16, 2006 Preparation of Motion to Compel .50 $22.50 
Discovery. 
Jan. 16, 2006 Revising and editing Motion to .40 $18.00 
Compel Discovery and 
correspondence with client. 
Jan. 19, 2006 Correspondence with client .40 $18.00 
including all enclosures 
Jan. 20y 2006 Send Petitioner's Answers to .20 $9.00 
Respondent's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents to 
opposing counsel; transmittal of 
same to client. 
Jan. 20, 2006 Going over the information 1.0 $175.00 
received thru discovery 
Jan. 23, 2006 Discussions with client and .50 $87.50 
letter to adverse attorney about 
the documents provided in 
discovery. 
Jan. 23, 2006 Correspondence with Mary Hansen .60 $27.00 
Jan. 24, 2006 Preparation of Corporate .30 $13.50 
Information Order Form 
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Feb. 16, 2006 
Feb. 16, 2006 
Feb. 27, 2006 
Feb. 27, 2 0 06 
Mar. 6, 2006 
Mar. 7, 2006 
Mar. 15, 2006 
May 4, 2 0 06 
May 8, 2 0 06 
May 22, 2 0 06 
June 1, 2006 
June 9, 2006 
June 12, 2 0 06 
June 19, 2006 
Discussions with adverse attorney 
about returning the property, the 
discovery and alimony. 
Meeting with client 
Going over documents received 
thru discovery 
Telephone call with client. 
Meeting with client to go over 
responses to discovery, arranging 
for an appraiser, calls to obtain 
closing documents and arranging 
for a mediator. 
Correspondence with Michael 
Barneck. 
Zions Bank - Copies. 
Telephone calls to set up the 
mediation. 
Meeting with client and working 
on a mediation brief and 
preparing for mediation 
Correspondence with Craig Snyder 
and client. Revising and editing 
Mediation Brief. 
40 $70.00 
.10 
1. 0 
.10 
1 . 0 
30 
80 
Meeting with client and preparing 2.0 
for the mediation hearing. 
Mediation of the case. 
Followup on mediation, calls on 
appraising the business and call 
to appraiser of the home. 
Work on motion and memorandum to 
seek to have the property 
appraised. 
5 . 5 
.40 
$5. 00 
$175.00 
$4 . 50 
$175.00 
60 $30.00 
$15.70 
$52.50 
1.5 $262.50 
$40.00 
$350.00 
$962 . 50 
$70.00 
.60 $105.00 
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June 19, 2006 Preparation of Motion to Order 1.5 $67.50 
Appraisals and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Order 
Appraisals. s 
June 29, 2006 Discussion with new attorney on .40 $70.00 
appraisals and settlement and 
providing copies to new attorney 
July 5, 2006 Preparation of Notice to Submit .40 $20.00 
July 10, 2006 Discussion with the adverse .40 $70.00 
attorney and reviewing the 
response to the motion 
July 12, 2006 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
July 13, 2006 Work on the reply memorandum .50 $87.50 
July 14, 2006 Preparation of Reply Memorandum 1.0 $50.00 
and Affidavit. 
July 17, 2 006 Work on the reply memorandum on .50 $87.50 
the appraiser and request for 
ruling. 
July 18, 2006 Revising and editing Affidavit .30 $15.00 
and meeting with client. 
Aug. 2, 2006 Correspondence with client .... .20 $10.00 
Aug. 7, 2006 Correspondence with client " .20 $10.00 
Aug. 10, 2006 Work on the order for appraisal .50 $87.50 
and discussions with appraiser. 
Aug. 10, 2006 Preparation of Order and .50 $25.00 
correspondence with client 
Aug. 14, 2006 Correspondence with client : .20 $10.00 
Aug. 17, 2006 Meeting with client to prepare .50 $87.50 
for deposition. 
Aug. 18, 2006 Attending the deposition of Kathy 2.5 $437.50 
and calls trying to arrange for 
the appraisal. 
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Aug. 23, 2006 Correspondence with Brad Townsend .70 $35.00 
and correspondence with client. 
Aug. 23, 2006 Revising and editing .30 $15.00 
correspondence with Brad Townsend 
and preparation of enclosures 
Aug. 28, 2006 Preparing response to objection .40 $70.00 
to order. 
Aug. 28, 2006 Correspondence with client. .20 $10.00 
Aug. 28, 2006 Preparation of Response to .40 $20.00 
Obj ection. 
Aug. 29, 2006 Correspondence with client. .10 $10.00 
Aug. 31, 2006 Meeting with client to discuss .50 $87.50 
recent developments. 
Sept. 14, 2006 Deposition copy charge $133.40 
Sept. 21, 2006 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Sept. 28, 2006 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Oct. 5, 2006 Calls to appraiser and to adverse .40 $70.00 
attorney about Jim's refusal to 
cooperate with appraisers. 
Oct. 16, 2006 Transcribe and send letter to Mr. .50 $25.00 
Heugley; transmittal letter to 
client with copy of same. 
Oct. 30, 2006 Reviewing the settlement letter .40 $70.00 
and calls with adverse attorney 
to set up the appraisal of the 
home . 
Nov. 22, 2006 Reviewing the appraisal and 1.0 $175.00 
responding to the settlement 
offer. 
Nov. 27, 2006 Revising and editing .40 $20.00 
correspondence with Dusten 
Heugley. Telephone call and 
meeting with client. 
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Dec. 11, 2006 Correspondence with client * .20 $10.00 
Dec. 28, 2006 Correspondence with Dusten .30 $15.00 
Heugley. 
Jan. 16, 2007 Preparation of Motion for Order .80 $40.00 
to Show Cause, Order to Show 
Cause, and Affidavit in Support 
of Order to Show Cause. 
Jan. 18, 2007 Revising and editing Motion for .20 $10.00 
Order to Show Cause and Order to 
Show Cause. ^ 
Jan. 18, 2007 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Feb. 1, 2007 Correspondence with Mr. Heugley .50 $25.00 
Feb. 12, 2007 Work on a motion to continue .50 $87,50 
order to show cause hearing. 
Feb. 12, 2007 Preparation of Motion to Continue .60 $30,00 
and Order for Continuance. 
Feb. 12, 2007 Correspondence with Dusten Heugly .40 $20.00 
and client. 
Mar. 15, 2007 Work on the affidavit and .50 $87.50 
memorandum opposing the motion to 
release business property. 
Mar. 15, 2007 Correspondence with client. .20 $10.00 
Mar. 15, 2007 Preparation of Affidavit and ..  1.0 $50.00 
Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion of Return of Property. 
Mar. 20, 2007 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Mar. 27, 2007 Preparation of Supplemental .40 $20.00 
Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Return of Business 
Property. 
Mar. 29, 2007 Revising and editing Supplemental .40 $20.00 
Memorandum in Opposition. 
Correspondence with client. 
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Apr. 16, 2007 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Apr. 16, 2007 Discussions on providing the .50 $87.50 
computer for inspection and email 
to appraiser on status. 
Apr. 23, 2007 Correspondence with Dusten .30 $15.00 
Heugley and telephone call with 
client. 
Apr. 24, 2007 Preparation of Subpoena Duces .50 $25.00 
Tecum to Mountain America and 
Zions First National Bank. 
Apr. 24, 2007 Correspondence with client 
Apr. 26, 2 0 07 Preparing a request for the 
documents requested by subpoena 
Apr. 30, 2007 Correspondence with Mr. Heugley 
May 17, 2007 Telephone call with Dustin Heugly 
Maiy 3, 2005 Preparation of Motion and Order 
for Continuance. 
June 4, 2007 Meeting and arranging with person .40 $70.00 
to examine the computer, 
discussion with client. 
June 18, 2 0 07 Copies 
July 11, 2007 Correspondence with Dustin Heugly 
Aug. 13, 2007 Finalize and file Objection to 
Order to Show Cause; transmittal 
to client with copies of same. 
Aug. 21, 2007 Efforts to contact adverse .30 $52.50 
attorney to complete the 
appraisal. 
Aug. 23, 2007 Correspondence with Dustin .40 $20.00 
Heugley 
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. 3 0 
. 3 0 
. 1 0 
. 4 0 
$ 1 0 . 
$ 5 2 . 
$ 1 5 . 
$ 5 . 
$ 1 8 . 
, 0 0 
, 5 0 
, 00 
. 0 0 
, 0 0 
. 3 0 
. 2 0 
$ 2 1 . 
$ 1 5 . 
$ 1 0 . 
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Aug. 30, 2007 Discussion with client and .50 $87.50 
appraiser, attending court on 
Order to Show Cause, letter to 
adverse counsel on payment. 
Aug. 30, 2007 Correspondence with Dusten .30 $15.00 
Heugley 
Sept. 5, 2007 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Sept. 17, 2007 Meeting with client and potential .50 $87.50 
witness on assets being hidden 
Sept. 18, 2007 Correspondence with Randall .90 $45.00 
Gaither and Mr. Townsend. 
Sept. 24, 2007 Correspondence with Randall .40 $20,00 
Gaither; transmittal to client 
with same. 
Oct. 16, 2007 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Oct. 22, 2007 Going over the letter and .50 $87.50 
determining what we needed and 
letter to adverse attorney. 
Oct. 24, 2007 Correspondence with Randall .40 $20.00 
Gaither. 
Nov. 8, 2007 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Nov. 15, 2007 Preparing a response to the .50 $87.50 
petition to modify. 
Nov, 15, 2007 Preparation of Memorandum in .40 $20.00 
Opposition to Motion to Bifurcate 
Nov. 19, 2007 Revising and editing Memorandum .20 $10.00 
in Opposition to Motion to 
Bifurcate. 
Nov. 20, 2007 Transmittal letter to client with .20 $10.00 
copy of Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion to Bifurcate 
Dec. 3, 2007 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
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Dec. 27, 2007 Correspondence with Randall .30 $15.00 
Gaither. 
Dec. 31, 2007 Telephone call with and .20 $10.00 
correspondence to client. 
Jan. 17, 2008 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Jan. 31, 2008 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Feb. 6, 2008 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Feb. 7, 2008 Reviewing documents received and 1.0 $175.00 
preparing for pre trial 
conference 
Feb. 14, 2008 Court appearance for scheduling .60 $105.00 
conference 
Feb. 21, 2008 Work on obtaining information on .50 $87.50 
forgery issues, going over the 
property lists provided by 
counsel 
Feb. 25, 2008 Providing information to the .50 $87.50 
appraiser on forgery claims 
Feb. 25, 2008 Telephone call with and .20 $10.00 
correspondence to client. 
Feb. 26, 2008 Correspondence with client 
Feb. 27, 2008 Correspondence with Brad Townsend 
Mar. 6, 2008 Reviewing the police Reports 
Mar. 6, 2 008 Correspondence with Brad Townsend 
Apr. 10, 2008 Attempts to contact the appraiser 1.5 
of the business, calls to Mr. 
Gaither, working on stipulation 
and beginning work on the witness 
and exhibit list. 
.20 
.30 
.30 
.20 
 5 
$10 
$15 
$52 
$10 
$262 
00 
00 
50 
00 
50 
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Apr. 14, 2008 Revising and editing Witness .90 $45.00 
List. Preparation of Notice of 
Deposition. Telephone call with 
Court Reporter and correspondence 
with client. 
Apr. 14, 2008 Preparing for depositions and for 2.0 $350.00 
trial and setting up the times to 
meet with the Appraiser. 
Apr. 15, 2008 Correspondence with Court .50 $25.00 
Reporter and client. 
Apr. 17, 2008 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Apr. 18, 2008 Travel to Duchesne Court and 1.3 $130.00 
researching Jim's prior divorce 
file for asset information. 
Apr. 21, 2008 Researching Jim's property 1.3 $130.00 
interests at Duchesne recorder's 
office and online Uintah County 
records. 
Apr. 29, 2008 Correspondence with client .20 $10.00 
Apr. 30, 2008 Researching whether they can take .30 $52.50 
a second deposition. 
May 1, 2008 Correspondence with Randall .20 $10.00 
Gaither. Revising Stipulation 
and Witness and Exhibit Lists. 
May 5, 2008 Meeting with the appraiser and 5.0 $875.00 
going to the various sites, 
providing information requested 
by appraiser, preparing for the 
deposition of Mr. Brough 
May 5, 2008 Telephone call with client and 1.0 $50.00 
preparation of delivery documents 
to Mr. Townsend 
May 6, 2008 Delivery expense $6.04 
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May 6, 2008 Correspondence with Brad Townsend .50 $25 
and delivery of documents for 
mailing. 
May 6, 2008 Discussion with the appraiser and .50 $87 
working on a document request. 
May 7, 2008 Revising and editing Request for .30 $15 
Production of Documents. 
Certificate of Service. 
May 8, 2008 Research property values .30 $15 
May 8, 2008 Correspondence with client .20 $10 
May 15, 2008 Responding to the motion for a 1.5 $262 
protective order and preparing 
for the deposition 
May 16, 2008 Finalize the Memorandum Opposing .30 $15 
Motion for Protection Order; copy 
to Mr. Gaither and client. 
May 16, 2008 Deposition of Jim Brough 3.5 $612 
May 19, 2008 Preparation of Certificate of .40 $20 
Service. Revising and editing 
Third Request for Production of 
Documents. 
May 19, 2008 Correspondence with client .20 $10 
May 19, 2 0 08 Work on a request for documents 2.2 $3 85 
referred to in the deposition and 
beginning work on the trial 
memorandum, research update on 
the prenuptual agreement. 
May 22, 2008 Meeting with client to work on 1.0 -$175 
the exhibit list and to prepare 
for trial. 
May 23, 2008 Trial preparation, organizing the 1.5 $262 
exhibits. 
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May 27, 2008 Review and finalize motion, memo 1.6 $80.00 
and notice to submit; Prepare 
mailing certificates; Prepared 
copies and mail; draft letter to 
client. 
May 27, 2008 Work on the exhibit and witness 2.0 $350.00 
list, going over all proposed 
exhibits and working on a trial 
memorandum. 
May 28, 2008 Witness Fee - Basin Land $18.50 
May 28, 2008 Witness Fee - Farm and Home $18.50 
May 28, 2008 Witness Fee - Express Title $18.50 
May 28, 2008 Witness Fee - Sunrise Title $18.50 
May 28, 2008 Reviewing records that the 3.5 $612.50 
recorders office and copying 
deeds of sales, reviewing prior 
divorce and working on subpoenas 
for title companies. 
May 28, 2008 Preparation of Subpoena Duces 1.0 $50.00 
Tecum and correspondence with 
Express Title. Telephone call 
with the same. 
May 28, 2008 Preparation of Subpoena Duces 1.0 $50.00 
Tecum and correspondence with 
Sunrise Title. Telephone call 
with the same. 
May 28, 2008 Preparation of Subpoena Duces 1.0 $50.00 
Tecum and correspondence with 
Farm and Home Title. Telephone 
call with the same. 
May 28, 2008 Preparation of Subpoena Duces 1.0 $50.00 
Tecum and correspondence with 
Basin Land and Title. Telephone 
call with the same. 
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May 29, 2 0 08 
June 12, 200 i 
Preparation of Subpoena's for 
service. Correspondence with 
client. 
Reviewing documents received by 
subpoena and working on the 
exhibit list 
June 12, 2008 Correspondence with client 
June 12, 2008 Correspondence with Randall 
Gaither, client and telephone 
call with client. 
June 13, 2 001 
June 16, 200! 
June 16, 200! 
June 16, 2 00! 
June 16, 200! 
Research and working on the trial 
memorandum 
Ink Spot - Copies 
State of Utah - Principle Search 
Sunrise Title - Copies 
Work on the witness and exhibit 
list. 
June 16, 2 00 8 Correspondence with client 
June 16, 2008 Revising and editing Witness and 
Exhibit List, 
June 17, 2008 Correspondence with client 
June 17, 200 8 
June 18, 2 00 8 
June 19, 2 00 8 
June 19, 20 0 8 
June 20, 2 00 8 
Preparation of Subpoena's for 
Trial 
Correspondence with client 
Witness Fee - Jared Jensen 
Preparation of Subpoena's for 
service. Telephone call with 
service agent. 
Going over exhibit and witness 
lists, preparing objections, 
preparing for trial and 
organizing exhibits. 
.60 $30.00 
1.5 $262.50 
.20 $10.00 
.50 $25.00 
.50 ' $87.50 
$22.71 
$1. 00 
$63.75 
.50 $87.50 
.20 $10.00 
.30 $15.00 
.20 $10.00 
1.0 $50.00 
.20 $10.00 
$18.50 
.30 $15.00 
2.5 $437.50 
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June 23, 2008 Correspondence with client.- .40 $20.00 
June 24, 2008 Discussions with appraiser and 1.5 $262.50 
working on the exhibits. 
June 25, 2008 Discussions with appraiser and 1.0 $175.00 
working on exhibits 
June 30, 2008 Work on the objection to the 1.0 $175,00 
exhibits and witnesses, 
discussions with Kathy and 
discussion with R. Gaither about 
reviewing documents. 
July 1, 2008 Work on Affidavit of Attorney 2.0 $100.00 
Fees 
July 2, 2008 Work on Affidavit of Attorney 4.0 $200.00 
Fees 
6. The fees charged are reasonable for legal services in the 
area. 
7. The fees set forth herein were reasonable and necessary, 
and were billed to the Petitioner pursuant to a written fee 
agreement. The legal work included work by Clark B Allred and Brad 
Brotherson and their paralegals, Cheree Brotherson, Carrie Weight 
Debbie Reed and Melinda Palmer. Paralegals are used to reduce the 
costs to the client by doing research, document preparation, 
obtaining and providing information to the client and exhibit 
preparation. The firm has expended costs for filing fees, service 
fees, copies, witness fees and postage in this matter in the amount 
of $547.53. Clark B Allred has expended 73.60 hours at a rate of 
$165.00 - $175.00 per hour; Brad Brotherson has expended 2.6 hours 
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at a rate of $100.00; Melinda Palmer has expended 3.0 hours at a 
rate of $80.00 per hour; and the other paralegals have expended 
60.40 hours at a rate of $45.00 - $50.00 per hour. 
DATED this ' ( d a y of July, 2005. 
/ ^ 
ALLREB Sc\ McCLELLAN, P .C. 
A t t o r n e y ! f o r P e t i t i o n e r 
By; 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE 
) ss . 
) 
On the / day of July, 2008, personally appeared before me 
Clark B Allred, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
I w\TO-p^«f My Commission Expire* • \ > w / y ' July 28,2010 • 
State of Utah • 
Notary Public 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner herein and hereby certify 
that I served the attached AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY FEES on Respondent 
by fax and by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an 
envelope addressed to: 
RANDALL GAITHER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
15 9 WEST 3 00 SOUTH BROADWAY #105 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
(801)672-1162 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 7Lh 
day of July, 2008. 
CHEREE BROTHERSON 
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